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FBIS-SOV-95-115-S CONTENTS *15 June 1995*

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Possible Counters to NATO Expansion Viewed *[DELOVOY MIR 31 May]* 1
*Russian Banks, Merrill Lynch Join Forces To Attract Investors *[SEGODNYA 23 May]* 1
*Sanctions' Impact on FRY, Neighboring States Viewed *[DELOVOY MIR 31 May]* 6
*Chechen Radio Station in Krakow Viewed *[NOVOYE VREMYA Jun]* 9

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

Yeltsin's Motives for Vetoing Elections Law Viewed *[PRAVDA 26 May]* 12
*Prospects for Authoritarian Regime Discussed *[OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 11-17 May]* 13
*Presidential National Security Adviser Baturin Interviewed *[OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 11-17 May]* 15
*Experts Predict 'Future Ratings' for Russian Politicians *[DELOVOY MIR 26 May]* 18
*Roundup on Political Parties, Movements Taking Part in Elections *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 23 May]* 35
*'Our Home — Russia' Bloc's Goals Criticized *[OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 11-17 May]* 39
*Delay of Parliamentary Elections 'for Technical Reasons' Suggested *[OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 11-17 May]* 41
*Zhirinovskiy, Others Assess Chances of Forming Opposition Bloc *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 24 May]* 43
*Chernomyrdin's 'Russia Is Our Home' Party Dismissed *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 24 May]* 44
*One Year Later, Civic Accord Agreement Assessed *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 30 May]* 46
New Party's Prospects for Winning Doubtful *[MOSCOW NEWS 19-25 May]* 47
*Reasons for Adopting Law on Political Parties Outlined *[SEGODNYA 31 May]* 48
*Polevanov Criticizes Privatization of State Property *[SEGODNYA 30 May]* 50
*Gaydar Answers Critics of Economic Program *[DELOVOY MIR 27 May]* 53
*Head of General Affairs Department Interviewed *[OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 4-10 May]* 56
*Supreme Court Chairman on Development of Legal System *[IZVESTIYA 30 May]* 59
*New Academy To Promote 'Slavic-Eurasian Idea' *[PRAVDA 26 May]* 61

Media Issues

*Press Committee Head on New Anti-'Fascism' Law *[IZVESTIYA 6 Jun]* 62

Military & Space Issues

Duma Member Urges Delay in Ratifying Chemical Weapons Treaty *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 25 May]* 65
Commission To Declassify Nuclear Archives *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 7 Jun]* 67

Federal Assembly

*Quarterly Chronicle of Foreign Policy Activities *[DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK Apr]* 68

Regional Affairs

*Regional Authorities Create Own 'Free Customs Zone' *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 1 Jun]* 71
*Regions Begin Issuing Bonds To Finance Local Budgets *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 2 Jun]* .. 72
*Tatarstan Council's Likhachev on National, Regional Problems *[SEGODNYA 25 May]* 74
*Decree on Supporting, Organizing Deliveries to Far North *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 7 Jun]* 76
*Komi Oil Spill Scale, Aftermath, Cleanup Effort Examined *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 23 May]* 77
*Officials Comment on Region, Center Responsibilities *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 14 May]* ... 79
Likely Communist Victory Consequence Aired *[MOSCOW NEWS 19-25 May]* 81
*Local Administration Lawbreaking Detailed *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 19 May]* 82
*Necessary Measures To Prevent Religious Extremism Viewed *[SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI 17 May]* 83

CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan

Statehood Evolution, Crime, Power Analyzed *[MOSCOW NEWS 19-25 May]* 88

Possible Counters to NATO Expansion Viewed

954Q0210A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 31 May 95 p 7

[Article by Nikolay Kalintsev: What Could Counter NATO Expansion?

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] What should be done in the current situation, and what arguments could Russia use to prevent or slow down the already unfolding process of NATO reforming within new geographical and political boundaries? What real tools are available? What should be set in motion, and what methods should be rejected?

Answers to some of these difficult questions can be found in a report entitled Russia and NATO which has circulated extensively in Moscow foreign policy circles.

According to Sergey Karaganov, a Russian political scientist and Presidential Council member, the report contains a concept that is an alternative to NATO expansion. We must create a window of opportunity in order to establish close military and political cooperation with NATO and other Western organizations and with the strong Western states. We cannot cooperate with NATO while it states its intentions of expanding within the next few years. If NATO would postpone that decision for several years, we could create the window of opportunity and be able to make use of the interval thus gained.

It is emphasized, continued S. Karaganov, that though an expansion of NATO is not in Russias interests and moreover could become a destabilizing factor, Russia should not work against the West. It must work with the West, so that the latter will not make mistakes or opt for simple solutions, particularly since in the West as well there are powerful forces opposed to the expansion. or who at the very least are dubious of the appropriateness of such expansion and fear political repercussions.

The report also talks about thing that should not be done. Under no circumstances should talks be conducted with the West concerning compensation in return for NATO expansion, as that might only accelerate the process. By the same token, neither must we bluff and talk about countermeasures that would hit us harder than anyone else. For example, these would include expansion or redeployment of conventional armed forces. Also not allowed are statements that distort Russian intentions and Russias interests with regard to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, or that create a siege mentality. The report notes that one should bear in mind that NATO is a defensive alliance of democratic states which operates on the principle of consensus. That means that, firstly, it is incapable of large-scale offensive operations and, secondly, the nature of the alliance provides a wide range of opportunities to influence its development. Nor should we forget one of Russias fundamental geostrategic interests, i.e. its interest in good relations, if not a strategic association, with the leading Western countries and their associations, S. Karaganov emphasized.

In addition, the report proposes a number of alternative measures that could satisfy the legitimate aspirations of Central and Eastern European states to feel that they are secure and associated with the West and with Europe. This could include their accelerated admission to the European Union and the West European Union, the granting of bilateral security guarantees by Russia and NATO, or unilateral guarantees from NATO or the most important Western states.

It is also proposed that all discussion regarding NATO expansion or non-expansion be used to achieve Russias fundamental foreign policy goal, i.e. the creation of a Europe-wide collective security system. The report emphasizes that expansion is very likely on account of Chechnya and pressure from certain quarters in the West. However, analysis indicates that this is by no means inevitable and that in any case it is possible to achieve a window of opportunity, if we pursue an active policy.

*Russian Banks, Merrill Lynch Join Forces To Attract Investors

954E1028A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 23 May 95 p 7

[Article by Rustam Narzikulov: "'Capture Group' in Fight for Fourth Division of Capital: The Investors and the Enterprises Being Privatized Are Known; What Remains Is To Define the Middlemen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Last Giveaway**

There is a fairly simple underlying explanation for the tempestuous activity of commercial groups aspiring to a key role in "opening up" state packages of stocks in Russian enterprises.

The sale of state stocks is not simply another stage in the opportunities for getting rich quick that have been generously presented throughout the three and a half years of reform. It is, first of all, the stage with the greatest prospects for creating "money out of thin air," in comparison with which the initial concentration of capital on the exchanges (in 1990-1991, through the difference between free and fixed prices), in the banks (in 1990-1993 by means of obtaining centralized credits at a negative interest rate), and through successful voucher privatizers (in 1993-1994 by means of buying up undervalued shares in enterprises being privatized) will look like the mere prelude to a major stock game.

Second, the sale of state stocks is evidently the last stage in the division of former state property, after which the room for legitimate and outwardly respectable giveaways will narrow to the dimensions of the status—which is unreliable from a strategic viewpoint—of someone who has the authority to decide some question or other in an important state agency (it is clear that "illegitimate giveaways," i.e., the acquisition of openly criminal income, will not disappear on Russian territory in the foreseeable future).

Inasmuch as a truly major stock game is in the offing, the distinguishing feature of the fourth stage of "giveaways" is the formation of lobbying groups acting on behalf of "national capital" and claiming to protect Russian enterprises from being sold off at cut-rate prices. Such an organization of high-revenue operations was not characteristic of the three previous stages, if you don't count the short-term lobbying alliances formed for purposes of obtaining various sorts of privileged status (an authorized representative of the Central Bank, a government agent, etc.). Such alliances were always characterized by intense competition within a specific type of business.

Understandably, the group interest of today's aspirants to state stocks is not, of course, the protection of the domestic stock market against foreign investors but an attempt to act as middlemen in the sale of state stocks (it doesn't matter to whom; one could even sell them to the ostensibly condemned foreign investor) and obtain the right to acquire, on a priority basis, the juiciest pieces at artificially low prices. The game is worth the candle, and for the sake of a large profit one can even partially give up one's commercial sovereignty by entering into some sort of consortium.

SEGODNYA has already dwelled in detail on the attempt by one consortium to gain the support of the government and the president in the noble cause of protecting the domestic stock market (see SEGODNYA for 18 May 95). In today's issue we are offering readers materials on an alternative banking association ("alternative," in a manner of speaking, since some of the consortium's members simultaneously figure on the lists of other associations).

Sixteen in the Group, Not Counting Merrill Lynch

The idea of providing credit to the government in exchange for transferring state stocks to commercial banks "to be managed in trust" was made public for the first time in early April. For example, in a letter addressed to First Vice-Premier Anatoliy Chubays, such a proposal was presented by Mr. Potanin, president of the ONEKSIM Bank, who in this case was acting as chairman of a working group of a banking consortium. In a letter to Chubays, Mr. Potanin for the first time declared the banks' lack of commercial interest as a dominant purpose: "The consortium participants' principal interest in granting the state privatization credit consists not in earning interest on it but in a desire not to allow the Russian securities market to leave the borders of the Russian Federation." According to Mr. Potanin, "the exodus of the national securities market" would be accomplished with the use of American or global deposit receipts (such as ADRs and GDRs).

In the letter to Mr. Chubays (the author cites the 30 March 1995 government session where the consortium's proposals were discussed), six banks figure as members of the consortium's working group: ONEKSIM, Inkombank, Imperial, the Capital Savings Bank, the International Financial Company, and Menatep. Subsequently Inkombank, Imperial and the International Financial Company no longer appeared on the list of those aspiring to state stocks, while only Sergey Rodionov, the chairman of the board of Imperial, publicly declared his bank's decision not to participate in the consortium.

On 4 April, that is, just four days after the government session, a group of banks with a totally different makeup (from those on the first list, only the Capital Savings Bank belonged to this group) held its first meeting under the leadership of a little-known Russian Government organization—the Working Group for Guiding International Financial Projects, under the chairmanship of the Russian Government (group director, V. K. Zantsev). Attending the meeting were representatives of Mosbiznesbank, Vneshtorgbank, the Savings Bank, Promstroybank, the Capital Savings Bank, the Renaissance Bank, Tokobank, Russian Credit, and Menatep.

Judging from the meeting's materials, the "Nine" banks, unlike the "Six," did not complain about the intrigues of foreign investors but openly endorsed and deemed timely the initiative "to form financial mechanisms in Russia for entering world private-capital markets." The meeting reaffirmed the "readiness of commercial banks to cooperate with the Russian Government in matters pertaining to the implementation of national investment programs involving the attraction of financial resources from the world private-capital market."

Among the other matters discussed at the meeting, one that is noteworthy is the curious point whose significance, as it will later turn out, goes far beyond the bounds of a single particular problem—"the participation of the international financial company Merrill

Lynch and other private international financial institutions in attracting investment resources for Russia."

The next meeting of the Working Group for Guiding International Financial Projects was held on 26 April. This time 16 banks attended the meeting—the Nine were joined by Agroprombank, National Credit, Unikombank, ONEKSIM, MAPO Bank, Rosmedbank, and Mosstroybank.

The meeting resolved to form a Russian Banking Union "in support of government investment programs" and to establish a Russian Foreign Banking Union "with offices in London and other cities of the world for the financial support of projects and provision of guaranteed terms for investments directed to Russia, as well as for carrying out transactions with Russian securities on the international stock markets."

The Merrill Lynch investment company once again figures in the meeting's materials. The banks decided to "reaffirm the decision for the commercial banks present to jointly cooperate and participate in financing investment projects determined by the Russian Government with the participation of the Merrill Lynch company and other international organizations."

The same 16 banks are also represented in a subsequent document pertaining to activities involving the provision of credit to the government in exchange for state stocks: a Protocol of Intentions of the Working Group of Banks (for some reason, participants in the "group" insistently avoid the previously established name of "consortium"), dated 12 May 1995.

The Protocol of Intentions is signed by Mr. Bazhanov, president of the Interbank Center for Project Financing Joint-Stock Company, who, judging from the protocol, is responsible for preparing further consortium documents. The document on the consortium's makeup, signed by Mr. Bazhanov, lists not just 16 but 18 banks; the Bank for Property Development and the Moscow Industrial Bank have been added to their number. The document, however, is dated 10 May—two days before the Protocol of Intentions, in which 16 consortium participants continue to figure. So the latter figure should evidently be taken as the official one (as of today, of course).

Participants in the Working Group of Banks That Signed the 12 May 1995 Protocol of Intentions

Mosbiznesbank (V. N. Bukato)

Vneshtorgbank (Yu. I. Poletayev)
Savings Bank (V. K. Ispovernikov)
Promstroybank (Yu. A. Balagurov)
Capital Bank (A. N. Latyukov)
Renaissance Bank (Yu. S. Moskovskiy)
Agroprombank (Yu. V. Trushin)
Tokobank (V. K. Yakunin)
Russian Credit Bank (A. V. Kulikov)
Menatep (A. B. Yashechkin)
National Credit Bank (O. V. Boyko)
Unikombank (N. N. Tokar)
Oneksimbank (V. D. Prokhorov)
MAPObank (Ye. N. Ananyev)
Rosmedbank (S. I. Vybornov)
Mosstroybank (M. I. Zhuravleva)

The Evolution of Ideas: From Fighting World Capital to Serving as Middleman in Attracting Foreign Investors

The big game that the aspirants to state stocks are playing requires powerful ideological substantiation. It may be that the ideological shield in the fight for stocks represents, in general, a key lobbying argument, since the banks can on no account aspire to purchase state stocks for MONEY—no consortium could put together the necessary amount of money, even if it united all 2,000 Russian banks under its banner.

For Russian investors, who are incomparably poorer than foreign ones, participation in the stock game is possible on the conditions of either the direct reallocation of state stocks on their behalf, or of their serving as middlemen in the sale of stocks to foreign investors.

The first option for getting involved in "monetary" privatization is simple, if not primitive. It entails, for all practical purposes, the expropriation of state property by successful individual lobbyists. The ideology of reallocation is, correspondingly, equally simple: better to let our own people grab it than to let foreigners buy it up. That is the idea that was put forward by the first consortium (the Six), on whose behalf Mr. Potanin declared a determination to block the "departure of the Russian securities market beyond the borders of the Russian Federation."

In reality, however, the original author of the stock-confiscation idea was Aleksandr Zaveryukha, the vice-premier of the government (some experts claim that Mr. Zaveryukha is backed by a major Russian bank), who demanded early this year that the government turn over blocks of state stocks in many of Russia's largest enterprises (see table [not reproduced]) to Interagrofond [expansion unknown]. Aleksandr Zaveryukha is the chairman of the Interagrofond, on behalf of which he asked Anatoliy Chubays to have the State Committee for the Management of State Property to "instruct" the Federal Property Fund to turn over blocks of stock to

Interagrofond "at the par value determined at the time of their issue."

Judging from the fact that Interagrofond did not become Russia's largest property owner, the first vice-premier strongly disliked Mr. Zaveryukha's plans.

The Working Group of Banks is acting considerably more cautiously. The motives for which the Nine, which subsequently turned into the "Group of 16," came to advocate the direct opposite (the group declared: "to develop and implement a concept of the financial infrastructure and mechanisms that would guarantee a favorable investment climate for foreign private investments in Russia's economy") are unknown. Perhaps the government resisted the openly nonequivalent exchange of stocks for the banks' credit; perhaps the authorities' position was influenced by large foreign investment companies; or perhaps the consortium, having learned from Aleksandr Zaveryukha's experiment, preferred to play a more subtle combination to advance its cause.

In any event, now the consortium is trying to get the government to grant it the status of a general middleman in monetary privatization, which, however, would give the banks themselves the right to purchase shares if the terms of purchase seemed favorable to them.

In the aforementioned Protocol of Intentions, the banks declared the need, "with the assistance of the Russian Government, to establish a Russian Overseas Banking House," whose activities would be "aimed at supporting the government's investment and financial policy."

This same idea is reflected in the draft memorandum "On the Creation of a Bank Pool" that was prepared by the Working Group of Banks, which, signed by the government representatives, would indicate support for the consortium.

The Lynching of the Russian Stock Market

It has been noted above that the Working Group of Banks intends to take part "in the implementation of government investment programs jointly with the Merrill Lynch company." The preference the banks give to precisely this foreign financial company is no accident.

Last 14 December the Russian premier and the chairman of the Merrill Lynch board of directors signed a protocol of intentions according to which the company is assigned a special role in attracting foreign investments.

On 14 April 1995 Winthrop H. Smith, chairman of the board of directors of Merrill Lynch International Inc., sent Viktor Chernomyrdin a letter of agreement in which he confirmed the company's readiness "to serve as an international financial agent for the Russian Federation," and set forth the terms for Merrill Lynch's working with the Russian Government.

Mr. Smith proposed that Russia use a number of international financial instruments for the purpose of entering international financial markets (see table). Noteworthy on the list of these instruments is a project for issuing convertible corporate bonds, the obtaining of foreign investments in which it is very closely bound with state stocks, which would play the role of a security.

Last year the Merrill Lynch company was 107th on the list of the largest American corporations. Its specialization is financial services. Based on final figures for 1993, the market value of Merrill Lynch was $8.08 billion; its profits for the year were $1.394 billion; its assets (1992 figures) were $107024 billion. Figures on volume of services are not available.

Financial Instruments Proposed by Merrill Lynch for Placement of Russian Securities in World Markets

Instrument	Period	Commission
Ruble issues of state short-term bonds offered to foreign investors in the form of Global Certificates of Deposit. At present, it is expected that they would have a one-year maturity.	Several issues would be made in course of a year; first issue expected in first quarter of 1995.	Russian Federation would not pay commission.
Eurobonds offered on international basis.	Initial issue expected in second quarter of 1995 following payoff of 8.88% issue of USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activities in German marks, and after presentation for international investors is made by Russian Federation government's representatives	1.5-2.5%, will be determined in course of talks depending on length of maturity, overall amount, currency and market conditions
Financing connected with deliveries of goods, including gold-related financial instruments, gold swaps, and financing connected with deliveries of gas	Initial issue expected in second or third quarters of 1995	0.875-3%, depending on type of financing
Convertible corporate bonds	Initial issue expected in second half of 1995 depending on (among other things) the availability of financial reports of participating companies prepared in accordance with international financial standards	2.5-5%, will be determined in the course of negotiations depending on the total amount of stocks shares, participating companies, and market conditions as of the date of offer

The letter goes on to say that Merrill Lynch would earn ordinary agent's commissions and "commissions for the placement for sale or placement of securities by mutual consent."

According to the letter, Russia was supposed to pay Merrill Lynch $250,000 by 1 May 1995, "toward costs sustained in connection with this letter," and as a prepayment for future work.

To supplement the commissions indicated in the table, Russia is, "within reasonable limits," supposed to reimburse the company for its current costs sustained in the course of Merrill Lynch's fulfillment of its commitments regarding the placement of securities.

One of the key points in the letter of agreement consists in the terms and procedures for Merrill Lynch's use of government information. The company insists on obtaining, primarily, patent information, i.e., information turned over by government experts on a strictly confidential basis.

In the event of their fulfillment of their obligations as financial agent, Merrill Lynch and its subsidiary companies are supposed to receive the "right to retain all patent information and to use that patent information without incurring any obligations vis-a-vis the Russian Federation."

According to the letter, any type of legal proceedings fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Great Britain.

Even a brief survey of the document attests to the extremely attractive commercial prospects opened up to Merrill Lynch, and not just the financial prospects related to serving as a broker in world financial markets but also the prospect of possessing a huge mass of information that is in itself a valuable asset.

The editors do not possess any documents containing evidence of an alliance between Merrill Lynch and the banking consortium. For now, one can speak only of the most profound respect with which the Working Group of Banks treats the government's financial agent, demonstrating a readiness for direct cooperation with it.

According to SEGODNYA's information, the letter of agreement sent to the government by Winthrop Smith more than a month ago has not yet been signed by Viktor Chernomyrdin. It is entirely possible that strong pressure is being exerted on the premier by Russian industrial companies that do not want to reconcile themselves with the notion of letting one American company and one Russian consortium serve as exclusive intermediaries in their own privatization.

*Sanctions' Impact on FRY, Neighboring States Viewed

954Q0209A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 31 May 95 p 7

[Article by Yelena Martynova, DELOVOY MIR correspondent, Belgrade, under rubric "Analysis," on "Foreign Economics" page: "Sanctions in Yugoslavia: Myth and Reality — Three years ago, on 31 May 1992, the country's economy was given a death sentence."]

[FBIS Translated Text]

'The Deceased Broke Into a Sweat Before Death...'

During the first months after imported goods and raw materials ceased arriving in the country, the airports and seaports emptied, currency receipts at Yugoslavian banks from abroad ceased (and in the country tens of thousands of people used to receive a currency pension that had been earned in the United States, Australia, and West European countries), and the foreign accounts of Yugoslavia itself were seized, it seemed that the goal would be achieved. It was assumed in the West that the dissatisfied people would go out into the streets and overthrow the socialist government which — many people slyly, and others completely genuinely — considered to be the culprit for all the misfortunes in the Balkans. Western politicians were counting how many days Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic had remaining until his resignation.

Possibly, if at that moment he had had any sensible opponents with a realistic and attractive program, those expectations would have been justified. But the opposition in Yugoslavia (even to this very day) is considerably less formalized than even in Russia. The man in the street is not attracted either by the slogans in the style of "Serbia is the homeland of elephants," or by the promises to do everything just like Uncle Sam says, or by the vague appeal "Decently!" (in a situation in which the opponents in the opposition counted behind the representatives of the party that had advanced that slogan a rather large number of Greeks). The average statistical Yugoslav understands even less why he suddenly has to fling mud at the partisans who liberated the country from fascism and has to praise to the skies the specters of the Ravna Gora movement that had collaborated with the Hitlerites.

From the moment of the introduction of sanctions, there have already been two elections. Twice the socialists emerged as the victors, the second time with an even larger number of votes in the parliament.

Most importantly, no one had presented a solid economic program. When Yugoslavia was experiencing the black days of galloping inflation, empty store shelves, and lines of people waiting since the previous night for bread and milk, the opposition unceasingly criticized the government, accusing it of getting rich from the superinflation. "It shouldn't be like this," everyone said. But no one said how it should be.

Meanwhile, if one measures the situation by the quantity of social product, Yugoslavia has been turned back 26 years in its development. Even if the sanctions are removed immediately, the economists assume, the country will feel their consequences until the year 2011, and the total losses are estimated to be the insane figure of $147.3 billion. The magic of large numbers always casts a spell, but one can see their even more monstrous meaning in the example of "one separately taken" Yugoslavian family. The Mihailovic family consists of the mother, a linguist and writer; father, a retired diplomat; and daughter, professor at the Belgrad Conservatory. In December 1993 they were getting ready to greet the New Year by scraping the mold off of pieces of bread. An older daughter — a scientist working in England —could not help them in any way. It was not only because Resolution 757 of the United Nations Security Council made a money order impossible by including not only the state, but also every citizen of it, among those to be punished. The resolution stated that "all states must prevent the sale or supplying on the part of citizens of their state, either from their own territory or with the use of the fleet under its own flag or aviation of all types, of goods and output... with the exception of medical products and food products... to any legal entity or individual in the SRU [SR Yugoslavia — FRY, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]." Moreover, countries neighboring on Yugoslavia (it was necessary to learn how to carry out a new type of shopping trip with the "south": the purchase of essential products and articles abroad, since the distances are not great), in the person of their customs officials, also worked to tighten up the embargo conditions. Germany took such a creative approach to the practice of applying sanctions that... it did not allow Yugoslavs who had died on its territory to be shipped back to their homeland for burial. If it had not been for Russia, which offered Yugoslavs our cemetery in Germany, it is completely unclear how the problem would have been resolved.

The average earnings were $6, maximum $20, and pension $1.50. But good-quality meat cost $6 a kilogram. Add to that two million unemployed in a country of 10 million and enterprises that are idle for a month, then operate a month at 20-30 percent of their production capacities.

Torn bed sheets in the children's wards of hospitals and the catastrophically higher children's mortality rate, and doctors who are on the brink of insanity because their patients are dying from lack of the elementary medication... The decrease in the birth rate, the mass emigration of talented youth, the increase in suicides... That is the real face of the sanctions.

In a word, it would seem that the country that had not chosen for its president the person whom they wanted to see "there" is approaching death in gigantic strides.

Miracle Worker

Even if tomorrow the new Yugoslavian dinar falls down the inflationary chasm, its creator — Dragoslav Avramovic, head of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, doctor of economics, and professor — will be preserved in people's memory as a magician who returned to money its true value, returned goods to stores, and returned to people a more or less decent income and the hope that the country will be able to withstand the present situation.

The announcement of the introduction into effect, as of 24 January 1994, of the new dinar with a "price" of one German mark during the days when the inflation had reached more than 300 percent a day, caused only weak smiles. A rather active lobby of currency speculators was supposed to "sink" the new dinar in only a few days. Despite a number of outright provocational acts, they have not yet succeeded in doing so.

The details of the Avramovic program were not known even to certain members of the government. In a country where fabulous fortunes are being made in the smuggling and speculation that were engendered by the sanctions, the government had no need to be especially frank. So the preparation for the implementation of the program was carried out long before the government began to carry it out, and it was rather serious preparation. The agencies that were involved included the law-enforcement agencies, which managed to grab a decent number of crooks by the arm. Another agency was the Committee on Commodity Reserves, which collected a reserve of food products and basic consumer goods that was sufficient for reacting instantaneously to the attempts to raise the prices of a particular commodity without justification. Another agency that contributed its share was Yugoslavia's Mint — Topcider. But the last-mentioned did so by... hiding for a prolonged period of time and ceasing to print empty paper currency.

That, properly speaking, is what lay at the basis of the monetary reform: not a single dinar would be printed without currency cover or a golden "backup." In February, people mistrustfully saw the stores filling up and the prices falling; in March they were surprised that the wages had risen slightly; in April they made long lines to the markets for the first fresh vegetables; in May, to the accompaniment of the passionate incantations of the opposition that the program had failed, would definitely fail, and absolutely had to fail, they began planning their summer vacations; and in June-August the sunburnt bodies gladdened the eyes of workers in hotels and cafes on the Black Sea coast.

The Rumors of Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated...

The government achieved an increase in wages and production and the number of unemployed was reduced. In 1994 the government succeeded in finding jobs for a quarter of a million persons, by implementing 535 different regional employment programs.

For example, an enterprise that gives a job to a young specialist is freed for a two-year period from paying taxes on his wages (incidentally, 98 percent). Fewer people will be leaving the country, and that is more beneficial to the country. Much is also being done by the development of private small and medium-sized business — during a four-year period the number of persons working in that sphere has quadrupled.

Yugoslavia's industry, half of which had been tied to imported raw materials, during the first year of the sanctions literally was being strangled without them. In the next year the breathing began to level off — approximately 3000 different commodities that previously had been exclusively imported are now being made at home. Many types of raw material are being produced. The freeing of customs on those raw-material items that are necessary for domestic production has whipped up their import. The well known expression "if you want to live, know how to hustle," in the example of this country, proves the entire justification of that expression. Whereas, for example, the need for equipment used to be satisfied by 56.7 percent at the expense of import, today 80.7 percent of the necessary equipment is made in FR Yugoslavia.

Since the beginning of the introduction of sanctions, the recession in industrial production in the country every month has been an average of 0.9 percent, including 1.9 percent for the production of producer goods. Since the beginning of the application of the program of monetary reconstruction, industrial production began to grow monthly by 2.1 percent, and the production of producer goods by 3.8 percent. In particular, the new economic program has led to the intensive growth of the volumes of metal processing and to the production of nonferrous metals and certain types of food products.

Last year one billion dinars was invested in the development of private entrepreneurship. Thus, approximately 5000 economically operating entities were built or are in the stage of completion. Radoje Djukic, minister of entrepreneurship in the government of Serbia, has proposed creating a state investment fund with capital of no less than 150 million dinars, which would make it possible to provide credit for 3000 programs annually. The credit would be given for two years — or a maximum of three —with annual payment of 10 percent of the total amount of the loan and with solid support. Then, Mr. Djukic assumes, the private sector will be able to provide jobs within the next five years for 800,000 more workers.

But It Is Necessary To Check the Pulse

The first attack on the dinar happened in July of last year. Many enterprises at that time began to raise the prices of their articles. Without any special reason, simply the average wages constituted at that time approximately 200 dinars (equivalent to 200 German marks), and the population's purchasing power rose — why not try to get a bit more? At that same time, as a result of recreational trips being taken by Yugoslavians to foreign countries, the banks began experiencing problems with the exchanging of currency — the dinar wavered slightly and lost value by 0.2 percent. The government attempted to force the enterprises to lower the prices, promising to apply punitive economic measures to the obstinate ones. The timid enterprises reconsidered their price lists and lowered them, but there did not prove to be too many that wanted to do that. Then it also became obvious that many enterprises — basically those included in the group of cumbersome "searchlights of workers' self-government" and "flagships of socialism" — were not planning to return their credit. There was nothing from which to do so. Because they had taken the credit for the purpose of developing production, but had spent it all on wages, that is, putting it more simply, they had eaten it all up. So they asked for more. Avramovic said, "No!" The "monsters" were offended and began to exert pressure through their people in the government. Avramovic threatened to resign. No additional credit was given, but all these factors, taken in their totality, led to a situation in which the dinar in the black market has a value of half the German mark.

The famous "black weekend" in March of this year was an attempt to "rock the boat" even more. The government's endurance led to a situation in which, within a period of several days, it proved to be possible to be victorious over the speculative rise of currency, and the currency returned to its previous positions. But the threat of "large shocks" has not been completely removed. The "culprits of triumph" have not yet been founded, and it would seem that they have strong protectors in the corridors of power. But the price rise that practically all the industrialists hastened to announce did not come true. The state once again issued an ultimatum demanding the return of prices to the old level, but this time its threatening speeches intimidated a still smaller number of people. On the average, however, during the period between the two "ultimatums" prices rose by 38.7 percent. The level of wages from January through March was "frozen." The government feels that it will be necessary to monitor that level even longer. On the one hand, this reduces the public's purchasing capacity, and consequently lowers its standard of living, and, on the other hand, restrains the growth of the inflationary spiral. So it is necessary to choose which of the two evils is the "prettier" one. But there is no time left for reflecting: in March the average wage was 272 dinars, and in April, 292.

The Economics Institute warns: future months promise that the inflationary pressure will be even stronger. Radoje Kontic, Yugoslavia's prime minister, also agrees with this. During one of his public statement he stated that things will be more difficult for us this year than they were last year.

The government has begun implementing the second stage of Doctor Avramovic's program. It will be guided by the documents prepared by a group of experts headed by their coordinator Dragoslav Avramovic. This is a project for remodeling the system of wages, support of pensioners and disabled individuals, the tax system, the financial system, and an investment program.

The government has noted that the chief deterrent to the complete execution of all the points in the program is the sanctions.

Yugoslavia Is Not the Only Country Being Hampered

The Balkan countries met the three-year sanctions with a demarche: they sent the United Nations Security Council a collective letter (Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Romania, Ukraine, and Moldavia) demanding the rejection as soon as possible of this method of exerting political pressure on Yugoslavia. Macedonia is writing its own independent message. Russia has repeatedly stated that it is favor of immediately canceling them, especially since all the conditions of Resolution 757 of the United Nations Security Council were carried out long ago. Romania says that it has already lost $9 billion because of the execution of the sanction terms; Bulgaria, more than $8 billion; Greece, more than $2 billion; Hungary, $2 billion; Ukraine, $4 billion; and Russia, according to certain estimates, more than $10 billion. The total losses caused by the sanctions to the Black Sea and Danube regions is no less than $50 billion.

Hungary is losing its patience: it has repeatedly heard compliments because of the firm fulfillment of the embargo, but has not got one penny of compensation for this. The experience of Hungarian industrialists says that only one-tenth of the applications are returned from the United Nations Committee on Sanctions with a positive resolution. Thus, in 1994 they asked for authorization to import goods with a total value of $1.5 billion, but received authorization for only $27 million.

Recently Bulgaria had returned to it all the applications for importing into Yugoslavia marble, granite, hops, plastic packaging for food products and medical goods, as well as... flowers! One would still like to know why flowers cannot be shipped from Bulgaria, but Yugoslavian raspberries can be shipped to Germany.

Public-affairs journalist Tomislav Krosovic assumes that the sanctions were introduced in accordance with the principle "we write one thing, but we have two things in mind": officially, they are against FR Yugoslavia, but actually they are with the purpose of converting all the Balkans and the southeast of Europe into a kind of political and economic colony, a "garbage dump" where the "developed" countries can dump their radioactive waste products and where harmful production entities will develop. Of all the Balkan countries, only Albania has stated that it considers the sanctions to be necessary. We would think so! Smuggling petroleum into Yugoslavia is the only method for feeding a good third of the 80,000 inhabitants of the Lake Scutari area. Throughout Albania, 100,000 people are living "from oil." How, then, can the government of this country, the poorest one in Europe, have a different point of view? So packaging the situation in the words about human rights or other eloquent speeches in which it wraps this frankly expressed economic interest is only for naive ears.

[Editorial note] Today, when FR Yugoslavia has closed its borders with the Bosnian Serbs and has recognized the plan of the Contact Group as being a suitable basis for negotiation, there are no foundations for delaying the cancellation of the sanctions. Just as there are no foundations for failing to recall that the same resolution prescribed to Croatia the withdrawal of its regular troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it has not done to this day. But today, at least, is it obvious that the representatives of certain countries are measuring this situation with a double measuring stick. The United States asserts that it will not be ready to remove the sanctions finally until after Yugoslavia carries out an additional series of U.S. desires that are linked with other problems, in particular, with those into which you cannot poke your nose without interfering in that country's internal affairs. Will the emissaries of other countries to the United Nations have sufficient resolve to explain to their American partner: by artificially delaying the sanctions, you are discrediting the United Nations itself as an institution. Or is it yielding to the principle "this might mean that we will destroy the peace, but we shall perpetrate injustice"?

*Chechen Radio Station in Krakow Viewed

954Q0208A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian Jun 95 No 22, [signed to press 30 May 95] pp 30-31

[Article by Vitaliy Ganyushkin: "The Chechen Flag in Krakow—Will Radio Free Caucasus Ever Begin Broadcasting From the Polish City of Krakow?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our group of Russian representatives of both broadcast and print journalism had been invited by the Stefan Batory Fund in Warsaw, one of the "subsidiary enterprises" of the omnipresent Soros. The fund's capabilities proved truly unlimited: in just a week we were able to have substantial interaction with more than 20 leading representatives of current Polish public life, beginning with Stanislaw Lem and Adam Michnik and ending with Prime Minister Josef Oleksy and the president of the Polish Republic himself, Lech Walesa. I will talk about these meetings later. Now let us take up the most timely subject—Chechnya—because another round of Russo-Polish squabbles has developed over this subject.

Speaking Among Ourselves, Russian to Russian

Coming out of the Royal Hotel in Krakow in the morning, we saw a poster on a column: "Oleksy, don't come back!" It said a protest demonstration against the prime minister's visit to Moscow would take place at a certain time. This was two days after Victory Day. The poster showed the Polish prime minister in a degrading pose before Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin. Some student society was organizing the demonstration in support of free Chechnya.

It was not a topic on our program, but it piqued our interest greatly and we asked our kind hosts to arrange for us to meet these young people. It was done. At the meeting a very likable young man, their leader Pawel Wujnacki, a history student at Jagiella University, told us everything: in academic circles the Russian war in Chechnya is considered criminal; they have already organized 15 demonstrations in the spirit of "Russian imperialism, hands off free Chechnya!" and they are collecting money for humanitarian convoys and signatures on protest documents.

We also learned that in addition to this student center there is in Krakow an official Chechen Information Center (for brevity we will call it the CIC). Pawel showed us the flag of the Ichkeriya Chechen Republic, which was waving in one of the windows on the main square of Krakow.

At first we thought that the local Chechens would hardly want to talk with their Russian countrymen; possibly it might even be a clandestine operation. It was nothing of the sort. Likable, intelligent people greeted us with coffee and tea and talked with us comfortably, without any concealment or trickery, it seemed. It turned out that these Chechens are special; they are completely critical of their own general (Dudayev) too. Tamara Mazayeva, former minister of culture, left the government in protest against its course. They were, however, undivided in one thing: their attitude toward the Russian adventure in Chechnya.

A Microphone From Solidarity

The CIC is a kind of offspring of the war. The group of Chechen intellectuals came here, to Krakow, last year with a perfectly peaceful, humanitarian mission: to set up an Islamic information center. Then the Chechen war broke out. Their intentions changed abruptly. Tamara Mazayeva expressed this attitude: "Our homes are burning and we have to do something to put out the fire."

Of course, the Chechnya-Russia debate unfolded at our meeting too. Chingiskhan Zubayrayev, president of the center and a member of the presidium of the Congress of the Chechen People, said that the Chechens are resisting so desperately in order to gain time in the hope that power in Russia will change hands. In general, the hosts and the guests did not disagree on the proposition that the operation of the Russian pseudo-patriots and power mongers to conquer a "fraternal" Russian republic is stupid, a terrible idea which could only develop in greatly overheated minds.

There were also powerful nuances in our discussion. The Chechens admitted, although reluctantly, that from the beginning it was never a question of seceding from Russia. Then we asked, in that case why didn't anyone in the Chechen leadership explain this, for really, that is why the fighting broke out. For example, why didn't Chechnya, having reared up, direct its gaze to the East of Russia where Shamiyev in Tatarstan offers an example of a civilized divorce from Mother Russia which has worked, at least so far? This set off an uproar among the Chechens, and the question was simply left hanging in the air of our mutual miniature civil war.

We visited the CIC at the height of the sensation caused by the diplomatic move just made by Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin, who protested strongly and even expressed indignation at the intention of the CIC to put its own radio station, Radio Free Caucasus, on the air. As our hosts at the meeting told us, their intention is absolutely firm and has the full support of the authorities in Warsaw. Those authorities begin from the idea that the free city of Krakow has become for Chechnya something like it was at one time for the Polish Solidarity, which was operating underground then, or like Brussels. This parallel even has a strange material manifestation: the equipment for Radio Free Caucasus was inherited from Solidarity, which at one time got it illegally from Brussels.

Why is it Krakow in particular (the second capital of the Polish Republic, and the apostolic capital) that finds itself at the epicenter of the latest Russian-Chechen ruckus? This was explained to us by representatives of the Polish authorities who took part in the meeting; their city has always been a dissident one and even the communist authorities could not completely break its spirit. Through all the decades of the Polish People's Republic, resistance to totalitarianism, muffled but sometimes vocal, was growing. It is natural that Radio Free Caucasus could feel more at home in freedom-loving Krakow. Incidentally, during the war many Polish cities have become sister cities to Chechen cities by concluding the corresponding agreements. There are more than 30 Polish citizens among the founders of the CIC itself. The capital to finance its activities is formed from both private donations and various public funds, charity organizations, and partially from the city budget.

In short, as the leaders of the CIC told us, things are going fine, and all they have left to do is get the license to set up the radio station. As we soon learned, however, things are not quite so simple.

President Walesa Spoke With Us 'in Shirtsleeves'

The meeting with President Lech Walesa was the final stage of our marathon across the political map of present day Poland. I will try to tell about it, and about the others, later. For now I want to tell what relates to the subject of Chechnya. Our minister of foreign affairs, Andrey Kozyrev, added fuel to the fire already lit by our Duma speaker (who, incidentally, also expressed a fear that the launching of the radio station could seriously complicate Russo-Polish relations) when Kozyrev let it be known that there was a possible threat to the recently concluded Russo-Polish interstate agreement.

How could we help but draw the Polish president himself into such a gentlemanly dialogue? Shortly before this meeting, in other circumstances, I (a veteran expert on Poland, I had once worked in the country for almost eight years) reminded my fellow journalists of a certain Polish custom that flourished, especially in the recent days of "indivisible friendship," when at every Russo-Polish meeting someone would suggest: "Well comrades, now let's talk 'in shirtsleeves.'" Then they would set the official record aside and a normal, more or less frank, conversation would begin.

I decided to use this takeoff to give a little help to Andrey Cherkizov, the well known lead announcer of EKHO MOSKVYY, who was traveling with our group. Lech Walesa liked this apparently forgotten custom so much (by nature he is a very animated man) that he immediately took off his coat, which left him in elegant suspenders. Our "emissary" did the same (although with the one difference that he was not wearing elegant suspenders).

Now for the essential point, the matter of Radio Free Caucasus. The president said that as far as he knows, Polish law does not contemplate such broadcasting across the border, that he himself suspects that the special services had a part here in order to create one more source of friction between Poland and Russia, and that he, the president, had ordered his special services to look into this. I should also note that Polish Prime Minister Josef Oleksy, who met with us, threw light on one other aspect of the situation. In his opinion, Kozyrev's statement was premature, since the Polish side had not adopted any decisions. The very sharp reaction by Moscow, however, commands that it be taken seriously. Whether a Chechen radio station in Polish territory is such an important matter in the broad context of the CSCE and actual Polish-Russian relations remains a question, but no matter what decision is made, it will in no case be adopted under pressure from Moscow.

When we talked with the leaders of the Chechen Information Center, they were just making photocopies of the decree adopted the previous day by their board of directors concerning I. Rybkin's statement. The decree naturally denies all the slanderous accusations, especially those addressed at the Krakow authorities, and among other things states that the accusations concerning the anti-Russian orientation of a non-existent radio station are incomprehensible and thus do not deserve comment.

However the CIC plainly is not readying itself for local activity. They intend to broadcast in all the languages of the Caucasus and to all the Caucasus, including the independent states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. One more hot spot—political, legal, ideological, for Europe at least—on one side is Helsinki and on the other is Groznyy. From there—from Warsaw, Krakow, from Poland, which even in fraternal times tried to lean toward the West, toward Europe—it was somehow more palpable, more uncomfortable. How tight the Helsinki jacket, the smoking jacket in general, is for us Russians: it catches under the arms and the buttons are falling off. All these reactions of ours, often inappropriate to the situation, are in the spirit of banning, closing, jamming. Why not, for example, ban the cavorting of all those satellites and every kind of photograph taken from them over the territory of our native land?

Andrey Cherkizov, as a radio broadcasting specialist it seems, got involved in the situation with the CIC and its radio station. In any case he remained in Poland for a while, and when others had flown back and were in Sheremetyevo Airport, the loudspeaker called for Mr. Cherkizov, arriving on flight such and such from Warsaw, to go to the information office.

Perhaps it was about a car or something. I don't know, I just don't. Strange things happen in our country.

Political Issues

Yeltsin's Motives for Vetoing Elections Law Viewed

954Q0194A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 May 95 pp 1, 2

[Article by Viktor Trushkov: "The Kremlin's Weathervane Right: What President's Veto Threatens"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidential veto that has been floating in thin air has come to earth. B. Yeltsin refused to sign the law on State Duma elections despite the fact that over two-thirds of the deputies voted for him in the lower chamber. What does the head of state think is wrong with it?

First is the planned distribution of seats among representatives elected by federal and single-mandate districts. He insists that one-third of the State Duma deputies be elected by party lists, while the law has stipulated 50 percent. The Kremlin's argument is this: nobody knows the current parties, random people are receiving mandates, etc. It would seem, as the poet said, that "everything looks the same; everything is like what is or may be..." Yes, and Soviet tradition here is such that from 1936 to 1990 we voted only by single-mandate territorial districts.

Besides, Yeltsin's current conclusions are not original; they were all expressed by the left opposition when the Kremlin was preparing an election decree after the House of Soviets shooting. Then it was the president and his circle who stood their ground: half of the deputies should be elected by party lists. The regime hoped that the shock after the blood of October 1993 would be the best environment for a parliamentary victory by the "democrats." Moreover, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was not allowed into the election process until the last minute, but shock didn't help either. The Duma ended up without rights, but not entirely without teeth.

The national mood for the coming winter obviously scares today's lords of the moment. According to all the public opinion surveys, the communists come out the leaders. To counteract them, construction has begun on Chernomyrdin's "house," but the Kremlin, evidently, has little faith in its success, or it would have created the opportunity for its offspring to receive the maximum mandates by party list.

Regarding the statement that Duma parties are little known, this shows obvious cunning. Of course, the majority of the 235 organizations possessing the right to nominate candidates for deputies to the lower chamber are unknown to the population, but let us recall 1993. At the beginning, not all, but only 34 associations nominated candidates to the lower chamber; of those, only 12 were written into the election ballot, and seven received a vote of confidence.

Now, about "random" deputies. First, the well-known parties have sufficiently well-known figures. If only one-third of the deputies in today's Duma end up elected by federal district, then such famous parliamentarians as V. Denisenko of Russia's Choice, ministers V. Danilov-Danilyan, Ye. Sidorov, B. Saltykov, V. Ryzhkov, the reporter on the NDR [Russian Peoples Democrats], Yabloki [YABloko party] V. Lysenko, Ye. Ambartsumov, V. Shostakovskiy, press personality S. Stankevich, and others will end up without mandates. Second, many more little-known people were elected by single mandate districts than people on party lists.

Let us not forget this detail: increasing the number of single-mandate districts will lead to an unavoidable change in their borders. I think that Duma Deputy S. Baburin was correct in observing that "one of the tasks of this crisis is to move toward a restructuring of election districts to the advantage of the president's allies."

B. N. Yeltsin's second wish is to exclude from the law the article that requires that candidates employed in executive structures, including ministers and journalists, leave their positions after registering for the election campaign. The legislators' logic is obvious: the "work places" of those and others create a colossal advantage for them. Let us say that the premier and his deputies, just like television commentators, can remind us of themselves from the blue screen daily, laying out their political positions there, exhibiting their chest of promises, etc., but this is why the "householders" from the government are knocking together their own "House"—so they can use all the advantage of the state roof to fill the parliamentary chamber with people lacking executive prospects. Retain the article in the law, and it would be senseless to indulge in nomenklatura-official party building. Incidentally, cynicism among government officials has reached such a scale that nobody hides this reason for the president's amendment.

B. Yeltsin's third wish is that the parliamentary elections will be considered to have taken place if no less than half the electorate participates in them and that a deputy is considered elected in the first round if he gets 50 percent of the votes. If the law were intended for the island of Robinson Crusoe, this amendment would be ideal. After all, when the RF Policy Research Center, one that is far from me in its political sympathies, calls the current Duma "a parliament of the absolute minority," I have no wish to refute it. Current realities, however, do not allow me to agree with the president's recommendations.

All analysts, including those from FAPSI [Federal Agency for Government Communications & Information], admit that the population's interest in the elections has decreased in comparison with 1993, but I will even take December 1993 as source data. According to an announcement from Tsentizbirkom [Central Election Committee], the ballots—both for referendums and the election—received 54.8 percent of the electorate. This figure is subject to doubt both abroad and in Russia. We also have another figure, one that is probably closer to the truth—46.1 percent. If the electorate's level of activity decreases even more or maintains the same level, then if the president's wish is fulfilled, the state will remain without a parliament for a long time.

Let us recall the history of the State Duma that was elected in December, 1993. The lower chamber began its activity when 219 deputies were elected by single-mandate districts. Eight of them were elected in districts where over 65 percent of the electorate came to the urns, and 18 of them with 60.1 to 65 percent. At the same time, 100 (one hundred!) deputies (over 45 percent) received mandates in districts where less than half of the their electorate voted. So what do we have here: only a third of the electorate came to vote for the two candidates and their opponents. They became deputies all the same, in complete accord with the presidential decree of 1993 on elections to the Federal Assembly.

Now let us imagine that this decree had not suited the "expediency" of a time when there was a rush to hide the blood of October '93 and the president's current ideas (or new "expediency"). In this case, there would be no representation for 30 Federation subjects. The Far East, East and West Siberia, the Urals, and the Northwest, including Petersburg as well as Moscow, Nizhegorod, Samara, and Astrakhan oblasts would have found themselves without their own Duma representatives.

In the meantime, using arithmetic, we will now attempt to unravel the algebra of the Kremlin's calculations. It looks very much as if the local wise men, in cahoots with foreign-speaking consultants, are trying to join together in what would seem the impossible—leaving the country without a State Duma—by conducting parliamentary elections at the proper time. Pay close attention to the politicians' arguments; they all boil down to election procedure. Just the day before yesterday, B. Yeltsin, in a television interview with a correspondent from ORT [Russian Public Television], explains to the naive: "We must read our own Constitution. The Constitution indicates election terms; we must abide by them. Therefore, both the State Duma and the 1996 presidential elections will be on time..." Yes, and how could it be otherwise, when he has promised his friend Bill. The entire trick consists of the fact that both the Kremlin and its sworn friends are well suited by those elections that are doomed to success with failure. It would seem that even the attractive presidential "I propose increasing the requirements for electorate attendance to 50 percent" in order to prevent the loss of "representation in the lower chamber of parliament" solves that very problem ideally.

Without two-thirds of its membership, the lower chamber cannot begin work. Even if the Duma manages this norm, it will still be incapacitated. Recently, the Constitutional Court established that all tallying of votes in the Federal Assembly are taken not from the number of representatives actually elected but from the full membership. If now, when over 440 Duma representatives are working, it is sometimes difficult to gather 225 votes, then without a full complement of deputies—and with today's political opposition!—it would be completely impossible.

So one asks questions. Why did the president have to refuse the very same norms that he introduced a year and a half ago by his own decree? Why is the government striving to create a situation where the State Duma is obviously doomed to incapacitation? How is the executive branch hindered—with today's Constitution!—by a lower chamber that lacks rights? Why are the state and pro-president mass media stubbornly drumming into the population's awareness the idea that non-participation in elections is normal? In the meantime, I do not exclude the idea that all these questions have already become rhetorical.

*Prospects for Authoritarian Regime Discussed

954F2474A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 11-17 May 95 No 19, p 8

[Article by Andrey Fadin: "Time of the Feudal Lords"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Subject Gap

The fears of some and hopes of others for the formation of an authoritarian regime in Russia turned out to be at least premature. Although the vector of the "October" regime was doubtless aimed at authoritarianism and although the Russian society, in turn, still has an authoritarian orientation in many of its aspects, authoritarianism as a regular vertically organized political system is for the time being not coming about at all.

The most obvious reason for this is that there is no subject "A-project" in Russia. The Kremlin under Yeltsin acts much more as a resultant of different elites and interest groups than as the bearer of any comprehensive organizational principle or cohesive social and political philosophy. In the absence of an "image of the desired future," all of the political power of the Kremlin is utilized only to retain authority and to preserve its fragile balance. Political clans, regional leaders, and branch and financial interest groups use presidential authority as a platform for the fight for resources or as an instrument for the suppression of competitors. Accordingly, the center is not fulfilling its primary "authoritarian" function—it is not providing for uniform rules of the game for different interest groups throughout the territory of the country.

Forgotten Legacy of Machiavelli

The main structural obstacle to the formation of a real, effective, and "enlightened" authoritarianism (approximately what A. Migranyan, S. Kurginyan, and other less well-known "power mongers" are dreaming about) is not so much the democratic conquests of the last decade as the neofeudal and vassal-seignorial organization of political authority itself, which is more and more reminiscent of the Pospolitaya Rech in the 16th and 17th centuries. No major interdepartmental decision made in the Kremlin can be pushed through the executive vertical "to the bottom" or carried out adequately to the desired result if it in any way goes against the interests of the regional elites.

The overwhelming majority of heads of administrations were appointed to their posts by the president under the principle of loyalty and were viewed as a primary element of the political administration of the country. It is therefore logical that gigantic real powers were dumped precisely on this stage of authority (in part they flowed there by themselves simply by the nature of the territorial-administrative organization of administrative functions). In the period of Yeltsin's fight with the Supreme Court, both sides ingratiated themselves with regional authorities, doing everything they could to strengthen them and to encourage their ambitions.

Moreover the Kremlin actually made it possible for the top leaders of the subjects of the federation to suppress the "structural opposition" initially in the person of the local soviets and then of the mayors of the largest cities (let us recall the fate of Bednyakov in Nizhniy, Cherepkov in Vladivostok, and others). In the draft law on local self-government, the State Duma tried to wrest this element of authority from the control of the governors but the attempt got bogged down somewhere in the committees, which is understandable, for it has neither a lot of money, nor powerful lobbyists, nor a propaganda potential.

With the disintegration of the centralized branch system of adminstration, the second category of local "structural opposition," that of the directors of the largest enterprises, who in the Soviet past were covered by branch ministries, was deprived of its protection in Moscow and ceased to represent a real alternative in the localities (possibly except for the enterprises of the TEK [transport and forwarding offices]). With the conversion and privatization of large enterprises carried out in practically 100 percent of the cases in violation of some particular legislative norms, their managers found themselves in an even more vulnerable position with respect to the governors—everyone remembers the scandals that the regional authorities caused with the conversion of the Ulyanov Automobile Plant, the Gorkiy Automobile Plant, or the Urals Machine Building "Plant for Series Vehicles."

Having made it possible for the governors to do away with the local opposition, the Kremlin thereby undermined the possibility of a subtle play on the differences of interests, that is, the political leadership of the country. Even Machiavelli instructed monarchs (authoritarians by the very nature of their power) to support small forces to counter large and medium forces, which they did, protecting the vassals against their feudal lords and urban dwellers against the arbitrary actions of feudal seigneurs.

Meanwhile, Mikhail Sergeyevich handled precisely this task very well, beginning by vetoing political repression, thereby opening a "safety umbrella" over the antinomenclature opposition. And then, at the very height of the "novoogarevskiy process," he entered the scene of autonomy as a counterweight to the growing independence of the republics. The man did not have enough time, for the State Committee for the Emergency Situation ruined things for him. If it had not, we would now be writing about something else....

Real Authoritarians

The inexhaustible irony of history! Authoritarianism as a regular political system in Russia is opposed primarily by an authoritarianism of the same political nature but of a different, regional level. Yeltsin's Kremlin naturally perceives the governors as its vice-regents. They themselves perceive themselves as a legitimate regional authority and the overwhelming majority of them would like to convert this legitimacy into legality through elections. Moscow still opposes this (there are elected governors in only six oblasts) but sooner or later it will give in.

By the way, even today the authoritarian nature of the Kremlin looks a lot like English-style liberalism compared with the authoritarian management, rigidity, and all-encompassing control of the governors over all aspects of life in the regional societies. The level of liberties of any kind, personal and group or political and economic, in the "authoritarian" Moscow of Yeltsin and Luzhkov is simply not comparable with what is done in Vladivostok, Elista, Ufa, or Yakutsk (fill in the name of practically any regional capital). Yeltsin is far away but Comrade Ilyumzhinov (or Nikolayev or Rakhimov) is near, dangerously near. There is no one to whom to complain: in contrast to the old days, the top leader of the subject of the federation is not part of the refined system of the center's party and police control. The Central Committee, oblast committee bureau, and KGB no longer exist, whereas the procurator's office and court depend upon the main subject in the subject. The status of the oblast bodies of representative authority and their composition (we remember well how they were chosen!) are such that by their nature they cannot and will not oppose the local masters of life.

As a result, the level of omnipotence and arbitrariness of the regional caudillos (especially in the autonomies) has become simply incomparable with the authority of the old Soviet first secretaries of the oblast committees. Recently, for example, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov declared that he gave (!) Saddam Husayn four hectares of land in Elista. Just let the Queen of England give such a gift!

In the recent times of his leadership of the Committee for the Management of State Property [GKI], the powerful Chubays himself had to go out "to the localities" to personally "push through" privatization under the Kremlin's model. The reason is understandable—the local property committees, formally being subdivisions of the GKI, actually carry out the policies of the local elite.

The same situation is coming about in practically all areas where the center is trying to erect its own vertical administration by-passing subordination to the regional authority. The clearest example is that of the fate of the RUOP's [Regional Organized Crime Administrations] that have formally made themselves subordinate only to the leadership of the federal Ministry of Internal Affairs but in real life more and more subjected to the regional internal affairs directorates. And where this is not taking place, as in Ryazan, there is a severe conflict.

Mobilization Regime? No, Thank You!

Thus, today the real authoritarianism of the Kremlin is limited, as the Moscow geographer Vladimir Kaganskiy put it, "by the bourgeois democracy of the regions," although possibly it would be more correct to call this system of things a regional nomenclature oligarchy.

In principle, one can also imagine such an authoritarianism. In the final analysis, the thoroughly authoritarian Japanese quasi-democracy "worked" for the last half century precisely on the basis of an arrangement of elites and until recently the Mexican model provided very well for stability.

In imagining the real characters of the "A-project" in Russia and the distribution of roles and forces among them, however, it would somehow seem to be even indecent to speak of an authoritarianism that is "enlightened," constructive, and so on with a "mandate of history." It would be even stranger to imagine that a real authoritative regime in Russia will be able to "maneuver the limited material, human, and financial resources for the preservation and development of priority branches of science, technology, and production" (A. Migranyan, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 22 April 1995). The best thing that can be said about such a prognosis is that it may be called upon to serve as an ideological hint to the powers that be (a genre that the political scientist has long since mastered). It is easy to imagine what kind of "mobilization regime" comrades Nazdratenko, Rakhimov, or Ilyumzhinov will set up in the territories under their jurisdiction and precisely how and where they will "maneuver limited resources."

In reviewing the main actors of the Russian scene, one is left with the conclusion that neither a social base nor the historical energy for a "dictatorship of development" exist in Russia today. No longer. The one that was all went out in the first attempt (approximately 1927-1940) and two times in one century is a little too much even for Russia. In this context, the popular talk about a "mobilization regime" and "dictatorship of development" appear to be no more than an attempt to legitimize the procedure to transmit authority by-passing elections.

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*Presidential National Security Adviser Baturin Interviewed

954F2474B Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 11-17 May 95 No 19, p 8

[Interview with Yuriy Baturin, assistant to the president of the Russian Federation on national security, by Yelena Dikun under "Life and Career" rubric: "Baturin Seven Years Later: More Gray Hairs, Fewer Illusions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Yuriy Baturin, assistant to the president of the Russian Federation on national security, is not an ordinary figure. He is the kind of encyclopedic intellectual that has almost disappeared. Three higher educations and two university degrees, books on computer law and works on political science and state theory, translations from Lewis Car-**

roll and the elaboration of draft laws on the mass media—that is quite a lot for a man of 45 and more than surprising for a person who has decided to join the bureaucrats. Is this an enigma of nature?

[Baturin] I myself would reach an impasse if I tried to define myself by profession. This is probably senseless. To understand why I sought to find myself in such varied areas, it is simply necessary to know my biography. After school I studied physics and, as funny as it may be to remember this today, at that time I had the clear dream of becoming a cosmonaut. There was every opportunity for this: I finished the school for aerophysics and space studies and was assigned to the top firm of the "Energiya" Scientific Production Association. Alas, my dream did not come true. Perhaps I regret this even now....

In those days, very many people had an acute sense of the impossibility of complete self-realization and I could literally feel how time was slipping away through my fingers. Some tried to create their own little world and began to drink, some got jobs as watchmen and read Kant, and I began to study. While working at "Energiya," I first enrolled in a juridical institute and within a year I entered the journalism school of Moscow State University. Sometime after that I was absorbed by the idea of utilizing physical-mathematical models in political science. In 1979, I gave a report at the World Congress of the International Association of Political Sciences and began to work on this theme professionally. It was unrealistic to go from the street to those places where they dealt seriously with political science and I had no connections. All of a sudden I got a call from Shakhnazarov from the Central Committee of the CPSU (we did not even know each other) and he asked me to drop by. Georgiy Khosroyevich had then just organized a political science sector at the State and Law Institute of the Academy of Sciences. I did not know what could have attracted him to me but he did bring me to his sector. At the institute, I first wrote a thesis on the European Parliament for my candidate's degree and later I received a doctorate in computer law. When Shakhnazarov became assistant to President of the USSR Gorbachev, he frequently involved me in work on different materials and documents. In June 1991, I was officially made consultant of the president's assistant.

[Dikun] You came to serve Gorbachev at a time when most perspicacious people were already abandoning him. After all, it was already clear that Gorbachev's time was ending.

[Baturin] I am an inveterate chess player and I like to play through lost positions. Frequently, when I am close to victory, I suggest to my opponent that I turn the board around and try to save the game. Sometimes I am successful. For me, working for Gorbachev was a kind of game in a losing position. Besides, I love to study and the work with Shakhnazarov is a very high-class school. I dealt with truly serious matters there—the Union Treaty, for example. And as a scientist, I myself wanted to feel what authority and real politics are and to see this whole environment from the inside. For in scientific institutes, when we create models in political science, we do not know the real situation, we pull the data out of the air, as they say, and we make forecasts based on common sense. Naturally the purity of the experiment is not guaranteed.

[Dikun] Is President Yeltsin also a "lost game" for you? After all, you joined his team when many were already leaving.

[Baturin] Everything is more complex here than in the case of Gorbachev. When they asked me to become a member of the Presidential Council, the situation was rather serious: after December 1992, the confrontation between Khasbulatov and Yeltsin became particularly acute and ahead loomed a referendum and impeachment. The president's people did not feel as confident as they do today. It is no accident that many told me at the time that it was necessary to go to the Supreme Soviet rather than to the Kremlin. But I just was not convinced that this was a lost game. By the way, some of my friends stopped associating with me after I came here but even now I do not regret that I agreed to do so.

[Dikun] Meanwhile, for five months the newspapers have been writing that very soon Baturin will be fired, this being already decided. Do you yourself have an explanation why they are tolerating you so long?

[Baturin] I do not know why the newspapers are writing this. They report a lot of interesting things. But the president did not put the question this way, although not all are pleased with the existence of the post of national security assistant regardless of who holds it.

[Dikun] And can you say precisely who they are?

[Baturin] Why talk about this? Forgive me, but I am not obligated to tell about everything.

[Dikun] From the beginning of the campaign in Chechnya, the democratically oriented public expected a revolt in the president's administration. The "peace party," it was thought, was supposed to take bold moral action and oppose the "war party." But nothing happened. The "war party" is calmly going about its business. So is the "two-party system" in the president's team a myth to a certain extent?

[Baturin] I think that this is simply an inaccurate model. In the president's staff, one can indeed identify two groups of people with dissimilar styles of thinking, although people from different "camps" certainly can associate with each other and even reach mutual understanding. By the way, the deeper each of us delves into his own position, theme, and role, the more often we may differ from each other even in our own group. For example, there are situations in which Georgiy Satarov and I have quite opposite opinions.

You said that we "did not speak out." But how do you see this? There was, to be sure, the version that the newspapers wrote about—for everyone to resign. But if some one of us or all of us had done this, then how, in your opinion, would the Chechnya campaign have developed? It is quite possible that it would have been even more drastic. After all, we did something and, I think, we did influence the decisions made.

[Dikun] Excuse me, when the events in Chechnya began, it was as though the earth had swallowed up the president's assistant for national security. You were not seen or heard.

[Baturin] I returned to Moscow from a trip literally the next day after the start of the events. It is also true that during that time I was not even present at the meetings of the Security Council and was not involved in this process and therefore there was no reason for me to go to the public.

[Dikun] When did they "involve you in the process"?

[Baturin] I resumed attendance of the Security Council meetings in the second half of February. Prior to that, however, I almost immediately began to give Boris Nikolayevich daily reports with correlated materials on Chechnya. I worked on this on 31 December, on 1 January, and on Christmas day. I hope that with these reports I did help the president to form an objective picture of what was happening. For I gave him not only information from the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service] but also letters from deputies and materials from journalists. If I had resigned at that time, someone else would have reported to the president and it is quite possible that the tone would have been very different.

[Dikun] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, during the time of your work in the president's administration, did you begin to think better about politics, about the state machinery, and about the people in authority?

[Baturin] Just as before, our policy remains closed and there is no tendency toward openness. If it has become more transparent, it is not because this is what the authorities want but rather because the situation has changed—above all on account of the mass media. As for the people in authority, I had also seen them before. There were no shattered illusions, because there were no illusions. I cannot say that the moral atmosphere in authoritative circles has become worse or better in comparison with the time of Gorbachev. It is simply that today there has been a polarization here. A great many interesting, professionally trained, and morally pure people have come to power. Formerly there were not many such people. At the same time, however, the wave of all these revolutionary transformations has brought with it a great many people who ought not to be in power. There are people who for pay will give any documents to the mass media or commercial structures. Thanks to my official position, I possess a rather substantial amount of information in this regard. Believe me, it is very unpleasant to know this.

[Dikun] But why are these crystal-pure people not sounding the alarm bells and are not revealing the rascals?

[Baturin] The dumbest thing that one can do is to cry "stop thief!" Justice cannot be achieved in this way. Moreover the honest people will "go away," while the others will stay. Only by increasing the critical mass of decent people and by pushing out the indecent ones can one accomplish anything serious.

[Dikun] Recently there has been more and more talk and articles to the effect that Kremlin offices are being listened to by the president's Security Service, that Korzhakov is observing practically the entire staff. Do you also sense this?

[Baturin] Because of my position, I know the technical possibilities of different special services. For this reason, I follow this rule: neither in my office, nor on the telephone, nor anywhere else do I say anything that I could not say publicly. If I want to share confidential information with someone, I will always find a way to do it. But of course I am not going to say in a newspaper exactly what.

[Dikun] Do you find that work in the system has greatly changed you?

[Baturin] I recently experienced a great shock when I looked at a film that goes back seven years, which showed me during the time of the discussion of the draft Law on the Press. My God, Baturin in 1988 and Baturin in 1995 are two completely different people! It is not just that I have become quite gray but also my temperament and rate of speaking are quite different. Then I spoke categorically, fervently, and rapidly, whereas today I speak slowly with pauses. These changes took place gradually as I gained secret information. Before pronouncing a word, I think a hundred times what can and must be said, for all of the information is mixed up in my head. There are other changes as well. On the one hand, I now have more negative emotions, whereas, on the other hand, the more deeply that I understand what is going on, the more that my mind benefits. So as not to "dry out" completely, I make myself read artistic literature. There is no longer time for the theater or music. I do not deny that I am very tired. I usually return home after midnight, when I all that I want to do is to lie down and go to sleep.

[Dikun] Whichever politicians you listen to, they all complain, the poor fellows. But why does no one want to retire from this drudgery?

[Baturin] There are people who choose politics for their entire life. I am certainly not one of them. When you understand that all of this is temporary and that one day the team will be changed, then you can perceive this fragment of your biography accordingly. Just like your time in army service, it will come to an end and you can return to your own business.

[Dikun] And to what will you return?

[Baturin] Possibly I will write the book "Physics of Power," in which I will try to interpret my experience in observing political life.

*Experts Predict 'Future Ratings' for Russian Politicians

954F2408A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 26 May 95 p 5

[Article by Dmitriy Olshanskiy, professor and director of the Center for Strategic Analysis and Prognosis, under the rubric "Prognosis": "From May to December: The Future of Russian Politicians Based on the Results of the New 'Future Ratings'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **People would like to know right now just what tomorrow will be like. It is interesting to try to imagine December in May. How will they look, these current idols of our political life? What ups and downs await them on the path to the Olympus of the new State Duma? Who has more chance of being elected and who less?**

A poll was conducted on 10-12 May which made it possible right now to obtain new "future ratings" for May-December of 139 prominent Russian politicians. Such political "futures" have already shown their effectiveness. A comparative analysis with reality made of the first future ratings produced a month ago, on 3-5 April (published in DELOVOY MIR on 26 April), (with retrospective ratings, based on April results, of the influence of 100 politicians published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on 12 May) showed that the "accuracy" of the futures was extremely high. It came to 70 percent for the top 10 (7 politicians out of 10 held the positions predicted for them [plus or minus 1 point]), and 75 percent for the top 20 (15 out of 20). The prediction of general uptrends or downtrends in the influence of particular politicians (moving "up" or "down" on the list) was 85 percent right. For your information we remind you that in world prediction science and in practice, predictions with a realization rate of 51 percent are considered effective. Everything above that is already accepted as a "working prognosis."

The essence of the project being carried out by the Center for Strategic Analysis and Prognosis (director, Professor D. V. Olshanskiy) and the Vox Populi Service for the Study of Public Opinion (director, Professor B. A. Grushin) is to use expert polling to determine these "future ratings" of prominent politicians every month. Starting from the technology and 2 years of experience in determining influence ratings of politicians during the preceding month (printed in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA), the project is moving further. Fifty experts (well-known political scientists and journalists who actively participate in discussing the political process) are presented with a list of almost 140 well-known Russian politicians—representatives of three groups (the first is politicians whose achievements in one way or another involve evaluation by the electorate—"public politicians"; the second is representatives of the state apparat, "apparat politicians"; and the third group is leaders of certain Russian regions—"regional politicians"). The experts' task for May was to start from the influence of politicians which had already been recorded based on the April results and predict their possible influence in May (the ratings at the start of June), in May-July (at the start of August), and in 1995 overall (the ratings at the end of the year). Twelve ratings tables were obtained after the tabulation (a general table plus tables on each of the three groups for the three time frames).

Prominent Politicians: The General Panorama

Among the trends of the general list which attract most attention are the extremely stable positions of first place—V. Chernomyrdin, second place—B. Yeltsin, and third place—Yu. Luzhkov. The premier, who recently announced his readiness to join parliamentary elections at the head of the "party of power," retained his "future rating" which was already high in April. The president, who seemingly receded "into the shadows" somewhat, will follow the elections for the Duma seemingly from outside. His own rating is more important to him next year, as the presidential elections approach. However, his influence continues to be very significant.

In the April "futures," experts believed that by December Yu. Luzhkov might overtake B. Yeltsin, but by May the analysts came to understand that the Moscow mayor could hardly justify these expectations for a number of reasons: he has almost completely stopped showing any political activism, clearly concentrating on economic work. However, a stable third place at most is not bad for our times. Naturally, it simultaneously means a stable first place among regional politicians: the capital was and remains the flagship of subjects of the RF.

The relative weakening of the predicted influence of I. Rybkin was a somewhat unexpected result of the May futures poll. This is possibly linked to the attempts, for now plainly unsuccessful, to form the notorious "left-centrist bloc." While, say, back a month ago the Duma speaker was firmly in fourth place in Russian politics, now he is predicted to be only in fifth place for May and July, although experts believe that in December he may in fact return to fourth place. In May-July A. Korzhakov will pass him slightly in terms of the scope of his influence.

The following people may "drop" from the May "top 10" by the end of the year: P. Grachev (from 6th to 17th place), A. Kozyrev (from 8th to 13th place), and V. Shumeyko (from 10th to 12th place). Everything is clear with the ministers of defense and foreign affairs: the holiday parades have rumbled by and foreign guests have gone. Participation in elections is hardly a threat to the speaker of the Council of the Federation this year; that is why he will drop slightly on the list. O. Soskovets is very stable (remaining in ninth place). The following people may join the top 10: G. Yavlinskiy (from 12th to 6th place), G. Zyuganov (from 14th to 7th place), and V. Zhirinovskiy (from 17th to 10th place). Based on all indicators, it looks like they are the most promising personages among those who presently do not occupy high official chairs. And they are quickly drawing close to the occupants of these very "chairs," although they have not yet reached them in terms of the scope of their possible political influence.

Overall, "public politicians" in the pre-election year are generally inclined to crowd out the "apparat" politicians somewhat in terms of their influence. This is a natural process which is completely understandable to experts. Accordingly, some "apparat" politicians will hasten to provide themselves additionally with a "public status"; for example, the stability of the future position of O. Soskovets is apparently related to the fact that he became Chernomyrdin's first deputy not only for the government but for the right-centrist bloc as well.

The following people may well end up on the December 20: the leader of the "Russia's Choicers," Ye. Gaydar (from 24th to 18th place), vice premier S. Shakhray (from 23d to 19th place), and deputy chairman of the Council of the Federation R. Abdulatipov (from 26th to 20th place). It is entirely possible that the Chechen leader, D. Dudayev, will "drop" from it (from 11th place straight to 57th place; experts are inclined to believe that the impact of the Chechen war will in fact lessen by December), as may the minister of internal affairs, V. Yerin (from 16th to 23d place), and the head of the FSB [Federal Security Service], S. Stepashin (from 19th to 29th place). The influence of the "power leaders" will generally go down—the expectations of experts regarding the fact that someone will have to pay for the chronic war have an effect. The position of S. Filatov, head of the presidential administration, is stable (remaining in 15th place).

Among the "public" politicians, experts expect a continued upsurge from the commander of the 14th Army, A. Lebed, the chairman of the Federation of Commodity Producers, Yu. Skokov, and the leaders of the DPR [Democratic Party of Russia], S. Glazyev, the APR [Agrarian Party of Russia], M. Lapshin, and the OPP [United Industrial Party], V. Shcherbakov, and others. However, the rise in influence may vary. For some, for example, the "limits of growth" seem to have been outlined; for example, in April it was predicted that A. Rutskoy would move from 58th place to 35th, and in May, from 48th to 36th place. It turns out that both from April and from May his December position looks almost the same. The picture may look more dynamic for other politicians; for example, the future rating of the leader of the "Union of Realists" and the head of Gosinkor [State Investment Corporation], Yu. Petrov, shows stable movement (in April he was expected to move from 92d to 63d place, and in May, (down from 62d to 56th place). A slump is predicted for legal rights activist S. Kovalev, Duma Deputy M. Poltoranin, and a whole series of other politicians. No particular progress is expected from the leader of the new "Common Cause," I. Khakamada (remaining in 70th place) and the head of the Social Democratic Union, V. Lipitskiy (remaining in 83d place). And, naturally, the influence of the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, N. Ryabov, will rise steadily in the pre-election year (from 47th place to 28th).

Overall, the May "futures" show not only curious personal trends which are largely tactical, but also more general, quite strategic trends. Thus, the results demonstrate that the "old guard" is gradually departing the political stage: former president of the USSR M. Gorbachev, from 69th place to 75th (in April he was expected to be in the 50s), former secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, A. N. Yakovlev (from 56th to 69th place), former Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov (from 78th to 89th place), and former mayor of Moscow G. Popov (from 88th to 93d place). At the same time, the "first wave" democrats are going down: S. Yushenkov, L. Ponomarev, V. Sheynis, and others. Overall this attests to the process of replacing the elite: the gerontocrats and the too extremist democrats are gradually yielding the top places to technocrats and bureaucrats.

Among the "apparat" politicians in the general list, the positions of the president's closest circle and his aides and close generals are practically unshakeable. However, certain adjustments, say, in the positions of prominent economic figures are fairly likely—in the direction of reduced influence. Judging from everything, the experts do not believe in serious improvement of the Russian economy, and there are certain grounds for this. As yet it is not even apparent that the government will find the money to execute this year's long-suffering "non-emissions budget." It is interesting that in early April the experts' opinion was slightly different—the positions of our prominent political-economic figures seemed much firmer. But now, by the end of the year minister of economics Ye. Yasin may drop from 21st to 31st place (in April it was predicted he would stay in 20th place), while minister of finance V. Panskov may drop from 38th to 45th place. The position of T. Paramonova is stable (remaining in 32d place).

Among the "regional" leaders, experts predict the following people will move up the most, though for clearly different reasons: Nizhniy Novgorod governor B. Nemtsov (from 20th to 16th place), the president of Tataria, M. Shaymiyev (from 31st to 21st place), and the head of the Kemerovo Oblast legislative assembly, A. Tuleyev (from 54th to 46th place). The head of administration of Moscow Oblast, A. Tyazhlov, will rise slightly in the general list: from 85th place in May to 79th place in December. Against this background, St. Petersburg mayor A. Sobchak will continue to drop (from 63d to 68th place), as will the president of Kalmykia, K. Ilyumzhinov (from 95th down to 102d place).

The "future ratings" look interesting not only on the individual, personal level, but also on the group-averaged level—above all from the standpoint of all kinds of blocs and coalitions. The former top three in the 1993 model look bad, for example. Thus, the average position of the former "Russia's Choice" (S. Kovalev, Ye. Gaydar, and E. Pamfilova) does not promise to move from the middle in May and December: it remains 58th. Things do not look good for PRYeS [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] from December 1993 (S. Shakhray, A. Shokhin, and K. Zatulin) either: 61st to 62d place. It is clear that for Shakhray the situation in a potential V. Chernomyrdin-O. Soskovets-S. Shakhray bloc would be much better by this December: there we have a change in the average position from 11th to 8th place. On the other hand, the trio A. Lebed-Yu. Skokov-S. Glazyev may look promising (from 30th to 21st average place), as well as certain other combinations.

'Public' Politicians: The Struggle for Greater Growth

The situation within the group of politicians who passionately desire to fight for the sympathies of the Russian electorate is fairly tense. It is clear that as December and the upcoming Duma elections approach, it will become increasingly lively. These politicians have practically nothing but the so-called "public resource," and they face a harsh fight for that too.

V. Chernomyrdin, having jumped from the category of typical "apparatchiks" to the "public" group of politicians, retains his customary leading place there too, both in May and in December. It appears that the total possible drop in points of influence in December among the leaders on the list (Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin) reflects a certain decline in the "relative significance" of politics in our life. Although other potential champions for the electorate's votes will build up their influence not only locally but in points as well, and that will lead to a higher "degree of pressure" on this group list. It appears that the distance between the leaders, the "middle group," and even the losers of this group will to a certain degree decrease because of fierce pre-election publicity-propaganda campaigns.

B. Yeltsin's second place and I. Rybkin's third place are firm. However, unlike those above him, Rybkin may increase his "relative weight" in absolute points. G. Yavlinskiy may rise from 5th to 4th place, in doing so raising his points fairly substantially. The situation for G. Zyuganov, V. Zhirinovskiy, and A. Lebed looks similar. Among outstanding figures, V. Shumeyko may go down (from 4th to 8th place). S. Govorukhin may drop from 9th to 13th place, but surprisingly retaining his potential influence to the exact hundredth of a point. The positions of the following people are stable: vice premier S. Shakhray in 10th place, the leader of the DPR, S. Glazyev, in 15th place, V. Lukin, one of the leaders of "Yabloko," in 16th place, and A. Dolgolaptev, one of the deputy chairmen of the Council of the Federation, in 21st place.

Among politicians who are picking up strength, the leader of the new United Industrial Party, V.

Shcherbakov, may begin to move up (from 41st to 34th place), as may the deputy chairman of the Council of the Federation, P. Romanov from the Yenisey region (from 43d to 36th place), and the Petersburg Council of the Federation deputy from "Yabloko," B. Yu. Boldyrev (from 46th to 39th place). A new wave of popularity may await the leader of the Russian All-People's Union, S. Baburin—the prospect is that he will rise from 55th place in May to 40th place in December.

Among personages losing popularity, the deputy of the State Duma and head of "MMM," S. Mavrodi, stands out; he is predicted to fall from 49th to 60th place. It is curious that the experts do not see grounds for changing the positions of the six politicians ending the list. In this case we are in fact also speaking of a drop in influence—it is simply that based on the conditions of the poll, there is nowhere lower to "drop."

Overall the experts predict a certain decline in the advantage which representatives of power now have in influencing politics, and accordingly, an increase in the influence of leaders who are in opposition to the regime. However, we cannot speak of any radical changes in the pyramid of influence yet: the persons who have power now remain "higher" in December too.

The general situation among the "public" politicians looks fairly unique. The most marked changes in terms of numbers are possible within the top 20: 14 persons may change their positions, and only 6 may keep them. Then the dynamism declines and significant changes become more the exception than the rule. This means that the most potential for change remains in the interval from 4th through 14th place, in the "second echelon" of politicians. The lower you go, the more it decreases—in subsequent levels the situation to a certain degree looks "cemented." The "zones of influence," like the potential electorate, are relatively divided. Is a new "redistribution" possible? To a certain degree, but it is unlikely to be radical. Hence, above all those few figures who lay claim to having "charismatic" qualities again face waging a struggle for greater growth.

The Apparat: Stabilization of Influence

Here the situation during the month which has passed since the previous "futures" has undergone large changes. After Chernomyrdin's "departure" into the "public" list, the head of the presidential guard, General A. Korzhakov, headed the group of apparat politicians fairly confidently. And although in December the points of his "political weight" will drop slightly (as, incidentally, will those of most of the "apparatchiks"—of the top 20, some increase is predicted only for the first vice premier, O. Soskovets, taking into account his "semipublic" role in the right-centrist bloc, General M. Barsukov, and the RF president's assistant for "election" affairs specifically and for "deputy affairs" in general, G. Satarov), he apparently should maintain his leadership in the apparat group in December as well.

P. Grachev will drop from 2d to 7th place, while the acting procurator general, A. Ilyushenko, will drop from 14th to 20th place. In contrast, both first vice premiers, A. Chubays and O. Soskovets, can be expected to rise. N. Ryabov may join the top 10 by the end of the year. To a lesser degree but still a rise in influence is predicted for V. Ilyushin and S. Filatov. Stable among the leading "apparatchiks" are A. Kozyrev (remaining in 4th place) and V. Yerin (remaining in 8th place). Given potentially major changes in the general list related in particular to the possible "decline" in the positions of these two ministers, it turns out that the apparat distribution of influence may be altogether different.

The potential dynamics in political influence of the RF president's closest circle looks fairly curious. Thus, the first assistant, V. Ilyushin, will move up one place and the assistant on economics, A. Livshits, will drop three places (from 13th to 16th place). The assistant for security, Yu. Baturin, will move up one place and the assistant on legal questions, M. Krasnov, will move up two places. The assistant on deputy and other party-political affairs, G. Satarov, is stable (remaining in 19th place). The overall change in this group of five well-known assistants is only one place up. Obviously, this certainly reflects the substantial stability of the president's closest circle—that is how the experts see it. Even if they did not take all factors into account, it is clear that there is no reason to expect a new person especially close to the president to appear. And here the situation seems fairly "set." On the one hand, this attests to the stabilization of the apparat and, as a result, suggests that its makeup and possible actions are more predictable. On the other hand, it also suggests the apparat's sufficient independence from the possible changes resulting from the pre-election battles.

The Regions: The View From Moscow

Moscow mayor Yu. Luzhkov leads the regional leaders. D. Dudayev still comes next, in second place, but in December he will most likely drop to the bottom of the top 10. Nizhniy Novgorod governor B. Nemtsov will replace him in second place, while the president of Tataria, M. Shaymiyev, will rise from 5th place in May to 3d place. A. Tuleyev from Kemerovo will slightly increase his rating. The positions of the Ingush leader, R. Aushev, the North Ossetian leader, A. Galazov, and some other regional leaders are stable.

Overall, the ratings of representatives of this group are less variable and substantially less dramatic than in the preceding groups. This suggests that a relatively stable hierarchy of influence has already been built up for the subjects of the Federation as a whole. There is reason to assume that changes in the positions of the regional leaders are perfectly possible, even very soon, but the source of these changes is not related to the regions themselves—it is in Moscow. Inasmuch as the RF president's administration took the "cadre questions" of the regional leaders into its hands fairly firmly, it attests to the increased unitaristic trends in Russian federal politics.

That is how the near and December political future looks based on experts' May evaluations. There is something to think about. Of course, knowledge of the "futures" is necessary to politicians above all: for them this is the particular "mirror" which is useful to look into. And to see how potential partners in party slates and, in contrast, possible rivals look in it. Business people need "futures" too: politicians are already forming long lines with their hands outstretched toward them. Money is needed for the upcoming elections. It is useful to evaluate the future of the supplicants in order to correctly decide to whom to give money, and to whom money should not be given. Finally, it is useful for us simple citizens to look into the future: once you look, our politics gradually become more predictable and we will finally move from political predictions to predictable politics.

Table 1. Future Ratings of Politicians (General List) for May, July, and December 1995

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
1	Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich	7.52	1	7.49	1	7.46
2	Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich	7.35	2	7.05	2	7.14
3	Luzhkov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich	6.92	3	6.79	3	6.88
4	Korzhakov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich	6.37	4	6.18	5	6.22
5	Rybkin, Ivan Petrovich	6.05	5	6.12	4	6.24
6	Grachev, Pavel Sergeyevich	6.01	9	5.52	17	4.97
7	Chubays, Anatoliy Borisovich	5.94	6	5.87	8	5.82
8	Kozyrev, Andrey Vladimirovich	5.88	7	5.59	13	5.27
9	Soskovets, Oleg Nikolayevich	5.54	8	5.56	9	5.63
10	Shumeyko, Vladimir Filippovich	5.49	11	5.39	12	5.29
11	Dudayev, Dzhokhar Musayevich	5.34	17	4.85	57	3.35
12	Yavlinskiy, Grigoriy Alekseyevich	5.31	10	5.50	6	6.02
13	Ilyushin, Viktor Vasilyevich	5.24	13	5.16	14	5.14

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
14	Zyuganov, Gennadiy Andreyevich	5.21	12	5.35	7	6.00
15	Filatov, Sergey Aleksandrovich	5.15	14	5.09	15	5.08
16	Yerin, Viktor Fedorovich	5.10	19	4.80	23	4.62
17	Zhirinovskiy, Vladimir Volfovich	5.09	16	5.01	10	5.49
18	Lebed, Aleksandr Ivanovich	4.90	15	5.02	11	5.34
19	Stepashin, Sergey Vadimovich	4.75	20	4.63	29	4.42
20	Nemtsov, Boris Yefimovich	4.59	18	4.83	16	5.01
21	Yasin, Yevgeniy Grigoryevich	4.52	22	4.49	31	4.27
22	Govorukhin, Stanislav Sergeyevich	4.49	23	4.41	25	4.49
23	Shakhray, Sergey Mikhaylovich	4.47	21	4.52	19	4.72
24	Gaydar, Yegor Timurovich	4.41	26	4.36	18	4.78
25	Lobov, Oleg Ivanovich	4.35	28	4.26	32	4.25
26	Abdulatipov, Ramazan	4.34	24	4.39	20	4.69
27	Aushev, Ruslan Sultanovich	4.34	29	4.24	27	4.45
28	Barsukov, Mikhail Ivanovich	4.28	25	4.38	24	4.53
29	Kovalev, Sergey Adamovich	4.20	33	4.10	35	4.05
30	Livshits, Aleksandr Yakovlevich	4.18	32	4.14	38	4.01
31	Shaymiyev, Mintimer Sharipovich	4.17	27	4.33	21	4.66
32	Ilyushenko, Aleksey Nikolayevich	4.16	35	4.04	43	3.77
33	Paramonova, Tatyana Vladimirovna	4.12	31	4.19	33	4.10
34	Baturin, Yuriy Mikhaylovich	4.12	34	4.08	37	4.03
35	Skokov, Yuriy Vladimirovich	4.08	30	4.19	22	4.63

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
36	Primakov, Yevgeniy Maksimovich	3.99	39	3.84	40	3.83
37	Glazyev, Sergey Yuryevich	3.91	36	4.02	30	4.39
38	Panskov, Vladimir Georgiyevich	3.90	37	3.92	45	3.74
39	Lukin, Vladimir Petrovich	3.78	42	3.74	34	4.05
40	Satarov, Georgiy Aleksandrovich	3.74	41	3.80	42	3.77
41	Lapshin, Mikhail Ivanovich	3.65	38	3.85	26	4.46
42	Shoygu, Sergey Kuzhugetovich	3.58	45	3.61	50	3.51
43	Zaveryukha, Aleksandr Kharlampiyevich	3.56	40	3.81	41	3.81
44	Galazov, Akhsarbek Khadzhimurzayevich	3.52	47	3.50	47	3.59
45	Fedorov, Boris Grigoryevich	3.52	43	3.70	39	3.96
46	Kokoshin, Andrey Afanasyevich	3.49	48	3.49	49	3.52
47	Ryabov, Nikolay Timofeyevich	3.40	44	3.66	28	4.45
48	Rutskoy, Aleksandr Vladimirovich	3.35	46	3.50	36	4.04
49	Ilyukhin, Viktor Ivanovich	3.34	51	3.38	52	3.44
50	Dolgolaptev, Anatoliy Vasilyevich	3.34	50	3.41	48	3.54
51	Zatulin, Konstantin Fedorovich	3.33	53	3.31	54	3.41
52	Volskiy, Arkadiy Ivanovich	3.30	54	3.25	51	3.50
53	Gonchar, Nikolay Nikolayevich	3.24	52	3.36	44	3.77
54	Tuleyev, Aman-geldy Moldagazyyevich	3.22	49	3.41	46	3.67
55	Yarov, Yuriy Fedorovich	3.19	55	3.19	61	3.22
56	Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich	3.14	64	2.92	69	2.99
57	Shafranik, Yuriy Konstantinovich	3.10	56	3.17	58	3.26

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
58	Poltoranin, Mikhail Nikiforovich	3.06	62	2.95	65	3.05
59	Stroyev, Yegor Semenovich	2.98	57	3.07	55	3.37
60	Nikolayev, Andrey Ivanovich	2.97	60	2.98	62	3.17
61	Lakhova, Yekaterina Filippovna	2.97	59	2.99	53	3.43
62	Petrov, Yuriy Vladimirovich	2.96	58	3.04	56	3.35
63	Sobchak, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich	2.95	65	2.90	68	3.00
64	Fedorov, Nikolay Vasilyevich	2.93	61	2.96	60	3.23
65	Yushenkov, Sergey Nikolayevich	2.90	69	2.71	71	2.94
66	Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich	2.77	63	2.94	59	3.25
67	Tumanov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich	2.71	67	2.82	64	3.11
68	Kolesnikov, Mikhail Petrovich	2.71	72	2.63	85	2.59
69	Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich	2.68	73	2.62	75	2.82
70	Khakamada, Irina Mutsuovna	2.64	71	2.65	70	2.94
71	Rossel, Eduard Edgardovich	2.64	68	2.78	66	3.02
72	Rogozin, Dmitriy Olegovich	2.63	66	2.83	63	3.11
73	Nevzorov, Aleksandr Glebovich	2.63	74	2.62	67	3.00
74	Fedulova, Alevtina Vasilyevna	2.62	77	2.56	72	2.92
75	Stepanov, Viktor Nikolayevich	2.61	70	2.70	73	2.86
76	Kovalev, Valentin Alekseyevich	2.61	80	2.54	90	2.49
77	Nosovets, Sergey Anatolyevich	2.56	83	2.50	88	2.52
78	Shaposhnikov, Yevgeniy Ivanovich	2.55	84	2.45	89	2.50
79	Vengerovskiy, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich	2.53	81	2.52	77	2.75

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
80	Nikolayev, Mikhail Yefimovich	2.53	82	2.52	82	2.63
81	Isakov, Vladimir Borisovich	2.52	78	2.54	78	2.71
82	Sheynis, Viktor Leonidovich	2.51	89	2.36	95	2.40
83	Lipitskiy, Vasiliy Semenovich	2.50	75	2.59	83	2.62
84	Ponomarev, Lev Aleksandrovich	2.49	87	2.40	92	2.48
85	Tyazhlov, Anatoliy Stepanovich	2.48	79	2.54	79	2.70
86	Resin, Vladimir Iosifovich	2.46	86	2.44	84	2.62
87	Shcherbakov, Vladimir Ivanovich	2.43	76	2.58	74	2.84
88	Popov, Gavriil Kharitonovich	2.41	93	2.28	93	2.47
89	Romanov, Petr Vasilyevich	2.41	85	2.45	76	2.78
90	Anpilov, Viktor Ivanovich	2.35	96	2.24	86	2.57
91	Nikonov, Vyacheslav Alekseyevich	2.35	88	2.38	87	2.55
92	Boldyrev, Yuriy Yuryevich	2.34	91	2.32	80	2.67
93	Tarpishchev, Shamil Anvarovich	2.31	97	2.22	105	2.14
94	Ryzhkov, Nikolay Ivanovich	2.31	90	2.35	91	2.49
95	Ilyumzhinov, Kirsan Nikolayevich	2.30	101	2.16	102	2.19
96	Mityukov, Mikhail Alekseyevich	2.30	102	2.15	103	2.17
97	Mavrodi, Sergey Panteleyevich	2.24	108	1.98	117	1.77
98	Zadornov, Mikhail Mikhaylovich	2.22	94	2.26	97	2.33
99	Pochinok, Aleksandr Petrovich	2.22	98	2.19	101	2.19
100	Yegorov, Nikolay Dmitriyevich	2.19	103	2.13	106	2.06
101	Rakhimov, Murtaza Gubaydullovich	2.17	95	2.25	94	2.41
102	Belyayev, Sergey Georgiyevich	2.16	92	2.29	98	2.30

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
103	Barkashov, Aleksandr Petrovich	2.12	104	2.11	99	2.25
104	Lukyanov, Anatoliy Ivanovich	2.10	105	2.10	96	2.33
105	Davydov, Oleg Dmitriyevich	2.07	106	2.05	107	2.03
106	Vartazarova, Lyudmila Stepanovna	2.07	100	2.17	100	2.24
107	Baburin, Sergey Nikolayevich	2.07	99	2.17	81	2.65
108	Yakovlev, Aleksandr Maksimovich	2.04	109	1.92	110	1.95
109	Vorontsov, Yuliy Mikhaylovich	2.02	114	1.83	115	1.85
110	Shokhin, Aleksandr Nikolayevich	1.98	107	2.00	104	2.15
111	Pain, Emil Abramovich	1.92	115	1.81	121	1.61
112	Lysenko, Vladimir Nikolayevich	1.92	110	1.91	108	2.01
113	Chilingarov, Artur Nikolayevich	1.89	112	1.85	109	1.99
114	Krasavchenko, Sergey Nikolayevich	1.89	116	1.81	113	1.86
115	Vitruk, Nikolay Vasilyevich	1.86	111	1.86	112	1.88
116	Krasnov, Mikhail Aleksandrovich	1.85	113	1.85	114	1.85
117	Zolotukhin, Boris Andreyevich	1.80	117	1.80	119	1.69
118	Burbulis, Gennadiy Eduardovich	1.71	118	1.76	116	1.85
119	Travkin, Nikolay Ilyich	1.69	120	1.60	111	1.90
120	Khasbulatov, Ruslan Imranovich	1.67	119	1.61	118	1.72
121	Pamfilova, Ella Aleksandrovna	1.56	122	1.45	120	1.64
122	Volkogonov, Dmitriy Antonovich	1.48	128	1.36	1.34	1.24
123	Bolshakov, Aleksey Alekseyevich	1.48	123	1.43	126	138
124	Babichev, Vladimir Stepanovich	1.47	121	1.55	122	1.58

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
125	Pastukhov, Boris Nikolayevich	1.45	126	1.38	130	1.29
126	Volkov, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich	1.43	124	1.43	124	1.47
127	Vladislavlev, Aleksandr Pavlovich	1.41	125	1.39	123	1.53
128	Churkin, Vitaliy Ivanovich	1.40	130	1.34	129	1.32
129	Sergeyev, Valentin Mikhaylovich	1.38	131	1.33	131	1.29
130	Podoprigora, Vladimir Nikolayevich	1.35	129	1.34	127	1.38
131	Kotenkov, Aleksandr Alekseyevich	1.33	133	1.22	133	1.25
132	Medvedev, Sergey Konstantinovich	1.33	127	1.37	125	1.43
133	Adamishin, Anatoliy Leonidovich	1.33	132	1.28	132	1.28
134	Medvedev, Vladimir Sergeyevich	1.19	134	1.21	128	1.36
135	Lebedev, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich	0.98	135	0.96	136	0.97
136	Petrovskiy, Vladimir Fedorovich	0.96	136	0.92	137	0.89
137	Kobelev, Viktor Vasilyevich	0.93	137	0.91	135	1.02
138	Kostikov, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich	0.83	139	0.70	139	0.63
139	Burkov, Sergey Vasilyevich	0.71	138	0.73	138	0.74

Table 2. Future Ratings of "Public" Politicians for May, July, and December 1995 (Positions Within the Group)

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
1	Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich	7.52	1	7.49	1	7.46
2	Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich	7.35	2	7.05	2	7.14
3	Rybkin, Ivan Petrovich	6.05	3	6.12	3	6.24
4	Shumeyko, Vladimir Filippovich	5.49	5	5.39	8	5.29
5	Yavlinskiy, Grigoriy Alekseyevich	5.31	4	5.50	4	6.02
6	Zyuganov, Gennadiy Andreyevich	5.21	6	5.35	5	6.00
7	Zhirinovskiy, Vladimir Volfovich	5.09	8	5.01	6	5.49
8	Lebed, Aleksandr Ivanovich	4.90	7	5.02	7	5.34
9	Govorukhin, Stanislav Sergeyevich	4.49	10	4.41	13	4.49
10	Shakhray, Sergey Mikhaylovich	4.47	9	4.52	10	4.72
11	Gaydar, Yegor Timurovich	4.41	12	4.36	9	4.78
12	Abdulatipov, Ramazan	4.34	11	4.39	11	4.69
13	Kovalev, Sergey Adamovich	4.20	14	4.10	17	4.05
14	Skokov, Yuriy Vladimirovich	4.08	13	4.19	12	4.63
15	Glazyev, Sergey Yuryevich	3.91	15	4.02	15	4.39
16	Lukin, Vladimir Petrovich	3.78	17	3.74	16	4.05
17	Lapshin, Mikhail Ivanovich	3.65	16	3.85	14	4.46
18	Fedorov, Boris Grigoryevich	3.52	18	3.70	19	3.96
19	Rutskoy, Aleksandr Vladimirovich	3.35	19	3.50	18	4.04
20	Ilyukhin, Viktor Ivanovich	3.34	21	3.38	23	3.44
21	Dolgolaptev, Anatoliy Vasilyevich	3.34	20	3.41	21	3.54
22	Zatulin, Konstantin Fedorovich	3.33	23	3.31	25	3.41

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
23	Volskiy, Arkadiy Ivanovich	3.30	24	3.25	22	3.50
24	Gonchar, Nikolay Nikolayevich	3.24	22	3.36	20	3.77
25	Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich	3.14	28	2.92	30	2.99
26	Poltoranin, Mikhail Nikiforovich	3.06	27	2.95	28	3.05
27	Lakhova, Yekaterina Filippovna	2.97	26	2.99	24	3.43
28	Petrov, Yuriy Vladimirovich	2.96	25	3.04	26	3.35
29	Yushenkov, Sergey Nikolayevich	2.90	30	2.71	32	2.94
30	Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich	2.68	32	2.62	35	2.82
31	Khakamada, Irina Mutsuovna	2.64	31	2.65	31	2.94
32	Rogozin, Dmitriy Olegovich	2.63	29	2.83	27	3.11
33	Nevzorov, Aleksandr Glebovich	2.63	33	2.62	29	3.00
34	Fedulova, Alevtina Vasilyevna	2.62	36	2.56	33	2.92
35	Shaposhnikov, Yevgeniy Ivanovich	2.55	39	2.45	44	2.50
36	Vengerovskiy, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich	2.53	38	2.52	37	2.75
37	Isakov, Vladimir Borisovich	2.52	37	2.54	38	2.71
38	Sheynis, Viktor Leonidovich	2.51	43	2.36	48	2.40
39	Lipitskiy, Vasiliy Semenovich	2.50	34	2.59	41	2.62
40	Ponomarev, Lev Aleksandrovich	2.49	41	2.40	46	2.48
41	Shcherbakov, Vladimir Ivanovich	2.43	35	2.58	34	2.84
42	Popov, Gavriil Kharitonovich	2.41	46	2.28	47	2.47
43	Romanov, Petr Vasilyevich	2.41	40	2.45	36	2.78
44	Anpilov, Viktor Ivanovich	2.35	48	2.24	42	2.57
45	Nikonov, Vyacheslav Alekseyevich	2.35	42	2.38	43	2.55

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
46	Boldyrev, Yuriy Yuryevich	2.34	45	2.32	39	2.67
47	Ryzhkov, Nikolay Ivanovich	2.31	44	2.35	45	2.49
48	Mityukov, Mikhail Alekseyevich	2.30	52	2.15	54	2.17
49	Mavrodi, Sergey Panteleyevich	2.24	56	1.98	60	1.77
50	Zadornov, Mikhail Mikhaylovich	2.22	47	2.26	50	2.33
51	Pochinok, Aleksandr Petrovich	2.22	59	2.19	53	2.19
52	Barkashov, Aleksandr Petrovich	2.12	53	2.11	51	2.25
53	Lukyanov, Anatoliy Ivanovich	2.10	54	2.10	49	2.33
54	Vartazarova, Lyudmila Stepanovna	2.07	51	2.17	52	2.24
55	Baburin, Sergey Nikolayevich	2.07	50	2.17	40	2.65
56	Shokhin, Aleksandr Nikolayevich	1.98	55	2.00	55	2.15
57	Lysenko, Vladimir Nikolayevich	1.92	57	1.91	56	2.01
58	Chilingarov, Artur Nikolayevich	1.89	58	1.85	57	1.99
59	Zolotukhin, Boris Andreyevich	1.80	59	1.80	62	1.69
60	Burbulis, Gennadiy Eduardovich	1.71	60	1.76	57	1.85
61	Travkin, Nikolay Ilyich	1.69	62	1.60	58	1.90
62	Khasbulatov, Ruslan Imranovich	1.67	61	1.61	61	1.72
63	Pamfilova, Ella Aleksandrovna	1.56	63	1.45	63	1.64
64	Vladislavlev, Aleksandr Pavlovich	1.41	64	1.39	64	1.53
65	Podoprigora, Vladimir Nikolayevich	1.35	65	1.34	65	1.38
66	Medvedev, Vladimir Sergeyevich	1.19	66	1.21	66	1.36
67	Kobelev, Viktor Vasilyevich	0.93	67	0.91	67	1.02
68	Burkov, Sergey Vasilyevich	0.71	68	0.73	68	0.74

Table 3. Future Ratings of "Apparat" Politicians for May, July, and December 1995 (Positions Within the Group)

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
1	Korzhakov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich	6.37	1	6.18	1	6.22
2	Grachev, Pavel Sergeyevich	6.01	5	5.52	7	4.97
3	Chubays, Anatoliy Borisovich	5.94	2	5.87	2	5.82
4	Kozyrev, Andrey Vladimirovich	5.88	3	5.59	4	5.27
5	Soskovets, Oleg Nikolayevich	5.54	4	5.56	3	5.63
6	Ilyushin, Viktor Vasilyevich	5.24	6	5.16	5	5.14
7	Filatov, Sergey Aleksandrovich	5.15	7	5.09	6	5.08
8	Yerin, Viktor Fedorovich	5.10	8	4.80	8	4.62
9	Stepashin, Sergey Vadimovich	4.75	9	4.63	11	4.42
10	Yasin, Yevgeniy Grigoryevich	4.52	10	4.49	12	4.27
11	Lobov, Oleg Ivanovich	4.35	12	4.26	13	4.25
12	Barsukov, Mikhail Ivanovich	4.28	11	4.38	9	4.53
13	Livshits, Aleksandr Yakovlevich	4.18	14	4.14	16	4.01
14	Ilyushenko, Aleksey Nikolayevich	4.16	16	4.04	20	3.77
15	Paramonova, Tatyana Vladimirovna	4.12	13	4.19	14	4.10
16	Baturin, Yuriy Mikhaylovich	4.12	15	4.08	15	4.03
17	Primakov, Yevgeniy Maksimovich	3.99	18	3.84	17	3.83
18	Panskov, Vladimir Georgiyevich	3.90	17	3.92	21	3.74
19	Satarov, Georgiy Aleksandrovich	3.74	20	3.80	19	3.77
20	Shoygu, Sergey Kuzhugetovich	3.58	22	3.61	23	3.51
21	Zaveryukha, Aleksandr Kharlampiyevich	356	19	3.81	18	3.81
22	Kokoshin, Andrey Afanasyevich	3.49	23	3.49	22	3.52

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
23	Ryabov, Nikolay Timofeyevich	3.40	21	3.66	10	4.45
24	Yarov, Yuriy Fedorovich	3.19	24	3.19	26	3.22
25	Shafranik, Yuriy Konstantinovich	3.10	25	3.17	24	3.26
26	Nikolayev, Andrey Ivanovich	2.97	26	2.98	27	3.17
27	Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich	2.77	27	2.94	25	3.25
28	Tumanov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich	2.71	28	2.82	28	3.11
29	Kolesnikov, Mikhail Petrovich	2.71	29	2.63	30	2.59
30	Kovalev, Valentin Alekseyevich	2.61	30	2.54	32	2.49
31	Nosovets, Sergey Anatolyevich	2.56	31	2.50	31	2.52
32	Resin, Vladimir Iosifovich	2.46	32	2.44	29	2.62
33	Tarpishchev, Shamil Anvarovich	2.31	34	2.22	34	2.14
34	Yegorov, Nikolay Dmitriyevich	2.19	35	2.13	35	2.06
35	Belyayev, Sergey Georgiyevich	2.16	33	2.29	33	2.30
36	Davydov, Oleg Dmitriyevich	2.07	36	2.05	36	2.03
37	Yakovlev, Aleksandr Maksimovich	2.04	37	1.92	37	1.95
38	Vorontsov, Yuliy Mikhaylovich	2.02	40	1.83	41	1.85
39	Pain, Emil Abramovich	1.92	41	1.81	42	1.61
40	Krasavchenko, Sergey Nikolayevich	1.89	42	1.81	39	1.86
41	Vitruk, Nikolay Vasilyevich	1.86	38	1.86	38	1.88
42	Krasnov, Mikhail Aleksandrovich	1.85	39	1.85	40	1.85
43	Volkogonov, Dmitriy Antonovich	1.48	48	1.36	52	1.24
44	Bolshakov, Aleksey Alekseyevich	1.48	44	1.43	46	1.38
45	Babichev, Vladimir Stepanovich	1.47	43	1.55	43	1.58
46	Pastukhov, Boris Nikolayevich	1.45	46	1.38	48	1.29

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
47	Volkov, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich	1.43	45	1.43	44	1.47
48	Churkin, Vitaliy Ivanovich	1.40	49	1.34	47	1.32
49	Sergeyev, Valentin Mikhaylovich	1.38	50	1.33	49	1.29
50	Medvedev, Sergey Konstantinovich	1.33	47	1.37	45	1.43
51	Kotenkov, Aleksandr Alekseyevich	1.33	52	1.22	51	1.25
52	Adamishin, Anatoliy Leonidovich	1.33	51	1.28	50	1.28
53	Lebedev, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich	0.98	53	0.96	53	0.97
54	Petrovskiy, Vladimir Fedorovich	0.96	54	0.92	54	0.89
55	Kostikov, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich	0.83	55	0.70	55	0.63

Table 4. Future Ratings of Regional Politicians for May, July, and December 1995 (Positions Within the Group)

May Position	Individual	May Points	July Position	July Points	December Position	December Points
1	Luzhkov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich	6.92	1	6.79	1	6.88
2	Dudayev, Dzhokhar Musayevich	5.34	2	4.85	8	3.35
3	Nemtsov, Boris Yefimovich	4.59	3	4.83	2	5.01
4	Aushev, Ruslan Sultanovich	4.34	5	4.24	4	4.45
5	Shaymiyev, Mintimer Sharipovich	4.17	4	4.33	3	4.66
6	Galazov, Akhsarbek Khadzhimurzayevich	3.52	6	3.50	6	3.59
7	Tuleyev, Aman-geldy Moldagazyyevich	3.22	7	3.41	5	3.67
8	Stroyev, Yegor Semenovich	2.98	8	3.07	7	3.37
9	Sobchak, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich	2.95	10	2.90	11	3.00
10	Fedorov, Nikolay Vasilyevich	2.93	9	2.96	9	3.23
11	Rossel, Eduard Edgardovich	2.64	11	2.78	10	3.02
12	Stepanov, Viktor Nikolayevich	2.61	12	2.70	12	2.86
13	Nikolayev, Mikhail Yefimovich	2.53	14	2.52	14	2.63
14	Tyazhlov, Anatoliy Stepanovich	2.48	13	2.54	13	2.70
15	Ilyumzhinov, Kirsan Nikolayevich	2.30	16	2.16	16	2.19
16	Rakhimov, Murtaza Gubaydullovich	2.17	15	2.25	15	2.41

*Roundup on Political Parties, Movements Taking Part in Elections

954F2485A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 23 May 95 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Mitrofanov and Inara Filatova under heading "Obstacle Course": "Election Poem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is 6 months till the elections. No more new independent forces can appear in the market of parties: the voters have already been offered not only all possible ideas for today's Russian Federation, but all possible combinations, up to and including the most ludicrous (for example, the combination of communism, [Russian Christian] Orthodoxy and market reforms). On the other hand, there seems to be no real choice. All that remains is to look for the least of all evils. Probably that, come autumn, is how the small and "weak" parties with their obedient flocks will align themselves in various blocs or political "pyramids."

According to rumors, May 17 was supposed to have been the cut-off registration date at the Ministry of Justice for organizations to participate in the December State Duma elections. That is, it seems that no public or political organizations, except those registered prior to that date, can officially nominate their candidates for public view after the the election date is announced. (Although it is impossible to say anything for sure, because the entire sequence of election campaign stages is laid down in a law still not signed by the President.)

Along with the games around the content of "election" laws and threats of postponing the elections, another intriguing process is taking place. Offices of political contractors and intermediaries are continuing to pop up. People close to current state structures have declared their special possibilities, while those farther out speak of fresh ideas or huge sums of money with which they could entice the electorate.

Truly, many of the newly organized blocs bring to memory the joke about the pushy Russian brokers who claimed to have struck a deal for the purchase of a carload of cement in exchange for a carload of rubles and who, after signing the deal, departed - one to look for the promised cement, the other, for the rubles.

But when the election date is officially announced (around August 17) the contractors who managed to register in the Ministry of Justice will have to start collecting signatures in support of their candidate lists; in other words, they will have to prove their political solvency. They have to get 200,000 signatures, with no more than 14,000 from one subdivision of the Federation. It is thus necessary to work over no less than 14 subdivisions of the Russian Federation.

Whatever the President would like, the extremists, whom he intends to "cut off" by proclaiming the creation of two election blocs, have no intention of clearing the way and are preparing for the elections. The most consistent opposition to Boris Yeltsin is, as is known, Communist and "Patriotic."

Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF]. CPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov is not far off the truth when he claims that today Russia is endowed with two communist parties: his own and the Tyulkin-Anpilov RCWP. The CPRF is, undoubtedly, the favorite among the Reds. Zyuganov claims that he has under him 550,000 dedicated party members and 20,000 primary organizations. According to him, this is more than all other registered parties combined.

Zyuganov invited everyone to join the election bloc of "state-patriotic forces," except, perhaps, Zhirinovskiy, but primarily Rutskoy, the Agrarian Party and labor unions. The former vice-president, however, responded from the rostrum of his "Derzhava" ["Great Power"] movement with derision. The self-confident agrarians organized a similarly named election get-together of their own, while the important labor unions from the Independent Trade Unions Federation [ITUF] ignored the communist's appeal.

The Zyuganov people, to be sure, will hardly grieve if they come to the December show alone. Provincial elections (as well as the recent election in Kolomna, where communist candidate Gherman Titov won) fill them with optimism. Furthermore, Zyuganov's opportunistic backing away from orthodox Leninism (which hopelessly destroyed his relations with the Anpilov revolutionaries) will help him lure a portion of the "Derzhava" votes from Rutskoy.

Russian Communist Workers Party [RCWP], "Worker Russia." Apparently disenchanted with the idea of putting the "Yeltsin gang on trial" through an all-Russia strike, "Worker Russia" and its core, the RCWP, have this time decided not to boycott the parliamentary elections. Speaking of the numerical strength of their party, the supporters of Viktor Anpilov are more modest than the Zyuganov people, boasting a total of 50,000 cohorts. They call their election association "Communists-Worker Russia." The Anpilov people are already selecting candidates at worker meetings.

Popular Resistance Union [PRU]. The smallest communist parties, which will hardly garner anything from the December elections, can only puff their cheeks. Or they can hurry and merge into something more representative. Sazhi Umlatova, for example, has already formed the Popular Resistance Union, uniting political dwarfs: Prigarin's Communist Union, Kryuchkov's Russian Party of Communists, and Shashviashvili's "Union" movement. The difference between the RCWP and the PRU is as much as between Gaidar and Yavlinskiy: only "of a tactical nature." So far the Anpilov people have no intention of merging with the Umlatova people because, they say, of the latter's small numbers.

All-Russia Bolshevik Communist Party [ARBCP]. The political midget ARBCP under the leadership of Nina Andreyeva has, it seems, no time for elections. The Bolsheviks prefer settling scores with their leader. For instance, recently a group of comrades expelled her from the party for "abandoning revolutionary activity." Now Nina Andreyeva has nothing left but to expel harmful comrades from the party.

National Bolshevik Party [NBP]. NBP leader Eduard Limonov, although displaying a desire for power, is currently ardently fighting only his former opposition friends. And so far with varying success: the newspaper ZAVTRA recently dubbed him "Edik-Velosipedik" [Eddie Biker]. But then, Limonov's party is make-believe. It consists of a handful of admirers of his literary talent who have decided to join the eccentric writer in carrying out a "national revolution."

The national patriotic spectrum of parties and movements is as discordant as the communists. At present there are three most noticeable groups the difference between which is only in the names of their leaders. These are Rutskoy's "Derzhava" movement, the Skokov-Lebed-Govorukhin Congress of Russian Communities [CRC], and, of course, Zhirinovskiy's LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia].

"Derzhava" Social Patriotic Movement. According to Rutskoy, "Derzhava" has a membership of around one million. The general managed to recruit so many braves for his "Derzhava" thanks to a technique conceived by him. During numerous political tours he simply handed out packets of application forms to his supporters. Rutskoy does not have that many people ready for serious party work. (And his choice of party-builder aides was not very good. Mikhail Astafyev and Viktor Aksyutich already failed the elections of their midget parties in 1993, and they could well sink "Derzhava" in 1995!) Be that as it may, Rutskoy will have no difficulty collecting the required number of signatures to take part in the elections. As a last resort he will make another tour of the provinces with his creative soirees.

Russian All-People's Union [RAPU]. According to Sergey Baburin, in the coming elections his union will rely only on itself. Since its origination the RAPU was conceived as a truly "all-people's" organization whose programs would include "all of the best" from imperial, Soviet and "perestroyka" Russia. The result has been neither here nor there, while Baburin's closest associates, like Nikolay Pavlov, have fled. The Baburin people will, most likely, have to look for companions not averse to such a varicolored ally.

Zhirinovskiy's party. According to expert opinion, the new parliament will have very few Zhirinovskiy people. Whereas in the 1993 elections no one knew them and the electorate was simply overwhelmed by the fireworks of Vladimir Volfovich's eloquence, by now the public has substantially sorted out what's what and sees that this guy is capable only of talking nonsense. Secondly, Mr. Zhirinovskiy has many powerful rivals claiming the same electorate. These are our patented "patriots" Rutskoy, Lebed, Romanov, N. Lysenko, Baburin, et. al., who were out of the game in 1993. Thirdly, an investigation by Aleksandr Sobyanin's group reveals that for "objective" reasons, to cover up their machinations, the organizers of massive voter fraud in 1993 were forced to assign a considerable number of votes specifically to Vladimir Volfovich's party. At the forthcoming parliamentary elections there will be no need for special gifts to Zhirinovskiy. Suggestions that Mr. Zhirinovskiy may come to terms with, say, Rutskoy can only cause a smile.

Congress of Russian Communities [CRC]. Initially the CRC united compatriots in the former Union republics, but recently it became a Russian organization. The absence of a charismatic leader (Skokov, Rogozin, Govorukhin and Glazyev can hardly be called charismatic, and General Lebed has still not finally defined himself) may not appeal to some of our citizens. But it will take the votes of the calmer and mentally balanced voters away from Rutskoy and Zhirinovskiy. The Russian CRC has some 70 regional organizations and, most important, money: the active participation of Yuriy Skokov, leader of the Manufacturers Federation, in preparations for the elections raises the chances of the "community folk." If only the CRC collective leadership does not squabble before the elections.

Russian National Assembly [RNA]. In the time that is left, RNA leader Aleksandr Sterligov will hardly be able to create anything more competitive than he already has. There is more to an election campaign than haranguing at news conferences about Jewish domination. Even among the all-out "patriotic" opposition Sterligov is routinely dubbed a clown, and the "assembly" around him Jew-baiters [zhidomor].

Russian National Republican Party [RNRP]. So far the RNRP has no intention of forming blocs with anyone. And it will probably be no more successful at the coming elections than before. However, even if RNRP leader Nikolay Lysenko again loses the election for his party he will not be overly upset. This time, too, he will probably prefer to save himself on his own and nominate himself in a single-mandate district somewhere in the provinces.

Russian National Unity. Aleksandr Barkashov always boasted his organization's ramified structure and high discipline. And even the fact that he managed to circumvent the law prohibiting the formation of party cells at plants. In his own words, at some plants he has organized RNU cells under the guise of labor unions. In general, the RNU leader boasts that he has more active fighters prepared to carry out any order of his than Zyuganov and Gaidar combined. However, the Nazis lost the fall election in Mytishchi. At the recent election in Kolomna their former cohort Vedenkin also failed to make it to the Duma. It is highly unlikely that unabashed Naziism will become fashionable by the December elections.

Russia Is Our Home. There can be no doubt that the Chernomyrdin people will collect their 200,000 [signatures]. They won't even have to strain themselves overly, since there are certainly at least as many bureaucrats of various levels scattered throughout the country. But "Our Home" will have to work hard to get an overwhelming number of Duma seats.

Figure out how many people from your house entrance will sign up for the new "Home." A retired veteran of party political work, plus a couple of grandmothers who will be given some sugar for this. But the broad masses—no, they won't come over. Nor is it that the movement still has no program, no platform, no goals. Simply, "Our Home" is not for us. There is no need even for explanations, analyses or studies. It is apparent at the subconscious level.

The "Home committee" will have to do something about a broad social base. Though they do have one really wonderful option: to join forces with the Beer Lovers Party. That will be a powerful force. Imagine Chernomyrdin with a keg of dark beer and Soskovets with a canister of lager. This way "Our Home" will have virtually no worthy opponents, and total victory in the election is assured.

"Realists" Association is a result of the efforts of the recently formed Industrial Party of Vladimir Shcherbakov and Arkadiy Volskiy. They began to implement the intention to "assume power in the country" proclaimed at their constituent convention with a feverish search for allies. The first to respond to the Industrial Party's call was the "Realists" Union of Yuriy Petrov, former head of the President's office. However, the ambitious directors were not satisfied with the acquisition of several nomenklatura people, plus a few unknown organizations belonging to the "Union."

Concern over the fate of "science-intensive, high-tech and processing industries," which will never be restored unless the ROPP [expansion unknown] gets into the State Duma, drove Vladimir Shcherbakov to Mikhail Shmakov's Independent Trade Unions Federation [ITUF]. Last week the ROPP president and the head of the "Realists" Association tried to persuade the labor leaders to enter into an alliance with them. The main argument in favor of uniting was, in the words of Mr. Shcherbakov, their common political orientation "to the very center, with no right or left deviations."

For the sake of his cause the ROPP leader conveniently forgot that back in March the trade unions had trumpeted their desire to create a "broad left-of-center coalition," calling on a fairly wide range of political forces to join it, from the agrarians and CPRF to the DPR and "Women of Russia."

The mass nature of their movement demonstrated by the labor leaders when organizing a nationwide day of protest has made the ITUF a desirable ally for many. Now, it seems, the labor bosses want to take a careful look at all potential partners. Having reacted coolly to the invitation from Zyuganov's CPRF, the labor leaders are in no rush to embrace the "directors." So far they have agreed only to continue negotiations. So the bloc's future is in doubt.

Whereas the "Women of Russia" are ready to enter the election on their own, with the sole purpose of not being "used" by male politicians "as a decorative element," their State Duma colleague Irina Khakamada has organized a bloc with three men. The co-chairmen of her "Common Cause" are now Anatoliy Korotich, president of the Independence Club, Stepan Orlov, chairman of the Liberal Youth Union, and Konstantin Truyevtsev, chairman of the "Living Ring" alliance.

In view of the low popularity of those organizations "Common Cause" will, most likely, have to rely on the image of its leader, Irina Mitsuovna. The thing is that Ms Khakamada sees her electorate among young people "unheard" by politicians, "who don't vote because politics have been force-fed to them."

Probably to keep from being accused of a desire to "force-feed," "Common Cause" has set forth its program in rather vague terms: to bring politics back to people's daily concerns and protect the interests of alienated and frustrated people. Primary in the drive for voters will be its president's "haircuts, endless sweaters, attendance of rock-'n-roll concerts and get-togethers [tusovki]." "I am a young deputy and it is all interesting to me. I hope young people will be interested in me," says Ms Khakamada.

She is confident that she will be able to capture no less than 10 percent of the electorate, provided TV time is fairly distributed among all participants in the election race. The bloc itself, its organizers concede, does not have too much money for the purchase of air time. So people may be denied features about the achievements of the art of hairdressing.

True, there is still hope in the association members themselves. "Living Ring" may be useful because of its experience in organizing rock concerts. If the bloc survives till the election the lovers of entertaining get-togethers will have a good time.

Attempting a political comeback is Vladimir Polevanov. The former State Property Committee chief, who is currently eking out as deputy chief of the President office's control department, has organized a social-political movement called New Russia.

In the election fight Vladimir Pavlovich will most likely cultivate the image of a sufferer for the good of the people. After all, he lost his prestigious position for attempting to renationalize what had been privatized according to Chubays. (In the view of radically minded Bolsheviks, this can be achieved only through revolution.)

Currently Mr. Polevanov is concerned with finding allies. Nationalists should like such statements of his as "Liberalism and democracy are not the Russian way," and his concerns about the absence of an "all-national idea" for Russia.

"Russia's Choice". At its convention the RCM ["Russia's Choice" Movement] welcomed the just launched construction of "Our Home." But it is ready to join the housing cooperative only in regional single-seat districts. The resolve to capture a majority in parliament on its own has been replaced by an active search for supporters for consolidation. They could include the "Forward, Russia!" movement, the Economic Freedom Party, and newly created democratic parties. In coalition with them, in the view of Boris Zolotukhin, the RCM can count on 40 percent of the vote.

"Yabloko". The fruit community can be joined only by those who fully endorse its program. The bloc, which relies on the "white-collar" community and reasonably thinking population of 70 regions, is confident of its strength. One of "Yabloko's" leaders, Vladimir Lukin, thinks that with a good campaign the bloc can count on 20 percent of the vote.

Economic Freedom Party [EFP]. Konstantin Borovoy is certain that his party stumbled at the 5-percent barrier in the last election only because the results were falsified. Borovoy intends to coordinate his actions with either "Yabloko" or "Russia's Choice." Although there is the possibility of creating an alternate bloc with other democrats.

Worker Self-Government Party. Recently established by Svyatoslav Fedorov, this party looks forward to 7 percent of the vote. Realizing that alone it will be difficult, the party hopes to woe Aleksey Kazannik's Popular Conscience Party. A coalition with other associations is possible, among them the ecological party "Kedr" [Cedar].

Forward, Russia! The movement, headed by Boris Fedorov, occupies a fairly good position in various sociological polls. This popularity may be due to the fact that Fedorov is new in the game and therefore arouses heightened interest.

Aleksandr Yakovlev's **Social Democracy Party** is still a dark horse. Yakovlev is still clearly lacking in popularity for the party to acquire any political capital.

Ecological Party "Cedar" is the only Green association in the election palette. Its leader, Anatoliy Panfilov, is optimistic. He estimates that with a successful bloc the party could win 7 percent of the electorate's vote. Panfilov is not even discouraged by his party's small membership—1,500 people—because he's confident he will be supported by numerous ecological movements in the regions.

PREDICTIONS

Vladimir Lukin: With good organization of the election campaign "Yabloko" will get 20 percent of the vote and win the election.

Boris Zolotukhin: It is still hard to say who specifically will win. But one thing is clear: "Russia's Choice," "Yabloko," PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord], and "Our Home" will get a large share of the votes - 40 percent.

Konstantin Borovoy: The democrats will get the most votes - 60 percent. "Our Home" will lose the election with a bang.

[Illustrated forecast by party]:

1. Most likely will not even get enough signatures in support. 2. Will get signatures, but will win no seats in the Duma. 3. Will win seats in the Duma.

Economic Freedom Party: 1 Russia's Democratic Choice: 2 "Yabloko": 3 "Common Cause": 1 "Russia is Our Home": 3 "Realists": 1 RDDR [Russian Movement of Democratic Reform]: 1 Worker Self-Government Party: 2 Social Democracy Party: 1 "New Russia": 1 "Accord": 1 Agrarian Party: 3 Communist Party of the RF: 3 RCWP, "Worker Russia": 1 National Bolshevik Party: 1 Beer Lovers Party: 1 "Cedar" and other ecologists: 1 Congress of Russian Communities: 1 "Derzhava": 1 LDPR: 2

*'Our Home — Russia' Bloc's Goals Criticized

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[Article by Anatoliy Kostyukov and Lev Sigal, under rubric "The Party Club": "The Premier's Roof Is in Good Working Order"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Tomorrow, on 12 May, in the movie center on Krasnaya Presnya, the RF government is conducting a congress of the federal and regional leadership at which it is planned to found the "Our Home — Russia" electoral bloc.**

Judging from the quality of the preparatory work that has been done by the government's apparatus, the congress will proceed in an organized manner and will end with the playing of the national anthem. The "Our Home — Russia" right-centrist bloc will be founded, and Viktor Chernomyrdin will be elected manager. It is expected that the congress participants will include delegations from all the subjects of the Federation (representation norm: three delegates from each subject, preferably with the president or governor at the head), as well as emissaries from the "Stability" and "New

Regional Policy" deputy groups, the PRES [Russian Party of Unity and Accord] faction, and a large number of well-known individuals who are entering the new organization on principles of personal membership. A total of 450 hotel rooms have been ordered for out-of-town participants and, as those in the government apparatus are convinced, there will be no empty beds.

Observers note the Stakhanovite rates that have been set by the builders of "Our Home." On 25 April President Yeltsin issued a state production order for the construction of the right-centrist association, and on 12 May the project is being turned over for operation. In two and a half weeks "right centrism" triumphantly strode across the country. Regional organizations of the bloc have already been created in many subjects of the Federation. Not only governors and mayors are proclaiming themselves to be adherents of the new movement, but also, here and there, as in Novosibirsk, absolutely all the members of the local administration. Thus, it is possible to establish that what has been achieved is a consolidation of the bureaucracy that is unprecedented in the past ten years — a consolidation around its new Central Committee, although that did not become part of the platform minimum that was declared by the superintendents of the new party construction project. Another fact that is just as obvious: not one of the tasks that the superintendents declared has been fulfilled or, one would think, can scarcely be fulfilled in the future.

What are the stated goals of "official centrism"? "Overcome the petty party principle that does not express anything or represent anyone." But the highly placed party builders obviously are not succeeding in gathering under one banner any considerable number of parties — the small, but proud ones. The congress organizing committee received from them a tremendous number of applications for guest tickets, but the only groups that "subscribed" for delegate mandates were Shakhray's greatly reduced PRES and the semimythical "Regions of Russia" and "Stable Russia" movements. So Chernomyrdin will have to start cooking his stew with an axe, with the political associations proper acting as the axe, and the basic ingredients being such "parties" as the Cabinet of Ministers, Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee on the Administration of State Property], the branch ministries, "Gazprom," the regional administrations, the state SMI [mass media], and, secretly, the administration of the RF president. A large amount of importance is attached to membership in the bloc of authoritative individuals, including captains of industry (Messrs. Vyakhirev, Bekh, Kadannikov, Korovin, etc.), cultural luminaries headed by Lyudmila Zykina, and free-business magnates, including Messrs. Berezovskiy,, Boyko, Khodorkovskiy, Smolenskiy...

The second task of the Kremlin party project is to "strengthen political centrism, to cut off the extremist wings." Here too there has been no success. One continues to understand by the term "centrism" the equal remoteness from the "collective Yeltsin" and his communal-patriotic opponents. Now, however, official propaganda treats centrism as a movement for prolonging the mandate of today's authority, which would be too radical a principle even for conservatism. It is understandable that this kind of "centrism" is not capable of "cutting off" Zhirinovskiy, Rutskoy, or Zyuganov. At best it can draw away some of the supporters of "Russia's Choice" [VR], who viewed VR exclusively as the "party of power" and who constitute, according to computations made by "Russia's Choice" sociologist Leonid Gozman, approximately one-third of those sympathizing with that organization.

What "Our Home" is realistically capable of doing is to draw away financial means from the opposition associations of democratic persuasion. According to rumors, it has already been recommended to businessmen who support "Yabloko" that they think a bit about the more efficient channeling of their political investments. It is obvious that the infusions of money into the "party of ministers and governors" will be so great that there will be an automatic rise in the market price of the services linked with the electoral campaign, and that price will prove to be beyond the means of many associations. In this instance, all that will remain for the "nonsavers" to do is to hope that "you can't buy our nation with dollars" and that, whatever the weather, the only citizens who will vote for the leadership bloc are those who are more or less satisfied with that leadership (that is, from a force of 20 percent of the voters). This, naturally, is a forecast only for the parliamentary election. The presidential campaign is a completely different game, a different choice of alternatives.)

Yet another task announced by the Kremlin "centrists" is "to create a stable two-party system, as in England or the United States." The fulfillment of this task is also being disrupted. If Chernomyrdin has at least a roof on "Our Home," on the adjacent site where Ivan Rybkin has been instructed to build an "alternative" centrist edifice that is supposed to rise on the constructive criticism of the government's achievements, absolutely nothing has been done. The prospect of servile leftist centrism has not yet attracted a single patented leftist centrist. Not even anything like PRES has proven to be at hand for Rybkin. It is also difficult with individuals and state offices — for the time being, the speaker is in America looking for furniture for his dacha, and the headlong prime minister has privatized everything.

From among the departments whose presence in the party rolls may guarantee success in the election, so far Tsentrizbirkom [Central Electoral Commission', Genprokuratura [General Procuracy], and the Constitutional Court have not been included in the "centrist movement." However, certain experts assume that the inclusion of these institutions would be too impudent a challenge to the electoral legislation. It is sufficient, they say, that the founders of the "Cherno-Rybkin two-party system" ignored Yeltsin's still unrepealed edict concerning departization and, in essence, are returning the agencies of state administration to the bosom of the directing and guiding party.

This also was not declared as a political goal, and now many people are reproaching the authors of the "large-bloc project" of being insincere. One would scarcely recognize this reproach as being well-grounded on the basis of naivete — it would be much more justified to think that the "party of power" is completely sincere in its desire to block an honest election and to commit malfeasance to the extent that is necessary.

Independent centrist Gavriil Popov recently prepared and disseminated a three-page inventory of the illegal acts that will definitely occur in the election campaign of the governmental bloc. They include the satisfying of election needs by the use of administrative buildings, governmental transportation, the work time of government employees, temporary-duty funds, electioneering during the course of official trips, and privileged access to the "blue screen" [television]. In addition, administrative pressure on the personnel at the lower levels is inevitable. For any regional administrator, failure to enter the official bloc and to guarantee an organized vote "as necessary" is a stern test both of his political loyalty and his professional suitability. It is clear that, on the basis of the election results, the people getting the grade of "Outstanding" will get governmental preferences, and those getting the grade of "Unsatisfactory" will get a certificate of incomplete conformity to official requirements.

The fate of the party being gathered by the premier is such that, no matter what he does, it is always like a detective story. If the party finances his election with budgetary money, that will be embezzlement of public funds. If it takes donations from bankers and oil traders, that is bribery. It does not have any other sources. If there were any justice in Russia, the home-building activity of the ministers and governors would have been already discontinued on the basis of the results of the constituent congress, but inasmuch as there is not yet any justice, the opponents of the ministerial bloc are hoping only that, with the election also, "everything will turn out as usual" for the government.

Incidentally, the assurance of the failure of the status "centrists" is so great that what seems to many to be the real purpose of this undertaking is not the elevation of Chernomyrdin and Rybkin, but, conversely, their elimination by means of disgrace in the election. OBSHCHAYA GAZETA commentators heard this version not only from the professionally mistrustful political experts, but also from such an experienced and cautious official as FNPR chairman Mikhail Shmakov. The nonparticipation of perspicacious tactician Kozyrev in the premier's bloc is also symptomatic.

The fact that the failure of the government's self-made structure is definitely not precluded from the Kremlin computations, as presidential aide Georgiy Satarov indirectly confirmed to an OBSHCHAYA GAZETA commentator. In his opinion, by operating in accordance with the principle "the worse, the better." that is, by losing the Duma election and intimidating Russia with the victory of the "Red-Browns," it is easy to achieve the re-election of Boris Yeltsin. There also exists the opinion that the failure of the "Cherno-Rybkin movement" may serve Yeltsin as a psychological basis for canceling the presidential election.

All this, apparently, is possible. It is only the fears concerning Viktor Chernomyrdin that seem to be groundless. For the time being, he has successfully outplayed everyone who attempted to equate him to a petty small-change figure. As soon as the prospect of a scandal appears, the premier will probably be able to cast off silently to the side. Especially since no one even considers him to be the initiator of the party "construction project of the century." Having at first not decided which kind of centrism — leftist or rightist — he was planning to develop, Chernomyrdin, by only that stipulation, provided himself with a reliable alibi. It is understandable to everyone that the premier is fussing around not because of his own will, and he has neither the time nor the desire to get involved in these stupidities.

*Delay of Parliamentary Elections 'for Technical Reasons' Suggested

954F2473B Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 11-17 May 95 No 19, p 8

[Article by Nikolay Troitskiy, under rubric "Crux of the Matter": "There Will Probably Be No Election This Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In all probability, the parliamentary election in Russia can no longer be held by the date specified by the Constitution — 17 December 1995. In order for this to happen, it will not be necessary to cancel it or postpone it — the delay will happen by itself, "for technical reasons."

The two houses of the Federal Assembly were unable to come to an understanding between themselves with regard to the election laws. The essence of the differences of opinion between the Duma deputies and the senators with regard to the Law "Election of Deputies to the State Duma" has been known for a long time. The Duma deputies are guided by "healthy conservatism" and want to preserve today's procedure of representation: half the deputies are elected on the basis of party lists, and half on the basis of ordinary single-mandate districts. The senators object, saying, "All your parties function only within the Sadovoye Koltso, and that is definitely not all of Russia." The senators would eagerly cancel all the party lists, but in the extreme instance are agreeable to having them used to elect one-third of the deputies to the Duma, and having two-thirds elected by districts.

In order to resolve this conflict, a conciliation commission was created. Representatives of the Duma proposed a trade: the upper house agrees with the "conservative" alternative of distributing the seats in the future Duma, and the Duma deputies, in response, adopt such a law "Formation of the Federation Council" that is kind to the senators.

First the trade went successfully, and the SF [Federation Council] Committee on Constitutional Legislation agreed to the mutually advantageous transaction. But then something indefinite occurred: the Federation Council did not support its special committee and last week it again rejected the Duma law. Inspired by the highly principled attitude of the other members of his house, SF chairman Vladimir Shumeyko stated, "If the Duma wants an election, let it agree to a compromise!" But a compromise, as is generally the situation in Russian politics, is possible only on those terms that the side proposing it sets.

What does this mean? Theoretically the Duma can strike a pose and attempt to overcome the upper house's veto. But, according to the experts, this is not very probable: the Duma has four factions — no less than a hundred votes — that are solidly with the senators. The enraged deputies also will scarcely agree to the "compromise" proposed by Shumeyko, and if they do agree, it will not be any easier.

The simplest thing is to change the figures in the text of the law. There had been 225 single-mandate districts. Now there will be 300. But this digital adjustment will lead to an unforeseen time delay, since Tsentrizbirkom [Central Electoral Commission] will have to make a completely new "cut" of the electoral districts, and to form 50 additional district electoral commissions. This can be done only in conformity with a federal law that still has to be developed and enacted. All these procedures, according to estimates by Vladimir Isakov, chairman of the State Duma's Committee on Legislation, will take no less than three months. But a parliamentary election has to be announced four months prior to the date for holding it. That is a total of seven months. Also, the countdown has to be made from the day that the law on elections to the Duma goes into effect, and, even under the most favorable circumstances, this cannot happen earlier than June. Thus, it will not be possible to schedule an election to the Duma even by 31 December.

The fate of the Federation Council, new convocation, is even more hazy. The legislative bill concerning its formation has so far been accepted only in the first reading. It also was sustained in the spirit of "healthy conservatism" — just like the first time, it is proposed that the senators be elected by the entire nation. That idea has already encountered the furious opposition of all the strong people in this world — the administration heads, Shumeyko, the president, and even Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin. Kremlin jurists and those who share their views feel that, once the Constitution has had written into it "the formation of the Federation Council," there cannot be any elections, and the persons who must be delegated to become part of the future senate on the basis of the positions they hold are the heads of the executive and representative authorities of subjects of the Federation. It is understandable that this kind of *nomenklatura* house is extremely convenient for the authorities, but is not to the liking of many elected parliamentarians. The latter assert that the concept of "formation" can also include within itself an "election," and that there is no contradiction here with the Basic Law. Incidentally, many members of the Constitutional Court also adhere to this opinion.

But this linguistic finding will scarcely influence the fate of the law on formation of the senate — it most probably will not pass through the Federation Council, and even if, by some miracle, that does happen, then it will be awarded a presidential veto, and even a houseful of votes is not enough to overcome it. Incidentally, just in case, Shumeyko sent out a circular message to all the subjects of the Federation: in no instance should they support that legislative bill. Vladimir Isakov, who reported on the speaker's initiative (the genuineness of the circular message was also confirmed by many SF deputies who asked to remain anonymous), feels that Vladimir Filippovich should have been brought to court for "hampering the activities of the agencies of state authority."

Of course, one may make one's own judgement, but, all things considered, the election will still have to be postponed until next year. To put it cynically, domestic "democracy" will not suffer from this; it can get along perfectly without any parliament at all. But it will be somewhat awkward in the eyes of foreigners — after all, Boris Yeltsin has promised several times that the election will be held on time.

*Zhirinovskiy, Others Assess Chances of Forming Opposition Bloc

954F2487A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 May 95 p 9

[Newspaper poll of politicians: "5x2; Ten"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. To what extent do the prospects of the formation of two electoral blocs correspond to the realities of Russian politics?

2. What is the probability of the formation of an electoral bloc of the united opposition?

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, State Duma deputy, LDPR leader: 0, 0

Aleksey Kara-Murza, political scientists: 5/2, 1

Yekaterina Lakhova, State Duma Deputy, Women of Russia faction: 0, 0

Vyacheslav Nikonov, State Duma Deputy: 8, 0

Aleskandr Chuyev, Political Council chairman, Russian Christian-Democratic Party: 5, 3

From 0 to 2: Awful, very bad; from 3 to 5: tolerable, satisfactory; from 6 to 8: good, quite well; from 9 to 10: excellent, great. Mean grade: 1: 3.6/3.0; 2: 0.8

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy:

1. The strong parties will join neither a center-right nor a center-left bloc. The formation of blocs demonstrates the political impotence of the groups that came to power on the wave of Gorbachev's "perestroyka" but failed to justify the people's hopes for a better life and, on the contrary, wrecked, ravaged and plundered the country.

2. Such a bloc is impossible and, besides, unnecessary. The largest parties have sufficient strength to conduct independent campaigns for elections to the State Duma. For example, the LDPR has no intention of joining in a bloc with anyone. Perhaps the small parties and groups will do that, but in any case none of those alliances can be called a "united election bloc of a united opposition."

Aleksey Kara-Murza:

1. The Chernomyrdin bloc has opportunities for financially and governmentally influencing the electorate, in the first place through the budget and occupied government positions. "Russia is Our Home" can, in my view, count on around 13 percent of the vote. Its possibilities can be estimated at 5 points. I think that nothing will come of the contemplated "Rybkin Bloc": the main left-wing forces—agrarians, communists, social-democrats—will hardly unite under that banner, because they count on getting their votes independently. I think they will easily overcome the 5-percent barrier. Therefore the possibilities of the Rybkin bloc are no more than two points.

In general, I must say that the formation of these two blocs is not appropriate to the situation in the country.

2. I think that such a bloc is impossible. More precisely, it is possible legally, but it has nothing to count on. The "left" votes will split between the communists and agrarians, the "great power" ["derzhavnyye"] votes of the statists, between Rutskoy, Zhirinovskiy, and Lebed-Glazyev-Govorukhin. A bloc of extreme political figures like Anpilov or Barkashov can hardly hope to gain support in the society.

Yekaterina Lakhova:

1. One should not artificially engage in socio-political structurization of society and mislead Russians.

2. The opposition to the government the and President is itself at two opposing poles, which will never merge.

Vyacheslav Nikonov:

1. The realities of Russian politics are:

a) All parties, blocs and movements have always been created from above;

b) Power has always fought to preserve power (and not only in Russia);

c) There is a clear dichotomy of social interests along the lines "freedom"-"social justice," those who pay taxes-those who get budget money, "our people"-"not our people";

d) It is necessary to see how various slogans, ideologies and figures fare in the Duma elections so as to test the waters for the presidential election.

At the same time, two blocs won't work out: there will be many more.

2. Firstly, in the 20th century, the contradictions within communist and related movements were the most irreconcilable differences in the world.

Secondly, it is impossible to imagine, say, Yavlinskiy and Zhirinovskiy joining together in the framework of a common electoral bloc.

Aleksandr Chuyev:

1. This is a natural development of the situation; it could not have been otherwise. Of course, the presidential and government team in power is concerned with the problem of retaining that power. However, if the president had organized only the Chernomyrdin bloc everything would have been clear and not new. It is hard to predict the future of Rybkin's bloc, which depends on who joins it. To say that "Russia is Our House" will score an absolute victory is, of course, wrong. The most it can count on is around 15 percent of the votes. If the speaker's bloc proves unifying it, too, can count on votes. However, it seems to me that the establishment of a two-party system in Russia is impossible: the country is too large to divide its mentality in two.

Besides, Russia has no two-party tradition, there is no such historical experience.

2. Such an association is hardly possible: the radicals will be incapable of coming to terms among themselves about anything. Every politician in this part of the political spectrum is too ambitious.

The most they can do is attend rallies together, but not engage in political activities together. Besides, the prestige of this kind of leaders among the people is not great. This could be seen in the Kolomna election: Vedenkin got the least votes.

*Chernomyrdin's 'Russia Is Our Home' Party Dismissed

954F2487B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 May 95 p 10

[Article by Stanislav Assekritov under heading "Prognosis": "Chernomyrdin Against Chernomyrdin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The much-suffering Russian people, who daily experience for themselves the total disaster of the government's policy, stubbornly continue to believe in a Miracle. Not, of course, that loaves of bread will grow on trees, but something greater, more significant, national, if you wish.

From time to time the script writers and puppeteers from the cabinets of power toss us such "miracles." True, without any firm belief that they will be accepted seriously. But they do so, nevertheless, just to test the waters. The last such trial balloon was the formation of Mr. Chernomyrdin's power party. What kind of miracle is that? Let us try to see, based on the speech of the movement's newly proclaimed leader and the political statement of the "Russia is Our Home" movement's convention.

I quote verbatim: "Our program is a program of serious people used to serious work. A program of professionals who know what to do, and how to do it..." But what is the seriousness and knowledge of those people if in four years of reforms, including the last two with Chernomyrdin's government in power, the country's economy has been thrown back dozens of years, while the absolute majority of the citizens of Russia have been placed at the threshold of survival? Facts are stubborn things, and they cast doubt on the claim that the government team knows what to do, and how to do it.

This is a very serious delusion of the prime-minister and those around him. It is based on the myth that there is no alternative to the government's policy. In the alleged absence of any more pragmatic and accessible program for leading Russia out of the crisis, Mr. Chernomyrdin bolsters his conviction with the claim that there simply are no clever people outside the White House. This is cynically stated in his report as follows: "If we do not organize, others will. People incapable of operating not only a machine tool, but even themselves. People who will plunge the nation and its economy into a new experiment, inevitably nudging the society towards dictatorship." In other words, everyone around us are numskulls and enemies of the people!

Analyzing the pathetic results of the actions of the government headed by V.S. Chernomyrdin and his program speech as the leader of a political movement, one can't help wondering, which Chernomyrdin will win? The party functionary sets tasks which the premier does not perceive, although they are one and the same person.

For example, I would like to know the true reaction of the head of government to such words of the political movement's leader as: "The movement will aim the executive power..." No less interesting is the statement that "the movement must create civilized mechanisms for making economic decisions..." That is, party man Chernomyrdin accuses statesman Chernomyrdin that up to now the government has been making decisions by uncivilized methods, without thinking them over, without taking into account the views of the people concerned, with even less concern for the consequences. Why, after such an accusation a top-level state bureaucrat should simply retire and all his decisions should be reviewed.

Probably realizing that to fight against oneself is difficult, and in some ways ridiculous, Mr. Chernomyrdin, as head of the party, decided to take over from himself part of his functions as head of government. Thus, henceforth "the movement will ensure the stability of Russia's banking system." "The movement's task is to pursue a balanced and realistic social policy." True enough! The government has been doing nothing of the sort, these are its most vulnerable points. Nor will it do this, since it does not fit into its policy of non-deficit budget and noninflationary development at the cost of worsening living standards. But it is not hard to guess how the political movement will do this.

We are used to the authorities fooling us at every turn, attempting to put rosy-tinted glasses on our eyes and lull us with false assertions that the situation is changing for the better. For more than three years we have been hearing a paean to government actions sung by a chorus of government bureaucrats. One is amazed at the immorality and cynicism of the statements of those entrusted with people's lives. Clearly, entrusted by mistake!

In his address at the convention Mr. Chernomyrdin said: "We must listen to Russia, we must hear it." Very correct! But from whom did he hear the conclusion, which he then broadcast, that "many are beginning to live better"??? Who are those many? Take the report for the 1st quarter, Mr. Premier: during that period alone real incomes of the population declined more than 30 percent. Since the beginning of the year the number of people living below the poverty threshold increased by another 20 percent. Because the death rate exceeds the birth rate the nation has physically declined by one million people. Those who are living better can be counted on one's fingers, with a list of their names. Although there certainly is one, since the participants in "Your Home's" convention were registered.

What awaits the ordinary Russian, what miracles will we be served? Flirting with himself, the leader of the new political organization asks: 'How can we achieve stability?" To which he himself replies: "We consider that we have sufficient laws, forces and means to handle this." So why hasn't anything been done? Why wait for instructions about the creation of an election bloc? If the executive power has everything to achieve stabilization, but there is no stabilization in sight, what will change with the appearance of a parallel cabinet of ministers in the form of a political force?

How can one believe a political movement which proclaims its objective of "ensuring the food independence of Russia," when in the 1st quarter of this year the government—which is that movement—did not allocate a single kopeck to the agrarian sector for the sowing campaign? How can one believe a movement which in words advocates free medicine and education while the namesake premier at the same time signs commitments to the International Monetary Fund to quickly, already in 1995, privatize entities of that entire social sphere? How can one believe a movement which declares that the state has sufficient forces and means to set things in order in Russia, while over the last few years the state itself, in the person of the leader of the movement and head of government, has created conditions for out-of-control criminal groups, for corruption and the spread of Mafia activities, for a parallel shadow economy already exceeding in scale the state controlled system of economic management?

Most ordinary people have long since lost interest in all political games. And the new invention of the bureaucrats from the presidential and government teams will, apparently, also not be taken seriously by the bulk of the population. There is no confidence in either the government or the party it has set up. Nor should one think that the people are a gray mass which will rush to the ballot boxes to vote for bankrupt, lying bureaucrats.

It is disgusting that once again people are trying to rob us! We are paying exorbitant taxes to maintain a hundred-thousand-strong army of government. Having launched a political foray to preserve their power and their chairs at the table with the fat pie, the government and its entire machinery, which has been drawn into the election fight, requires additional fiscal infusions. This is a separate item of expenditures over which few have control. But this is also our money churned through banks, through enterprises, through the mass media, through fine-honed schemes for turning state budget funds into the personal holdings of the individuals whom Mr. Chernomyrdin mentioned as living better.

The convention organizers' claims that it was financed not by government funds but by donations from its sponsors—GAZ, VAZ, KamAZ, their own Gazprom, and others—are simply insulting. It was precisely those enterprises which recently received substantial benefits and major financial support from the government. Perhaps these are the moneys which are now called sponsorship aid to the new bloc?

I think the newly formed government party has jeopardized its existence by unequivocally declaring that "it is necessary to continue the fiscal and budget policy," which, as we know, has led to the collapse of our industry and agriculture, has destroyed our social sphere and made half the country paupers. This party considers that "an attempt to change the logic of current reforms, an attempt to turn them aside is the worst manifestation of revolutionary impatience and intolerance." In other words, we are being told that it is necessary to continue to slide into the abyss, into the void from which there will no longer be any escape. But how not to change the logic when science, independent experts, Duma factions and other political movements are demonstrating with facts that the government's road is hopeless and harmful. Is it really necessary to wait for the final collapse of national production and a social explosion in the society to finally understand this?

In my view, the formation of any socio-political organization by decree is a manifestation of the old regime. Orders to subordinate structures to join the party and provide financial and organizational support are a throwback to the command system. But it is precisely that echo of the past which indicates a new attempt to restore the dictatorship of a government party of CPSU vintage. But the society has changed, it is striving towards a new, normal life which every Russian deserves. That is why there can be no victories in the struggle of Chernomyrdin against Chernomyrdin, and any outcome is a defeat for him, the authors, and participants in this spectacle.

*One Year Later, Civic Accord Agreement Assessed

954E1022 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 30 May 95 p 2

[Article by Lyubov Tsukanova: "Government and Society: Dialogue Is Only Beginning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **From a Message to the Federal Assembly from the President of the Russian Federation:**

A serious obstacle on the road to democracy is the absence here of a developed system of rules and procedures for resolving conflicts and finding compromises between various groups in society as well as between social groups and the state. It is hard to overestimate the role of the Civic Accord Agreement in perfecting this system.

If you were to ask the average Russian citizen what he knows about the Civic Accord Agreement, you could predict with great confidence that he would merely shrug his shoulders in response. If the question were posed differently, however:—Has life in the country become calmer over the past year?—the answer would be more specific. Some might answer: How can it be calmer if there is a war going on in Chechnya. Another might judge things differently: People in government are arguing, but they aren't fighting anymore; opposition meetings are taking place, but without the former excesses; strikes do occur, but they end, as a rule, with agreements between the disputing parties.

The average citizen does not need to see the connection between the resolution of any conflict and the mechanism that has made possible its decision. It is the result that is important to him. Politicians, however, must see and know whether and how well the levers that they use to maintain civic peace in the country are working. For them, the Civic Accord Agreement, concluded a year ago, is one of the working instruments that should aid in resolving as well as preventing serious social conflicts. In essence, this is what we are talking about: Is this a functioning, able instrument, or is it a rattle being used to distract attention, a screen to hide the real policy making from the populace?

Participants of the Saturday session of the Russian president's Civic Chamber were attempting to answer exactly that question: a mechanism has been created in the country which is aiding, for better or worse, progress in relations between the state and society. After all, as Sergey Filatov, RF presidential administration chief, observes, in 70 years the state has forgotten how to deal with society as an equal. True, the authorities have begun learning to listen, but they still have not learned how to answer; that is, there is still no real dialogue between the state and society. The Civic Accord Agreement was called upon to become a school for this kind of dialogue.

If one attempts to analyze how dialogue has developed over the last year since the Agreement was signed, it is easy to notice that it has been most successful between state governmental structures—the president, the government, the Federal Assembly. Coordination of draft laws is becoming the norm, an appropriate joint commission has been created, and compromises have been reached on several serious draft laws. Even though far from all the laws that the country desperately needs and that are designated top-priority by the Agreement are adopted and remain the subject of hot discussion, today legislative work has ceased to be a "mine field." Even though the political tension between parliament and the president and the government exists, it has never grown to the degree that one might call a crisis in government. The branches of government always seem to remember that they are all sprung from the same tree.

Improving interaction between government and social institutions is significantly more complicated. Society has not experienced any positive results from the socioeconomic reforms, all the more as a general decline in production continues; the first quarter of 1995 noted a drop in the population's standard of living. An indicator of the trouble is the growth in the number of strikes: in the first quarter of this year, according to data from Mikhail Shmakov, leader of the FNPR [Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia], more strikes were recorded than for all of 1994. The greater portion of them have to do with delays in wage payments. This is the "point" that is the most obvious and disturbing to society; it is the area in which the government is failing to fulfill it obligations in the Civic Accord Agreement. In the sphere of socioeconomic relations between the government and the population, the most powerful intermediary is the trade unions. In their very essence, these are non-political organizations, their sphere of operations is labor disputes, and it should be noted that in cases where trade unions are fighting violations of specific labor rights, they are successful in resolving the conflicts. The events at AvtoVAZ and AZLK [Leninist Komsomol Truck Plant] can serve as an example. Unfortunately, the trade committees occasionally act not so much as defenders of the workers as they do lobbyists for branch interests; there are many examples of this. This is a consequence of the fact that the trade unions as a social institution are, as before, a dependent force, but before they were dependent on the state, where now they are dependent on one department or another. In essence, the government is lacking the skills required to conduct a politically correct dialogue, while many social institutions have not had time to acquire them, either.

In general, the greatest test for the Civic Accord Agreement and for civic peace as a whole has been the armed conflict in Chechnya. In it, as in a drop of water, are reflected all the problems of political interactions between government and society. The lack of a preliminary public examination of such important decisions for the country; the inability and occasionally lack of desire on the part of the government to explain distinctly to citizens the motives for its actions and the chaos, an unsystematic approach and the predominating emotionalism of the public reaction to frightening government actions, both parties' lack of desire to listen to each other's arguments—all these things influence the average citizen's opinion that with a war going on at Russia's border, it is strange to talk about a civic peace.. It would be more fair to draw from it the conclusion that the Chechen crisis should never be allowed to end attempts at achieving civic accord or to break those fragile, still weak but already functioning, mechanisms for joint action between government and social institutions on festering—in the literal or figurative sense—problems. This cannot be allowed to happen, as we bear in mind most of all that not only the branches of government but government and society as a whole are not alone. They are both grew from a single tree—the Russian state.

New Party's Prospects for Winning Doubtful

954F2514A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English 19-25 May 95 No 19, p 2

[Article by Tatyana Yakhlakova: "The Project To Create a Two-Party System Is Most Likely Doomed to Failure; Will the Party of Power Become the Ruling Party"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The abundance of high-ranking guests and delegates to the constituent congress of the movement, which is to be known as "Russia Is Our Home," was reminiscent of an enlarged meeting of the Council of Ministers, with the participation of deputies and representatives from the business elite.

When Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's predecessors founded the "parties of power" (which is precisely what those attending the congress decided to call themselves), they were careful not to use this formula in their name. Both Alexander Rutskoi, who was the first to be suspected of such activity, and Yegor Gaidar, who closed the chain of similar initiatives, did not consider themselves to be in a position of power, even when one was vice-president, and the other headed the government de facto. Now, those who have retained this power, or who have obtained it following the primary redivision of property, are entering the political scene to reign and to rule. This, perhaps, boils down to the main hallmark of the current moment.

On the other hand, the trend is logical. However, is it the right tie for the party to count on success? In the given case, the point is not to overcome the five-percent barrier and form a faction in the Duma. The game started with faith in a crushing victory, which would make it possible to form a one-party ("responsible," "professional") government. In other words, what are the chances that the party of power will become a ruling party?

If some of the parties represented in the present Duma, and several somewhat extremist parties from aside were to join Chernomyrdin's bloc, the chances of fulfilling the minimum program would be sufficiently high. Similarly, the "left-of-center" wing (led by speaker Ivan Rybkin) should also have been formed. Its project resembled that of the "right-of-center" wing so closely, that even their founders confused them at first. The two major factions would then have formed the parliamentary majority (60 percent of the seats) of the united (not in organizational terms, or course) party of power. This was evidently the basis of optimistic forecasts.

Unfortunately, the elegant project failed. The parties were reluctant to waive their principles (and what led the developers to think otherwise?), whereas the left-wing link basically fell out of the construction. Chernomyrdin's bloc will now have to win the sought-after votes single-handedly. But from what sources?

It will hardly be possible to sway the party electorate: it is more or less stable. However, even if a tiny bit is taken away from each party, these votes will not make a difference.

It is both risky and naive to hope that "the work collectives of many thousands," which joined the party of power in a single impulse, will just as unanimously vote for it at the elections.

Trying to "awaken" those who did not take part in the pervious elections will encounter stiff competition from rivals, who are able to juggle the notions of stability, great state, tranquil life, etc., with equal zeal.

What remains are those who actually make up the party of power: the leaders of regions and republics, large-scale industrial enterprises, as well as those of financial and enterprising structures. Their true strength lies in the majority-vote constituencies, where these people will undoubtedly do all they can to direct the election campaign toward the channel they need.

It looks as though themselves there is no hope that the party of power will manage to get the controlling package of seats in such conditions. Moreover, no other result, no matter how honorable, will fulfil the "supertask."

The situation is being aggravated by the bloc's inner instability. Even when the congress was not disrupted by disputes, the familiar signs of possible splits still loomed. The election of the leading bodies caused slight murmurs in the hall: some of the regionals felt that they were overlooked. The formation of the electoral ticket promises new wounds, as does the elaboration of the program: ambitions do not manifest themselves until the goals have been designated in a general outline. In the corridors, individual delegates explained that they were not like that. The guests reserved the right to freedom of maneuver. The keynote of their comments was that the idea is good, but it is necessary to see what will come of it.

There is no such thing as being too careful in a country where accidents and whims can still reverse the situation completely. The left-of-center bloc died at the very moment when Rybkin's plane brought furniture instead of humanitarian cargo from the United States to Moscow. Who could presume that at the start of the election campaign, a person, whose political capital consists of variations on the theme of social welfare, would refuse to take medicine and toys for orphanages. However, the president has proposed to consider that the deceased is alive and not dead. The chronic inability to discard the inertia of theoretical calculations in time has, on several occasions, led to fairly unpleasant results. The reluctance to sign the law on the election of deputies to the Duma has been prompted to fidelity to the system, and not to life. This is the obvious result of bargaining with the party of power, whose chances now directly depend on reducing the norms of party representation in parliament.

The Duma may agree with the president, but the electors do not like being pressured. The head of state's insistence will most likely bury the project to create a two-party system for a long time.

*Reasons for Adopting Law on Political Parties Outlined

954E1060A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 31 May 95 p 5

[Article by Valentina Lapayeva, under rubric "Legal Experts": "Russia's Leaders Are Doing Nothing: Why a Law on Parties Is Needed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Valentina Viktorovna Lapayeva is a doctor of legal sciences and a leading scientific associate of the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Legal Studies, under the RF government.**

The history of the growth of the post-Communist multiparty system in Russia covers a period of only a few years. The event that was the legal reference point in this process was the repealing by the 3rd Congress of USSR People's Deputies of the constitutional statute governing the leading role of the CPSU. A few months later (in October 1990) the union law on public associations was adopted, a law that defined in the most general features the legal parameters of the creation and activity of political parties.

Since that time fundamental changes have occurred in our country's life, including the collapse of the CPSU, the disintegration of the Union, the dramatic confrontation of the authorities, the election to the State Duma, and the beginning of the preparation for the next electoral campaign. During that time, the Russian political parties have changed from outsiders in the political process, incapable of realistically entering the struggle for power and property among the powerful economic interest groups, regional political elites, financial-industrial groupings, etc., and have become a serious political force that exerted a definite influence on the formation and activity of the country's highest legislative agency. However, the legal regulation of party building continues to be carried out by the 1990 Law on Public Associations. All things considered, the country will enter the next election to the Duma without a law on political parties.

The deputies have already failed twice (in the summer and autumn of 1994) to accept in the first reading the draft of the law on political parties. The impression is forming that the crux of the matter here is definitely not in those claims made against the draft, which have been expressed by them from the podium and in lobby discussions with journalists (it is difficult to call these objections ones that involve principle). Most probably a law that regulates and, consequently, limits the activity of parties that is largely unmonitored at the present time is completely unnecessary on the threshold of an election either for the parliamentary factions or for those single-mandate deputies who have linked their political fate with a particular party. And although the developers of the legislative draft smoothed over in its text almost all the sharp angles, the attitude that the deputies take is in accordance with the principle "leave well enough alone." This position does, of course, contain its own corporative wisdom.

The point of view that is widespread in the deputy corps was expressed in the course of the most recent Duma review of the draft of the law by deputy V. A. Nikonov, who asked the perhaps rhetorical question: "Where is the need for adopting a law on parties before adopting election laws, which, properly speaking, ought to define the conditions for the parties' actions?" In most countries in the world, he commented, there are no laws on parties at all, and all the rules of the game for parties are established by the election laws.

That question can be answered as follows. The law on political parties in our country is needed at the present time primarily in order to erect legal barriers on the path that would allow totalitarian parties to use the electoral mechanisms to come to power, in order to prevent the misuse of democracy on the part of those who would want to destroy it. And a circumstance that is completely not accidental is the fact that laws on political parties that are analogous to the Russian draft exist in countries with a totalitarian past.

The legal-normative base that exists at the present time is completely sufficient to prevent the establishment of a totalitarian regime by an anti-Communist method, by force (it is simply a matter of having the proper work by the law-enforcement agencies). But a road to power that remains completely bare, from the point of view of the law, is the path by way of a democratic election, a path that is open for practically everyone who wants to take it.

Little can be provided in this respect by the campaign that was begun recently to combat fascism — the concept of fascism, because of its haziness and ambiguity, fits poorly within the logic of normative material. In addition, the danger of a recoiling to totalitarianism in our country is linked not only, and not even so much as, with fascism. The ideology and practice of rightist radicalism will scarcely receive the broad support of the multinational Russian electorate. Which cannot be said about leftist radicalism, which in our country has long traditions and rather deep roots.

Therefore the task lies in preventing any political forces with a totalitarian orientation from participating in the election. An important guarantee against this could be the establishment in the law on political parties of requirements for the democratization of intraparty life. Historical experience shows us that the inner structure of a party is a model of its ideas concerning the organizing and functioning of state power. We cannot allow a party that has been built in accordance with the authoritarian, totalitarian type to channel its actions outwardly to the implementation of democratic principles and goals.

The draft of the law that was rejected by the deputies contained the principle of the elected nature of parties and the reportability of their actions, the need to resolve the most important questions of party life at a party congress, conference, or referendum, as well as the limitation of the term of office of the leading party agencies to three years. Those principles in the draft, which encountered criticism among the deputies (especially from representatives of the LDPR [Russian Liberal Democratic Party], actually are much lower than the necessary minimum. In order to provide the minimal guarantees against "leaderism," there should be a direct indication in the law of the need to elect the leading agencies of the party, to strengthen the procedure of the secret vote in elections, and to include the lack of these requirements in the party's charter among the list of reasons for refusal to register it. In the optimal version it would be desirable to take more complete consideration of the experience of West Germany, where the law on political parties stipulates, in addition to the measures that have been enumerated, an entire system of legal means that are aimed at limiting the arbitrary actions of the party bureaucracy and at protecting the rights of the rank-and-file party members. But the most important thing is that this approach protects the interests of society as a whole and the democratic foundations of the system built on constitutional law.

A promptly adopted law on parties could also adjust in the correct direction the process of developing electoral legislation, if it bound the conditions for the preservation by a public association of the status of a political party to its participation in an election. Incidentally, in all the versions of the law on parties that were developed in the Supreme Soviet during the period from 1991 through October 1993, it was stipulated that an association loses the status of a party if, over the period of a number of years, it has not taken part in an election. Such a resolution of the question in the law on political parties (which resolution also corresponds to the experience of the democratically developed countries) would force the developers of electoral legislation to formulate in a more precise manner the concept of an electoral association, giving it the necessary political and legal definiteness.

At the present time, however, according to the existing legislation, any public association can participate in an election if its charter stipulates such participation. As a result, out of the 236 associations that were allowed to participate in the election, 79 listed themselves as being political parties and 61 as being public-political movements. The others, all told, represent an extremely motley and strange company, including the Union of Boxers and the Union of Writers, the Association of Accountants and the Union of Beekeepers, the Islamic Cultural Center, the Association of Rock-Climbers, etc. It is difficult to say exactly which motivated the leaders of those associations when they included in their charters the mention of participation in an election to the federal agencies of authority. But it is obvious that such a devaluation of the status of a subject of the electoral process is fraught with various kinds of abuses and machinations, shady electoral alliances, etc., that nullify the guarantees existing in the legislation against the use of the electoral mechanisms by destructive political forces.

In addition, the law on parties could make its contribution to guaranteeing a more honest competition in an election. One has in mind primarily the measures that are directed against the effort of parties that are financed by antisocial, illegal sources of monetary means. Obviously, the basic load lies here on the electoral legislation. However, something that remains outside the confines of the electoral laws is such a source of financial support of parties as their entrepreneurial activity. Unfortunately, the draft of the law on parties has not moved a single step in this direction from the level at which that question was resolved in the union law on public associations. But at that time the problem was not as acute as it is now — the problem of developing the legal guarantees against the fusion of political parties with financial-industrial groups, corrupt officialdom, the Mafia, etc. in the process of the parties' entrepreneurial activity.

One could continue the discussion about what would be provided to society by a law on political parties if it were adopted in the same package as electoral legislation and if, during the development of that law, the deputies could waive their own corporative interests. But with this number of "coulds" and "woulds," the question loses its practical significance. The reality is such that, if the draft of the law on parties is adopted in its present version, very little, essentially speaking, would change in electoral policy or practice (and this is specifically what constitutes the basic sphere of activity of political parties). But even in this form, which is greatly truncated and adjusted to meet the interests of the party factions, a law on political parties is completely incapable of moving from its dead position.

In this instance society's interests, which are linked with the need to introduce order into the various spheres of party life and to subordinate party building to the requirements of law-governed democratic development, have come into contradiction with the rather clearly revealed corporative interest of the political parties and movements that were victorious in the first (and, incidentally, extremely imperfect) election to parliament.

It is this party corporativism that is reason why the electoral legislation adopted by the Duma reproduces the basic flaws in that electoral system on the basis of which the current deputy corps came to power.

That is the price that society has to pay for the sharp intensification that was allowed in 1993 in the role of parties in the electoral process, an intensification that was not balanced by the simultaneous introduction into clear-cut legal confines of the basic spheres of party life. Isn't this price an excessive one? Much depends on the direction that will be taken by the further development of political practice, on whether the parties will be able to justify the advance given to them, and to what degree they will be able to correspond to those public expectations that are linked with the development of the multiparty system and the changeover from the chaotic multiplicity of parties to a stable multiparty system.

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*Polevanov Criticizes Privatization of State Property

954E1060B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 May 95 p 3

[Interview with V. Polevanov by Vladimir Nikolayev, under rubric "Opinion": "Vladimir Polevanov Has Been 'Destroyed' by (Mishel Kamdessyu)"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Vladimir Polevanov, ex-chairman of Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee on the Administration of State Property] and currently the deputy chief of the Control Administration under the president of the Russian**

Federation, proposed rejecting the acceleration of the process of privatization and replacing the government of Russia.

[Polevanov] First of all, I feel that the second stage of privatization can occur in Russia only after an extremely considerable pause. If only because selling state property in an accelerated mode is at least unreasonable. Especially since the first stage of privatization, in my opinion, was a complete failure. After that kind of failure, any normal government with a self-interest in uplifting the country's economy would have definitely not been in any hurry to carry out the second stage. That was done by Lithuania, which stopped the privatization and is now analyzing the first stage. It was also done by Hungary. Although both these countries went through the first stage in a considerably efficient manner and with a greater benefit for the state, for example, the first stage of privatization in small Hungary brought into the budget almost an order more of funds than Russia received.

In our country the course taken toward the accelerated sale of the remaining state property will lead to a situation in which that balance, which is already very small, will be bought up by those same nouveaux riches for a song. And that will intensify the polarization in society, will increase the slump in the economy, and will bring closer a "revolutionary situation" in Russia.

[Nikolayev] But is there another path? After you were removed from the position of GKI [Goskomimushchestvo] chairman, you remained silent for about two months. Then there was a series of interviews in the newspapers, articles about you, the publication of brochures... Was that linked with the beginning of the election campaign or are you hoping to adjust the course even before the election?

[Polevanov] The silence was linked with a worsening in the state of my health. In addition, there was the hope that my report, which was given on 18 January to Mr. Chernomyrdin, would be reviewed, measures would be taken, and the forced development of privatization would be suspended. Alas, the government's session on that question was conducted in a completely formal way, and I realized that there was nothing to hope for. But I am convinced that if this "privatization orgy" is not stopped, we shall heat up the situation to such an extent and shall so revolutionize the situation that we can expect (or achieve?) the same kind of "Russian uprising, senseless and merciless" that we like so much to talk about. After all, the situation in the country is worsening with every passing month (if not with every passing day), as is attested to by statistical summaries. I have two children, and I do not want to be afraid for their future in this country.

[Nikolayev] But can it be that you are being deluded again? You will recall your recent admissions that you harbored certain illusions concerning the check privatization being conducted, and they were dispelled after the first month of your work at GKI. Earlier, when you were occupying the position of oblast governor, it had been difficult to clarify what has been done in the country. Is that good or bad?

[Polevanov] Amur Oblast is not a typical territory. In view of the tension in Soviet-Chinese relations, nothing major was ever built there. There were several defense plants that are not subject to privatization, an agroindustrial complex, and small-scale enterprises that have to be transferred into private hands according to any model — Hungarian, Lithuanian, Russian... Nevertheless, in the Far East we were in last place with regard to privatization rates.

Then I came here, saw what was being done on an all-Russian scale, looked at the generalized experience of privatization in Eastern Europe, and...

[Nikolayev] But in this instance why did Boris Yeltsin support not you, a person whom he had put in the position of GKI chief, but Anatoliy Chubays? Who could exert pressure on the president?

[Polevanov] The international circumstances are to blame for everything. Russia today is incapable of conducting an independent policy without looking around for all kinds of funds: the IMF, etc. And that is also how it is with me: (Mishel Kamdessyu)'s visit to Russia was approaching, and the president was forced to remove me from the GKI under pressure from the structures that were tied to the IMF. So, with an ulterior purpose, shortly before that visit I was visited by ambassadors from all the countries in the Group of Seven — all of them within a period of some 15 days! I was visited by representatives of several funds — basically American ones. Purely exploratory visits...

[Nikolayev] But, on the one hand, Russia is expressing its desire to attract more private investments, and, on the other hand, is not doing anything for that purpose, or even is doing just the opposite. Although any country that is concerned about developing its economy must necessarily create favorable conditions for attracting foreign capital.

[Polevanov] In our country we are not actually creating conditions for attracting foreign capital. Currently the emphasis is made on the so-called "portfolio investments," but these are, in essence, a continuation of the sale of our assets for a song. When I was in Amur

Oblast, I attempted to create joint ventures with the Italians, South Koreans, and Americans. I tried to establish high-tech enterprises with new jobs for residents of Amur Oblast. And what happened? In our oblast we used to resolve any problems in a week, and then everything would quiet down in Moscow. The Italians have already been wandering around in the governmental jungle for eight months, and by the autumn the jewelry factory was able to produce the first consignment of output with an annual total of 10 tons of articles— which, on the basis of its economic effect, is equivalent to an increase of gold mining by a factor of 5! And there are plenty of similar examples.

Yes, we like to talk about foreign investments, but that is all. If that desire actually existed, then even at the governmental level it would have been possible long ago to develop a normal legislative base. But even in general with that economic policy that is being conducted by the Chernomyrdin cabinet, it is simply impossible for foreign investments to come here. According to information in EUROMANI magazine, with regard to the level of reliability of investments we are in 136th place in the world.

An investor will not come to a country where the wave of strikes is building up, where there is no middle class, where it is unclear what will happen tomorrow...

[Nikolayev] Or where the vice-premier and the Gosimushchestva chairman can suddenly announce the possibility of nationalizing the recently privatized enterprises?

[Polevanov] But only in accordance with the law! Which, incidentally, will still have to be developed and adopted. A law on nationalization is absolutely necessary for a country with a market economy, so that the investor knows the situations in which the property that he has purchased may be taken away from him, and what compensation he will receive. But we do not have anything like that!

[Nikolayev] Why do you think this is so? Who is the "extremist" here — current minister of economics Yevgeniy Yasin? His predecessor Aleksandr Shokhin? Or might we recall Andrey Nechayev? Which of them is unknowledgeable about economics?

[Polevanov] There is a good saying that a fish starts rotting at the head. First of all, all of this should have been guaranteed by the governmental chairman. Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin has been in power since December 1992 — that is a length of time that is more than adequate. But in our country no one is even administering state property any more. Although it is possible to create a special subdivision in the GKI to train people who are capable of efficiently administering the state share in the privatized enterprises. If it was possible during the war to train lieutenants in an accelerated mode — two or three months — after which they could go into combat, then now it ought to be possible to create everywhere courses in property management for 30-year-olders with the appropriate higher education. They could take those courses for four to six months and then be sent out to the enterprises en masse...

[Nikolayev] Those dreams can come true only if there are rather fundamental changes, if the government is replaced.

[Polevanov] And it definitely will be replaced!

[Nikolayev] Am I correct in thinking that you are applying all your efforts to this and are even creating your own "great-power" political party? Or are you planning to join already existing movements of national-patriotic persuasion?

[Polevanov] It is still too early to talk about this, but I think that this month we shall register our "New Russia" movement, which already has branches in 40 regions. I am supported by many governors, and even here in Moscow there are a rather large number of people in the most diverse structures who share my views. The prospects are rather good...

[Nikolayev] However, the current governmental cabinet against which you have taken up arms was formalized by the president. Moreover: the president recently "blessed" the creation of a pre-election bloc headed by the same Viktor Chernomyrdin —consequently, he completely trusts the premier. You call yourself a "Yeltsin man," but you are in favor of the resignation of the "president's" cabinet. But if you recall your statement about a "fish that rots from its head," then... It seems to be strange that, while working in presidential structures, you adhere to obviously oppositional views, preach them strongly, and are even creating a political movement that is in opposition to the president.

[Polevanov] There can be no discussion of any opposition of mine to Boris Nikolayevich. While working in the president's Control Administration, I keep on my desk the 1995 and 1994 messages of the RF president — concerning the effectiveness of state authority and the reinforcement of the Russian state. The government — and we monitor its actions — has disrupted practically completely the fulfillment of last year's message, and the same thing is being repeated during the current year. And, while I am in the president's Control Administration, I am simply obliged to be in opposition to that government that is not fulfilling the president's fundamental document. For me it is completely obvious that the government is not coping with its functions.

And, incidentally, concerning the Chernomyrdin preelection bloc. When I heard about it, I involuntarily remembered Sergey Mavrodi. After building and destroying two monetary "pyramids" (incidentally, not without the aid of the Chernomyrdin government), after robbing tens of millions of depositors, and after finding himself in prison, he realized that there was an urgent need for deputy inviolability. Which he actually received, after being hurriedly elected a deputy to the State Duma. I think that the current picture of the complete downfall of the state fills the government's chairman with such ideas —concerning future responsibility. And, like Mavrodi, he has decided to insure himself against the future.

[Nikolayev] In any case it is precisely the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin that will conduct the already announced second stage of privatization. What is your forecast? What will be the result?

[Polevanov] The expected result is just as lamentable as after the first stage: we shall lose a considerable part of state property, about 30 percent of which will go to foreign owners without any profit or benefit for our own country. We shall lose ports, raw-material branches, and plots of land. And so far I do not know of a single instance when any foreigner, after buying an enterprise for a song, has invested any major amount of money in it and put it "on its feet." Russia's economic situation will become even worse, and the new government after Chernomyrdin will have to begin under much worse starting-gate conditions.

[Box] [Comments by Mikhail Leontyev]

Vladimir Polevanov was thrown into the government as an instrument for undermining the positions of Mr. Chubays and, in the final analysis, scheming against Premier Chernomyrdin. A political roof over Mr. Polevanov was provided by the well-known structures surrounding the president, that were represented in the government by first vice-premier Oleg Soskovets. I recall that during that period, which coincided with hysterics concerning "Black Tuesday," Mr. Soskovets, like another political protector of Mr. Polevanov's — Oleg Lobov — was being thought of to take the place of Viktor Chernomyrdin.

But the most interesting thing that follows from the interview being published is that these people obviously have not rejected the goals that were set previously. Mr. Polevanov is not simply engaged in preservation in the apparatus of the president of the RF, but, as he himself confirms, he is monitoring the government until it, again as he himself confirms, is forced to leave.

The economic meaning of the Mr. Polevanov's attempt to ingratiate himself concerning privatization is simple: the property was not divided correctly and people did not get what they should have. This fundamental idea fits logically into the circle of interests of the previously indicated company. As for the idea of "delaying" privatization, in the current situation, which is given the scientific name of "institutional chaos," the more or less prolonged existence of the semiprivatized enterprises with a "state package" which, as a rule, has been returned to the management by a board of directors, will lead to a situation in which, by the moment that the delay ends, the item to be privatized will be robbed down to bare earth.

It is typical that Mr. Polevanov threatens that there will be nationwide indignation and a wave of strikes in the event that the current privatization is not suspended. But so far there have been practically no instances of any manifestation of "nationwide anger" at enterprises, which instances have not been sanctioned by those same directors who are taking advantage of the institutional chaos.

*Gaydar Answers Critics of Economic Program

954Q0201A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 27 May 95 p 8

[Article by Professor Yegor Gaydar, doctor of economic sciences: "Work on Mistakes;" with commentary by Leonid Lopatnikov, DELOVOY MIR economic commentator]

[FBIS Translated Text] I read with interest the article by A. Belousov, Ye. Abramov, and A. Klepach, "Mr. Gaydar's Six Mistakes," which your newspaper carried on 29 April 1995. It contributes a great deal of new information to current economic theory. Its quintessence is the nonstandard thesis according to which, "in Poland, which serves as a showcase for the successes of 'shock therapy,' monetary policy was considerably more lenient than in Russia. In Poland during the period of price liberalization and financial stabilization (the end of 1989 to the beginning of 1992), the ratio of M2 [money supply] to the gross domestic product (on an annual basis) dropped from 33 percent to 27-29 percent. In Russia from the end of 1991 to the beginning of 1994 (a period including two stages of 'strict policy'), the same index fell from 58 percent to 12 percent."

This is the discovery that provides the methodological basis for the authors' subsequent arguments.

After reading the passage quoted above, I first ascribed it to newspaper carelessness. However, after looking at a new article by one of the article's authors in the highly professional magazine VOPROSY EKONOMIKI (No. 3, 1995), I was persuaded that it was not a mere slip. The authors really are convinced that a drop in the ratio of the money supply to gross domestic product is evidence of the strictness of monetary policy, while a rise in that ratio is a sign of financial leniency.

Let us look at how that criterion applies to the experience of other countries, in 1993, for example. It turns out that despite the common opinion, monetary policy was stricter in Ukraine than in Russia. The ratio of M2 to the gross domestic product there was only 6.5 percent ("Ukrainian Economic Trends," European Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis of Ukraine, 6, MONEY AND CREDIT, p. 38). Evidently the monetarists were firmly entrenched in Kiev, but in the Yugoslav socialist government, the monetarists gained total dominance in 1993. By December, at the peak of hyperinflation, the ratio of the monetary supply to the gross domestic product was less than 1 percent there ("Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Yugoslavia in 1992-1994," Ya. Rostovski, No. 32, 1995, pp. 4-5). On the other hand, according to that criterion, the financial policy followed in the Czech Republic by Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus, whose reputation as a strict monetarist is plainly undeserved, turns out to have been lenient and pliable. The ratio of M2 to GDP there in 1993 was a full 66 percent (*Poland: the Path to a Market Economy*, p. 29. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, October 1994).

If we compare not the ratio of money to GDP but the changes in that ratio, the results turn out to be analogous. It dropped fastest of all in Yugoslavia and slowest of all in Czechia.

Just how did inflation itself respond to such different financial policies? Here, too, there are surprises. In places where monetary policy, according to the esteemed authors' definition, was the strictest, there was a complete collapse of money circulation. For example, in Yugoslavia in December 1993 alone, prices rose 283,833 percent, while in January 1994 they rose another 310 million percent! In Ukraine, which was balancing on the brink of hyperinflation, consumer prices rose 10,155 percent. In Russia, where, let me recall, according to the authors' definition, monetary policy was more lenient than in Ukraine, prices rose a total of 841 percent. In Poland, inflation was 38 percent. Finally, in Czechia the rise in consumer prices did not exceed 20 percent.

So there's some news! It turns out that an extremely simple means of combating inflation has been found: follow as lenient a monetary policy as possible, freely financing the budget deficit with empty money, and inflation will plummet downward. What ought to be done here is not writing articles for newspapers but drawing up the documents for a nomination for the Nobel Prize in economics.

Nonetheless, I would not advise the esteemed authors to be too hasty with their application. Sometimes it is useful to take a look at what was said before you on the issue you are judging. In this case I will not send the authors to P. Cagan's classic work on the dynamics of the demand for money under conditions of high inflation (Cagan, P., 1956, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation," in *Studies in the Quantity of Money*, ed. M. Friedman, Chicago: Chicago University Press), or to Yurovskiy's famous work that analyzes similar problems using evidence from our own country (L. Yurovskiy, *Denezhnaya Politika Sovetskoy vlasti, 1917-1927* [The Monetary Policy of the Soviet Regime, 1917-1927], Moscow, 1928).

That would be superfluous. Unfortunately, the misunderstanding stems not from scholarship but from education. Therefore, in order to analyze its sources, it is perfectly sufficient to take a look at the standard economic textbook.

The authors clearly confused two fundamentally different parameters—the dynamics of the nominal monetary supply and the dynamics of the real money supply. As is known, the real money supply is the ratio of the nominal monetary supply to the level of prices. The GDP is measured in current market prices. When one number is divided by the other (in determining the percentage, as our authors do), the nominal magnitudes are mutually reduced. What remains? That will be discussed a little later. For now let me note that in a market economy the government and central bank have no possibility of directly determining the size of the real money supply. It is always the result of the reaction of economic agents to the monetary policy that is being followed. That is why it is senseless to try to measure the strictness of that policy in terms of the ratio of money to the gross domestic product; that is, for all practical purposes, by the dynamics of the real money supply.

On the other hand, by granting and accepting credits that entail issuing new money and creating additional money assets, central banks and governments can directly determine the rates of change in the nominal money parameters, and only they can serve as a yardstick of the degree of strictness of the financial policy that is being followed. If we take a look at them, it will turn out that all the paradoxes cited above are an illusion.

The rates of growth in the nominal money supply in 1993 were the highest in hyperinflationary Yugoslavia and the lowest in stable Czechia. They were higher in Ukraine than in Russia and higher in Russia than in Poland. That is the order that was reflected by the dynamics of consumer prices. Thus, Vaclav Klaus is clearly not graced with the title of fighter for the inflationary support of production, and the 1993-model Yugoslav government clearly does not wear the regalia of strict monetarists.

What actually is characterized by the ratio of money to the gross domestic product, a parameter which became the subject of such unsuccessful constructions by the esteemed authors? What is characterized is the real demand for money, which, as good students know very well, figures in the main equation of the economic theory of inflation and is the magnitude that is inversely proportional to the rate of money circulation.

The level of prices equals the nominal monetary supply divided by the real demand for money (S. Fisher, R. Dornbush, R. Shmalenzi, *Ekonomika* [Economics], p. 636. Delo Publishing House, Moscow, 1993).

On the question of the stability of that parameter and the factors that affect it, numerous works, both fat and thin, both highly professional and trivial, have been written in the past four decades. I dare say there is no other economic phenomenon that has been the subject of such intensive study and serious debate.

For all the disagreements, by now many laws have been reliably identified here and have become part of educational materials. In particular, this includes the fact that as a rule, the rate of circulation of money is high in countries with high inflation and low in countries with low inflation.

The roots of this law are understandable. Inflation gives rise to a specific tax—the losses that are sustained by the holders of money that is devalued as prices rise. That is why when inflation is high a flight from money and attempt to minimize monetary assets and protect them from devaluation begin. **That is precisely why the ratio of money to the gross domestic product is extremely low in a period of hyperinflation (in 1990-1993, the real value of the money supply in the SFRYu [Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia] dropped from $4 billion to$40 million) and rises under the conditions of financial stabilization.**

So the authors have simply discovered differences in the rate of circulation of money. There is nothing surprising about that. The reason it was higher in 1993 in Russia than in Poland was that in our country the money supply during that period grew 5.2 fold, while in Poland it grew by only 31.8 percent (International Financial Statistics, March 1995, International Monetary Fund, p. 64). On the contrary, it would have been strange if high rates of growth in the nominal monetary supply in the Russian economy had not reduced the demand for money.

With extremely high inflation, a government frequently falls into a dangerous trap. It sees the real money supply declining before its eyes and tries to whip up demand through new infusions of money. The result is only to increase the flight from the national currency, stimulate price increases, and further reduce the ratio of money to the gross domestic product.

In a meeting I had with Mr. Avramovic, the chairman of the Central Bank of Yugoslavia and architect of the Yugoslav stabilization program that stopped hyperinflation in 1994, he told me how it took the insane price increase in December 1993 for him to succeed in persuading the Yugoslav leadership of the ruinous nature of such a practice.

It is much safer for a country when political leaders and their advisers learn about such laws from textbooks, rather than come to grasp them at the price of financial ruin, paralysis of the circulation of money, and profound general economic crisis.

That is why I would advise the esteemed authors to carefully read chapters 33-34 of the textbook by S. Fisher, R. Dornbush and R. Shmalenzi, and solve the problems contained in it on p. 652 before further developing their own original monetary theories.

I hope that this will protect them against such elementary miscalculations, after which it will be possible to continue a professional discussion.

A Necessary Addition, by Leonid Lopatnikov, DELOVOY MIR Economic Commentator

The letter to the editor pretentiously entitled "Mr. Gaydar's Six Mistakes, or a Word About 'Professional Subtleties' and 'Iron Laws,'" was a response to an interview given by Ye. Gaydar to the author of these lines. The letter was written in an extremely harsh, if not unbridled, manner. Just consider, for example, the following passage: "Evidently the researcher who interpreted the content of the "Glazyev" forecast scenario for Mr. Gaydar failed to read the textbooks closely, and Yegor Timurovich, without sorting things out, blurted out...."

As though the person involved were an executive bureaucrat and not a professor of economics. Yet if there is one thing that even his political adversaries admit, it is Gaydar's erudition. It is no accident that their chief accusation was always that he had "thoroughly read the Western textbooks."

Yegor Timurovich deemed it necessary to "analyze" one of his "mistakes," possibly the most vivid and fundamental one. I do not doubt that the rest could have suffered the same fate. There is one detail though that I cannot fail to take responsibility for. A. Belousov and his co-authors noted that the value of one index—the decline in GDP in Russia in 1992—was incorrectly indicated on the graph. The graph was presented apart from the interview as an illustration, and Gaydar—I want to attest to this—had nothing to do with it. It repeated data previously published in our newspaper. Unfortunately, in this case a mistake really was made in "translating" them into a graph: 11 percent instead of 19 percent. The oversight was mine, and you can judge me.

*Head of General Affairs Department Interviewed

954F2465A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 4-10 May 95 No 18, p 8

[Interview with Pavel Borodin, business manager for the president of the Russian Federation, by Yelena Dikun: "The Person Sweeping Old Square"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Before Pavel Borodin, the last business manager of the CPSU Central Committee to sit in this office on Old Square was Nikolay Kruchina. With the replacement of the boss, the premises underwent some changes, and not for the worse: instead of Ilyich, Boris Nikolayevich is now hanging on the wall, other walls are embellished by "Madonna with Infant" (copy) and several lithographs, and there is also china and bronze there. The service managed by the boss of this office has also been changed slightly—it is now called the General Affairs Department of the President of the Russian Federation. Since prior to its being renamed the Administration of Affairs enjoyed the reputation of being a hotbed of nomenclature depravity, the journalist who is fortunate enough to meet with Pavel Borodin first wants to be convinced that it is not just the chiefs that are changing but also the morals.**

[Dikun] To what extent are the Administration of Affairs of the CPSU Central Committee and the General Affairs Department of the president of the Russian Federation different structures? Pavel Pavlovich, could you name the more fundamental differences?

[Borodin] The Administration of Affairs of the CPSU Central Committee was just one-fifth of the present General Affairs Department of the president. There they had 6,000 people working, whereas we have more than 80,000. We serve all seven of the top agencies of federal authority: the president and his administration, the staffs of the government, State Duma, and Council of the Federation, the Constitutional, Supreme, and Arbitration courts, and the Accounting Office. The General Affairs Department of the president is a huge establishment mad up of 160 firms, directorates, enterprises, and organizations. The former Fourth Central Board of the Ministry of Health of the USSR came over to us, it now being called the Medical Center of the General Affairs Department. We have a large motor transport establishment, hotels, summer cottages, sanatoria, and a substantial stock of housing. We manage on the order of 300 buildings, from small offices on Old Square to unique structures such as the Kremlin, White House, and buildings of the State Duma and Council of the Federation. In general, we are growing steadily in the best sense of the word.

[Dikun] Are you saying that there are now more therapeutic institutions, government summer cottages, sanatoria, and hotels?

[Borodin] No the medical service has been dramatically reduced: there are now 70,000 people attached to us, including about 8,000 ministers, deputies, and officials. Today the once-enormous Fourth Central Board is a rather small subdivision, with about 26,000 people working there. As for the summer cottages and sanatoria, their number has now been reduced by about one-third. Some of them went over to the trade unions, whereas the Moscow Municipal Council and other departments received others. True, some of the sanatoria that were hurriedly turned over to the trade unions are now falling apart and we are forced to return them. Last year, for example, we returned "Dagomys," a wonderful complex near Sochi.

We now have just three hotels: "President-Hotel," "Arbat," and "Zolotoye Koltso." Whenever large measures are carried out, we rent the hotel "Rossiya" and very rarely, under special directions, the "Metropol," "Slavyanskaya," or "Penta." But this is only for very high-ranking guests such as Clinton or Kohl, for example.

[Dikun] You said that you have a large motor transport establishment....

[Borodin] Yes, about 2,500 passenger cars. True, previously there were no fewer of them but today it is much more difficult to maintain such a motor pool. Formerly there were no problems with the budget, whereas today we fight for the budget.

[Dikun] You also have to fight for money? From whom?

[Borodin] It is not necessary for us to do that but for the managers of those systems that we serve. We do not have our own budget. What is formally considered to be the budget of the General Affairs Apartment is in reality made up of the budgets of the corresponding agencies. I am not the manager of these funds but only carry out the instructions of the managers of the administration and staffs of the government, Duma, Council of the Federation, and so on.

[Dikun] Approximately how much does it cost the state to support one deputy or government official?

[Borodin] An average of $10-12,000 a year. This includes wages, maintenance of the workplace, communications, trips in the country, and so on. This is a minimum. In the West, the analogous expenditures are much higher. For example, one American senator "costs" $170,000. Of course there they have a different standard of living and a different budget.

[Dikun] There has been much talk about reducing the state apparatus, in particular the administration of the president. Have you noticed this in the number of clients that you have to serve?

[Borodin] There has indeed been a reduction and in particular it involved the staff of the government—it was reduced by almost one-third. By the way, the budget for the support of the staffs was cut back considerably this year. We warned the staff chiefs and the head of the administration that they will receive medical and transport services in accordance with the budget—we have strict accounting for everything.

[Dikun] It is understandable why an official needs a desk, telephone, and car. But do the official duties of the speaker of the Duma make necessary a special flight to take his family on vacation? Or the special elevator that Rybkin uses? Or the portable computers that you provided the deputies, which are mostly used for the play of the deputies' children?

[Borodin] Special aircraft are a particular item. Many have the impression that the leadership can simply fly on a special plane for a hunting or fishing trip or to a resort. We do not have such limitless possibilities. There is a special air detachment "Rossiya" to serve the top agencies of authority. This is a joint-stock company from which we hire the aircraft under a contract, including for the president if he flies somewhere on an official visit. A plane is allocated to the premier, vice-premier, or other higher officials only on the special instructions of the president. Boris Nikolayevich watches this very strictly.

[Dikun] Nevertheless, there was the case with the speaker.

[Borodin] Nothing like that happened here. And as for portable computers, the heads of the staffs ordered them. It is difficult for me to judge whether there was an official need for this or whether this was a luxury. I just carry out the will of those who order the music.... As for the special elevator, this was left over from the old party bosses. Should the building be remodeled to remove this elevator?

[Dikun] No, it appears that there is nothing abnormal about the state being concerned about state employees. But there is an entire class of people who enjoy all the benefits of special therapy and special rest while having just one merit in the country: their relatives occupy leading posts.

[Borodin] We have been engaged in a quiet fight against this lately. Almost all of the children have been removed from the medical service, with the exception of those who are ill and also elderly parents. In general, we have the appropriate regulations for every kind of service that we provide and there everything is set forth—who is illegible for what. In essence, we are a state within a state.

[Dikun] You keep all branches of authority in a state of material dependence and this, as you know, is the most severe dependence. For everything, from a rug to an airplane, one has to bow down to Pavel Pavlovich. Apparently you are a powerful man.

[Borodin] No one has to bow down to me. I tell you that the heads of the corresponding staffs give me instructions and I am supposed to carry them out. This is all of my power! If I fail to carry out the instructions given me, the president can fire me.

[Dikun] But such a danger has not yet arisen?

[Borodin] I have been working here for just two years and I think that so far there has been no reason to fire me. Tell me another person who could have restored the White House in a little more than two months, at the same time repair the buildings of the State Duma and Council of the Federation, organize the reconstruction of the Kremlin, and increase the introduction of new housing to 1,000 apartments a year in comparison with just 200 before!

[Dikun] How were you able to do this, if it is no secret?

[Borodin] I simply know how to work, having worked in management for 22 years after starting out in a remote area. Do you know why it is very difficult to become a top manager in Moscow? There are so many chiefs here and responsibility is so eroded that it is simply impossible to reach the top.

[Dikun] In heading the General Affairs Department of the president, you have carefully maintained the old personnel structure. So the staff set up by the Communist Party is also suitable for democratic authority?

[Borodin] If a person "pulls his load," why fire him? We are not a political organization, we are a management service. We sweep the squares and clean flower pots. Is it really necessary to do a worse job of sweeping the square where communists gather than the one where democrats have their mass meetings? It is all the same to us whom we feed, whether they be Soviet or democratic leaders. The main thing is that they must be fed, and with tasty and plentiful food. But of course we are doing many things differently now. Previously, as I have already said, it was very simple: you asked for a budget and you got a budget. But today we ourselves are forced to consider hunting for funds and involving ourselves in commercial and foreign economic activities. We do everything.

[Dikun] Forgive me, but the agencies of state authority are forbidden from engaging in commerce.

[Borodin] But we are not an agency of state authority. We are a management structure within higher federal agencies. We have the corresponding statute that permits us to be engaged in part in commercial activities. This involves above all our health complexes: sanatoria, resorts, hospitals, and pharmacies. They must be repaired, maintained, and technically modified but there is no money for this. Meanwhile, there are many interested parties here and in the West who have money. We are attracting them. We have, for example, a wonderful sanatorium called "Bor" in the region of Domodedovo. It is intended for 600 places, 200 of which we rent to others. This is more than enough to maintain the sanatorium and to lower the cost of a pass there for officials. The market is for all, including for us. We even hold special conferences to teach our managers how to work under market conditions.

[Dikun] If it is not a big secret, approximately what did it cost to repair the White House and State Duma and to reconstruct the Kremlin?

[Borodin] Absolute figures will not tell you anything. Usually the repair and reconstruction of such structures costs from $1,200 to $2,500 per square meter. At the White House, which has 175,000 square meters, the average cost per meter was $780. According to all calculations, the repair of the State Duma was supposed to cost $1,500 per square meter—this is along with the furniture and other things. We were able to do it for $680. As for the reconstruction of the first structure of the Kremlin, about which there has been so much rumor and gossip, this work is a little more expensive: about $2,000-2,500 per square meter. This is not simply the repair of an office for the president but the restoration of a unique historical structure. Other than the president, his first assistant, and the security service, there will be no one there. All of the remaining areas will be turned over for museums and halls for meetings, conferences, and congresses. In general, I think that officials come and go but the unique buildings and structures remain. Many ask me the question of why we put such luxury in the White House and State Duma. There everything is indeed beautiful and rich. And things are not bad where I am either.... But let us engage in some abstract thinking. Let us get a ticket for the train from Moscow to St. Petersburg and let us visit Pavlovskiy, Tsarskoye Selo, the Hermitage, and the house of Prince Yusupov. What beauty and what masterpieces were created by the Russian people, who themselves wore bast shoes all their lives! I want it to be just as beautiful here as it is in Tsarskoye Selo. We lived for 70 years in plywood panels. What kind of thoughts could arise there that are not coarse and crude? But I like to come to work. I spend practically my entire day within these walls, from eight in the morning until ten at night. Officials at this level have practically no days off. Very rarely you are free on Sunday or half a day on Saturday. We have telephones everywhere: under the pillow, in our cars. You never know when they are going to bother you. Many call these telephones "to me, Mukhtar!"

[Dikun] You probably know that our official delegations that go abroad surprise the foreigners with their size. Take, for example, the visit of Vice-Premier Soskovets to Tokyo or that of the premier himself to Paris and London. They were perplexed in all of the capitals: why are the Russians traveling in such large groups? It was calculated that Chernomyrdin's two-day trip to England cost the Russian treasury 150,000 pounds at the very least. No one gives that kind of money to Major.

[Borodin] Usually the people here who write about all this have never participated in such visits. The press is the same everywhere, they all need piquant facts, some piquant canards. Meanwhile, there is a precise protocol that stipulates the entire entourage and all the transportation and hotel services—everything is counted down to the last kopeck. After all, Clinton also comes to us with a train of assistants. We can count too and they are by no means fewer. And the Russian president does not have the kind of airplane that the American president has.

[Dikun] But now are there not the so-called "Kremlin" allowances, where they give money to officials "for representative expenses"?

[Borodin] We ended this a long time ago. But when protocol measures are carried out, of course, a certain sum is allocated. It is provided for in the budget and depends on the level of the reception: somewhere they simply drink tea, elsewhere coffee with cake, and elsewhere they have lunch. To be sure, recently such official receptions have become quite rare—only when the top persons of other states are in the country. As a rule, they invite a small group of 25 to 30 people.

Usually they set a purely Russian table. There is no getting around vodka either.

[Dikun] Pavel Pavlovich, are you a superstitious person? Two of your predecessors in the post, Pavlov and Kruchina, ended their lives tragically. They both threw themselves out the window....

[Borodin] I hope that I can avoid this fate. And all this has to do with money. We do not even have our own account. We take all of the requests to the Ministry of Finance and there they are prepared, double checked, and only after that are they sent to the Central Bank. With this kind of control, it is very difficult to violate anything even if you want to very much.

[Dikun] Were you not interested in who thought up the title of your position—business manager? As you know, the first business manager, then still the Soviet People's Commissar, was Bonch-Bruyevich.

[Borodin] This position arose earlier than that, back in the time of the czar. Only then this was the minister of the Court of His Imperial Majesty in the rank of field marshal. I am not a minister and not a field marshal but simply a high-placed porter.

*Supreme Court Chairman on Development of Legal System

954Q0197A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 May 95 p 4

[Interview with Supreme Court Chairman Vyacheslav Lebedev by Valeriy Rudnev: "Courts Gaining Authority: Better for Society"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Russian judges almost destroyed their Fatherland. It all started with what seemed at first glance an inconspicuous point in the Law "On Property in the RSFSR": if an owner sustains damage inflicted by a crime, the state must compensate him according to court decision. There were thousands of these victims, and many immediately announced their million-ruble claims against the state.**

Russian judges, having grown accustomed over the last decades to deciding everything with a first glance at state interests, have gone against Soviet rules in recent years and have begun pronouncing decisions in favor of citizens. The first suit, brought by a property owner whose car had been stolen and after an investigation had failed to find the perpetrator, was satisfied, and the rayon judge awarded the victim the market price of the misappropriated Zhiguli, to be paid by the state. The number of such suits has continued to snowball, and the amount of money asked from the state has already gone into the billions of rubles.

Here, the authorities have become concerned. High-ranking government officials began "running down" the judges, reproaching them for destroying the state, but the latter stubbornly stood by the letter of the law. In short, they were unable to convince the judges. Then, they simply terminated the validity of the norm that had proved so destructive to the state.

In essence, this was the first level that the Russian judges overcame in their ascent to the heights of power. A little later, the judges took their second legal summit; they began examining complaints concerning the procurator's decisions on arrests, which nearly caused shock at the General Procuracy.

What happened? What caused the court at that time, in 1991, to suddenly begin making decisions without looking to the government? And why today is everyone dissatisfied with the court—from the president to the average citizen? Has the court been toppled from the steep hills of power? IZVESTIYA's correspondent came to Vyacheslav Lebedev, chairman of the Russian Supreme Court, with these questions.

[Rudnev] Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich, evidently the Supreme Court is the same thing for Russia's judges that the General Staff is for the Army: the place where the strategy and tactics for future victories are developed. I have a suspicion that the plan for taking over the judicial branch was conceived in your office. Was the operation a success?

[Lebedev] The court is not an army, and of course, I cannot tell a single Russian judge, even a rayon judge, what to do. As far as judicial reform is concerned, the fact that it was necessary was, for me personally, obvious, even when I was still working in a rayon court. Ask any judge with some seniority, and he'll answer the same way: the dependence of our presence on the political will of the state was obvious for all the years of Soviet power. The fact that the politicians posed the question of a legal state and court independence only in 1985 is another matter.

The new history of Russia and the Russian court also, of course, began in 1991, but while for the country's political system everything was overturned with sharp pains and the August bloodshed, the judicial branch took the hill gracefully and, at first glance, inconspicuously.

The fact is that the court service, in the nature of its authority, is independent, and as soon as the politicians and legislators began gradually liberating power squares, we took them over, pronouncing legal decisions about ourselves. So don't think of me as a "man with a gun." There was, as you say, no plan to take over the government.

[Rudnev] I won't say that your relationship with your colleagues in power from the legislative and executive branches is harmonious, but the judges' ascent to the summits of power is always moving upward. Remember what happened after the famous judges' decisions on the citizens' suits against the state for compensation of damages inflicted by crime? Or the complaints concerning procurator arrest, when your deliberations were blockaded by the next thing to special forces machine guns?

[Lebedev] It all happened: the cries, the threats, the provocations. After all, people don't give up power that easily. We are acting according to the letter of the law, and we have no plans to deviate from it. The fact that those letters are frequently changing is another matter. We don't have the authority to make law.

There were problems with the procuracy because some of its employees were upset by the idea of judicial control over arrest. One day, one of the judges pronounced a verdict releasing a suspect from custody. The head of the investigative prison refused to release him, citing an order from the procuracy. The chairman of the oblast court came to me with the question: how should I handle a case like this? I recommended that he bring the head of the investigative prison to court for failing to carry out a court decision.

[Rudnev] That is exactly what people are criticizing you for. The militia and the procuracy work for months with a suspect before taking him into custody, and the judge releases him in an hour without any control from a higher court. True, in America nobody would say a word reproaching a judge for his decision.

[Lebedev] We are not in America. We have to deal with this question, not with the specific question of judicial control over measures of restraint during legal proceedings, but with our traditions of controlling everything. Maybe there really is a reason, as the procuracy and the MVD [Internal Affairs Ministry] suggest, to provide for the opportunity to protest a judicial decision on a release from custody, but if we give that kind of opportunity to the procuracy, we are obligated to grant the right to question judicial decisions to the accused and his attorney as well. Herein lies the principal of equality among the disputing parties, but I repeat: Everything is in the hands of the legislators.

Now it would be best to sign into action a statute in the Russian Constitution stipulating that arrest and further detention under guard are permitted only by court decision.

[Rudnev] Today, the court is being criticized at all levels of society. For example, the president reproaches you for your tendency toward acquittal, the militia and the procuracy for "humanism" shown toward "thieves within law."

[Lebedev] Well, let us say that everyone is criticizing us today: from the president to the rank and file government employee. So let us take things in order.

Regarding our tendency toward acquittal, here are the statistics: over the last 10 years, the number of not-guilty verdicts grew from 0.3 percent to 0.7. Incidentally, in 1994, out of all the verdicts handed down by Russian judges, only 0.5 percent were not-guilty. In other words, if the former 99.7 percent was considered a tendency toward conviction, then what is today's 99.5? A tendency toward acquittal?

Also, after all, higher courts reverse judicial appeals to an equal degree, both acquittals and convictions. Instead of our tendencies, we should be talking about judicial error. If an error is committed by the court, it must be reversed, regardless of the type of verdict. This is what the judicial system is built on, not on percentages.

Finally, don't forget that at the basis of the not-guilty verdict lies the quality of the investigation. No malefactor in a judge's gown will cross convincing evidence. In connection with this, I will tell you what our critics try not to mention. The number of criminal cases returned for continuing investigation due to extremely poor quality is growing from year to year. Here, we have a whole heap of problems. They begin with the still-functioning norm that requires the court to prove guilt.

No, that was not a slip of the tongue. Of course, the investigator and the procurator must prove it, but the court must too. This is justice for you; this is the adversarial principle. Using this obvious flaw in the law, the procurators do not appear at the proceedings in about 50 percent of criminal cases. Then who must prove guilt? The court, also?

There is still more. The judge sees that there is not convincing evidence, but he is in no hurry to acquit, as the idea of justice would require, so he makes a compromise with the procurator: he returns the case for additional investigation. Do you think that these cases ever get back to us? No. A relatively large portion of such cases the investigators and procurators, themselves, close. One may ask: why were they sent to court in the first place?

[Rudnev] Maybe the procurators and detectives are criticizing you because you don't want to fight criminals with them.

[Lebedev] We have different ways of fighting. If the state needs an organ that will automatically rubber-stamp suspicious operatives, it still must be created. The court won't work that way.

Our language, the tools of our professions, as they say, are different. More and more often, detectives talk about authorities and thieves within the law; they cite reports from their secret agents, dispatches from their operatives. We can speak only in the language of the Criminal and Criminal Procedure codes. We base our decisions only on evidence, not on conjecture.

I will quote facts again. In 1994, 65,000 complaints of illegal arrest came to Russian courts and 7,000 of extended periods of detention under guard. Judges recognized as well founded only 13,000 of the complaints against arrest and 1,300 for extended periods of detention under guard. The majority of the complaints against procurators were found to be unreasonable.

Another set of numbers: over 48,000 of the defendants, including dangerous criminals, were taken under guard by decision of judges, although this should have been done first by procurators.

Now, compare and evaluate the words of our critics of judges' spinelessness. Incidentally, for some reason the procurators and militiamen are staying quiet about the 58,000 people who escaped investigation only because they didn't arrest the accused parties in time.

[Rudnev] What do you say about citizens' complaints regarding judicial red tape and the long "line for justice?"

[Lebedev] I am prepared to admit their reproaches. Alas, cheap law is most expensive for the citizens. This is why we are fighting to increase expenditures for the judicial branch. We would like to have large judicial offices, modern organizational technology and computers. We would like to acquire an entire staff of aids—secretaries, stenographers, bailiffs—for each judge. Then the judicial machine would run more quickly and efficiently and people would stop suffering in the "lines for justice."

For now, we can only dream about it; sufficient funds for the judicial system are not to be found in the state.

[Rudnev] Recently, you met with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Were you satisfied with your conversation with the head of state?

[Lebedev] Entirely. I'll say this: we reached a mutual understanding on resolving issues of judicial reform, and here, I was not the only one to propose a solution; the president also offered his ideas, exhibiting a competent understanding of our problems. He, of course, did not promise mountains of gold, but he did guarantee us support.

[Rudnev] While I was preparing my interview with Vyacheslav Lebedev, I received an announcement from the information agencies: the State Duma has adopted, on its first reading, the draft project "On the Judicial System of the Russian Federation," prepared with the participation of the Supreme Court, and the president of Russia, B. Yeltsin, signed a decree "On Certain Organizational Measures Toward Accelerating the Conduct of Judicial Reform in the Russian Federation." So one would like to hope that the confrontational portion of the history of the Russian judicial branch is coming to an end. The creative period is beginning.

*New Academy To Promote 'Slavic-Eurasian Idea'

954Q0195A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 May 95 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Academic B. Iskakov, International Slavic Academy of Sciences president, by G. Pelisov in Moscow; date not given: "Why Have Victors' Children Allowed Themselves To Be Deceived? Difficult Questions Posed at International Slavic-Eurasian Congress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tomorrow, the Second International Slavic-Eurasian Congress opens in Moscow with the discussion topic "The 50th Anniversary of the Victory Over Fascism and the Modern World." It is being organized by the International Slavic Academy of Sciences, Education, the Arts, and Culture (MSA), together with several patriotic organizations from Russia and the CIS. Our correspondent speaks with Academic B. Iskakov, MSA president.

[Pelisov] What themes will be the subject of the discussion? What actually is the MSA? When was it created? What goals and tasks has it set for itself? Which famous scientists, writers, and cultural figures are members?

[Iskakov] Let us take the questions in order. The International Slavic Academy of Sciences, Education, the Arts, and Culture was created by patriotic circles of the country's scientific-technical and creative intelligentsia in response to the Belovezhskiy agreement. It was clear to all thinking people in the Fatherland that a most serious crime had been committed against the peoples of our country, which would lead to a tragic chain reaction. The artificial tearing apart of economic and scientific-cultural ties that had developed over centuries would end the collapse of the economy, the financial system, education, the arts, culture, slow-downs in all branches of the national economy, an increase in prices and hyperinflation, a drop in the population's standard of living, inter-regional and interethnic conflicts, and the impoverishment and extinction of nations. It was necessary to gather the Fatherland together once again, to bring together the best patriotic minds, the country's social brain, to gather patriotically thinking forces in order to develop the strategy and tactics for unity between the peoples of North Eurasia that have united around the Slavic peoples over the course of thousands of years. Organizational efforts toward the creation of the MSA were made as early as the end of the tragic year of 1991. The charter assembly took place in May 1992, creating the academy. In July 1993, the MSA was registered by the Russian Ministry of Justice.

[Pelisov] What are your goals and tasks?

[Iskakov] The MSA is not a political party; it is a scientific-public organization that offers aid to patriotic political organizations in developing and consolidating strategy and tactics. The very fact of the appearance and existence of the MSA is already politics, but it is just "soft politics." The MSA is, so to speak, a collective Ivan Kalita for patriotic circles of the country's intelligentsia. We do not accept everyone into our ranks, only the best scientists, writers, educational, and cultural figures who love Russia, who have not reconciled with the collapse of the country caused by the dark forces that torment our peoples.

[Pelisov] Do you believe in the Eurasian idea?

[Iskakov] No, the Slavic-Eurasian idea is substantially different from the Eurasian and Western; it is closer to the Slavophile concept, but it does not agree with narrow Slavic fundamentalism or pan-Slavism. All the versions of the Eurasian idea diminish, dilute the role of the Russian people and the Slavs in the creation of Russia and the Soviet Union; we criticize the Eurasian idea in all of its versions. We are also critical of the pro-Western, essentially mistaken concept of a "European home" that has been propagandized by Gorbachev and Yeltsin, into which nobody plans to accept Russia on an equal-rights basis; it is given the humiliating role of supplier of nearly gratuitous raw materials and a cheap labor force. We are also critical of narrow-minded fundamentalism, which does not want to deal with the fact that historical Russia penetrated far into the East, into the traditional area of Islam, Buddhism, and other religions. If we are to speak only of a Slavic state, then Russia will be quickly broken into pieces and narrowed into the Moscow princedom.

The bases of the Slavic-Eurasian concept were laid by D. I. Mendeleyev, the great Russian scientist, in several works, especially in his book *Towards a Knowledge of Russia*. It took the genius of Mendeleyev to light the way for decades ahead, up to our tragic days.

The Congress will deliberate upon the impact of our victory on the subsequent development of humanity, draw general conclusions on the lessons of post-war development, analyze the causes of the fact that our nation, a victor in the war, later suffered defeat in the competition between socioeconomic systems, and look at why the new generations—the children and grandchildren of the victors—have allowed themselves to be deceived and robbed. We will work toward making the Congress of the past victory a congress of a future victory.

[Pelisov] Who specifically will be deciding these important questions?

[Iskakov] The MSA's membership includes well-known scientists N. Severtsev, N. Borisevich, A. Tomilov, A. Yanshin, and R. Khasbulatov; writers S. Mikhalkov, S. Vikhulov, V. Rasputin, V. Belov, Yu. Bondarev, P. Proskurin, and V. Ganichev; composer G. Sviridov; sculptor V. Krylov; and film director N. Burlyayev. The theology division of the MSA includes Aleksiy II, patriarch of Moscow and all Russia.

[Pelisov] Solid forces. I would like to wish you success in a great and difficult job.

[Iskakov] Our goal is to serve our country, tirelessly. The secret of the invincibility of Russia, of the Slavic and Slavic-Eurasian world, lies in the fact that at all times, numerous passionate people have been found for whom the Motherland has meant much more than their personal cares. We will be equal to them, and we will draw upon their example of courage and strength. Russia has not perished and will not perish. Our work is right; victory will be ours!

Media Issues

*Press Committee Head on New Anti-'Fascism' Law

954Q0205A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Jun 95 p 5

[Article by Sergey Gryzunov, chairman of the RF Committee on the Press, candidate of historical sciences: "So Far, Nothing Is Threatening Fascism in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The date of 23 March will probably become a memorable one for many Russians. For some because that was the promulgation day of the Edict of the president of the Russian Federation, entitled "Measures To Guarantee the Coordinated Actions of Agencies of State Authority in the**

Fight Against Manifestations of Fascism and other Forms of Political Extremism in the Russian Federation." For others because it was precisely on that day that Aleksey Vedenkin, one of the scandalous leaders of Russian fascism, was freed. For me, as the chairman of the RF Committee on the Press, 23 March is also memorable because that was precisely the date of a letter from Timiryazevskiy Interrayon Procuracy in Moscow, in which it was reported that the procuracy does not look for violations of the law in issues of the RUSSKIYE VEDOMOSTI newspaper. Once again a message from Roskompechat [RF Committee on the Press] to law-enforcement agencies remained unsatisfied.

I am definitely not attempting to act in the role of a strict judge of our "partners" in the procuracy. If only because it is rather well known to me that our judges are very uneager to review any cases that are linked in one degree or another with the activity of the SMI [mass media].

Judicial practice has shown that, if he has a skillful lawyer, the defendant, in the person of a newspaper that prints fascist messages, is able relatively easily to drag the court into a labyrinth of purely theoretical discussions about how one should treat various principles stated in articles of the UK [Criminal Code] or the Law on Mass Media, instead of considering absolutely specific misdeeds of absolutely specific journalists. With a condescending grin directed at the vain efforts of justice, the defendants stand firmly on the grounds that in their articles it is only by pure chance that the persons who regularly prove to be villains and enemies of the Russian state are people of Jewish or Caucasian nationality. And that the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" is nothing more than a historical document which, in their opinion, ought to be studied by the broad public...

Another indication of the fact that our legislation takes a completely peaceable attitude even toward the most blatant manifestations of extremism is the incident involving the same Aleksey Vedenkin. I am more than convinced that our Russian fascist has proven to be definitely not as simple as he has appeared on the television screens. I am convinced that, before giving his consent to a public statement, Vedenkin studied the Criminal Code with a magnifying glass in hand. And he said everything that he wanted, having verified everything down to the last word.

It seemed to only a legally unsophisticated listener that, with every minute of his statement, Vedenkin was adding time onto his own sentence. But was that actually so? A detailed study of everything said by the Russian fascist led the law-enforcement agencies to a shocking result: essentially speaking, there proved to be nothing with which to charge the home-grown Nazi.

The Fight Against 'Manifestations' of Fascism Is Unpromising

Stories about the omnipotence of the domestic fascists and about their total penetration into the power structures have existed for many months. Personally, I do not put much faith in their reality. But there is something else that I cannot fail to mention: I am deeply convinced that a significant contribution to creating the myth of the influence wielded by Russian fascism is being made by the state departments that have been called upon to fight it.

Recently I studied the statistics of that fight in my own Roskompechat. At first glance the figures were very impressive. For example, during the past half-year the RF Committee on the Press issued slightly less than 30 official warnings to the editorial offices of newspapers and magazines for violation of Article 4 of the Law on the Mass Media. For purposes of comparison: our predecessors had issued exactly the same number of warnings during the previous two and a half years. So, if it gets to the point of doing what used to be done in previous times — that is, the reporting on the work that has been done within one's purview — then there would seem to be something to report, but...

Not a single extremist newspaper was closed on the basis of these warnings. As of today, there are only two cases before the courts: one involving ZAVTRA newspaper, and another one, that has been causing a sensation for about half a year, involving the AL KODS publication, which was deprived of registration by us. In the latter instance, Roskompechat is acting as defendant, and an agency that would seem to be our natural ally — the General Procuracy in the person of V. Davydov, deputy head of that department — has undertaken the defense of a newspaper that has grossly flouted the law.

The lack of coordination among the actions of the departments, their rigid orientation on "charity begins at home," rather than on the common cause, and their ability to report on the work that has been done, rather than their ability simply to work — that is the muddy water in which the domestic extremists of all levels and of all colors easily catch their fish.

Many people will probably remember a documentary that was shown on RTV [Russian Television], during which one could hear a fragment of a statement by Viktor Anpilov. Taking advantage of the ambiguous evaluation by the Russian public of the events in Chechnya, the leader of "Labor Russia" called upon the population to begin a civil war. Roskompechat immediately requested the General Procuracy to conduct a procuracy audit with respect to V. Anpilov. We are still waiting for the reply.

And there is yet another danger. Judging from the actions that are currently being undertaken with respect to executing the edict of the RF president, many ministries and departments have isolated from the context of the [edict] name as a key word the word "manifestations." This is very convenient for an organization executing the edict — all it has to do is to fight "manifestations of fascism and other forms of political extremism: there are, of course, many places where one can reveal oneself, where one can plan and report on mass measures. But at such time the main thing is simply forgotten: the "manifestations" are eliminated, but the phenomenon remains and produces newer and newer manifestations in increasingly sophisticated forms. When the fight is waged in this way, you have to agree that somehow there is no optimistic prospect in sight.

Let us compare the situation with the fascist press with the most optimistic alternative. Let us assume that the RF Committee on the Press has efficiently revealed all the publications that have published items that contravene the existing legislation on mass media or the principles stated in Edict No. 310 of the RF president. And that the procuracy and the courts, in just as clear-cut and efficient a manner, are carrying out their powers, as a result of which the activities of the extremist publications are discontinued. What next?

What would occur next would be the very same situation that was successfully tested by DEN newspaper. I might recall that, after it was closed by the court, the entire editorial staff found refuge under a roof that had been prepared ahead of time — they transferred to the newspaper that is currently known by the name of ZAVTRA.

Who Must Be Fought

The open and rather energetic efforts to try the SS uniform on Russia began during the *perestroika* era. At first the process was of a buffoonish, in places openly vulgar, nature. We might recall the dressed-up brotherhood of Dmitriy Vasilyev, the statements made by a group of *Parteigenosse* on the pages of DEN, the ignorant historical exercises of Ilya Glazunov — all these were, from time to time, somewhere in the back of public awareness.

Currently, alas, that which we considered with a rather large share of skepticism and irony has imperceptibly penetrated into the pores of society and has become deeply rotted in the awareness of definite segments of the population.

Meanwhile the complexity of the fight against Russian fascism has been made more difficult, largely by the fact that we have not learned how to identify it. Whereas in Europe the term "fascism," which became firmly established in the postwar political lexicon, is used as a synonym to designate total evil, in the present-day Russian context it is employed — inadmissibly frequently — improperly, with the purpose of demonizing one's political opponents. Therefore it is not surprising that the discussion that periodically flares up in the Russian mass media concerning "Russian fascism" as a rule has been deliberately ideologized, and has as its goal the putting of a label on one's political opponent. As a result of which it becomes extremely difficult to understand the situation with our numerous extremist groups.

Meanwhile fascism, as a political movement, possesses a number of clear-cut signs.

The first one is self-identification. This is the use of nationalistic categories and self-designations (Aleksandr Barshakov, for example, calls himself a national socialist; others call themselves fascists or Orthodox fascists), and the choice of symbols (the swastika or stylized swastikas) and rituals (the Nazi salute).

Another sign is the ideological and theoretical platform. First of all, this is the race doctrine that was borrowed from the Nazis, with its principle of priority of blood, but blood that has been "creatively" enriched — it is precisely the Russians who are proclaimed as the highest embodiment of the Aryan race.

The third sign is a program of actions. The path proclaimed in the economy is the "third path," which is an alternative both to "Judeo-liberal capitalism," and to "Judeo-Masonic socialism." The national-state structure is a unitary Russia with the ruthless suppression of absolutely all kinds of separatism. Its foreign policy: focus on establishing "Russian order" throughout the world; the restoration of Russia and its "historic borders"; clearly expressed anti-Americanism and noticeable Germanophilia.

The fourth sign is the action style, adherence to the destruction of the old social system and society and the creation of a new one, a leaning toward a spirit of revolution. Fascists are alternative with respect to the entire political and state system as a whole; their goal is not a primitive "walk to power," but a total change in the nature of the latter and the creation of a qualitatively different system of administering the country.

The fifth sign is the type of organizational structure: a rigidly structured, hierarchical party headed by a leader; the existence of storm-trooper detachments.

A valid question here is: are we dealing today with fascism in Russia or with Russian fascism? I am afraid that now we are already dealing with the conversion of the former into the latter. There is in progress a complicated, but already nearly completed process of transplantation of the fascist doctrine and program into the Russian sociocultural and ideological tissues, into the Russian mentality.

There is something else that is fundamentally important: is home-grown fascism an object of the political process that can be controlled by certain forces or has it already acquired qualities of an independent political subject, has it become an independent political player that is pursuing its own goals and that possesses a realistic strategy for achieving them? Without an answer to that key question, any discussion on the topic of the "fascist threat" in Russia is simply meaningless. So I feel that somewhere after the spring of 1994 a new stage in the life of Russian fascism began in Russia — the stage in which it acquired status as a subject. Fascism in present-day Russia is developing "in breadth and depth." The number of fascist groups, both large and small, is multiplying incessantly, and the influx of volunteers into the RNU [Russian National Unity] is of a nature that is frightening for democracy in the country. There has been a fundamental change in the doctrine of party building: a fully valid political organization is arranged around a military-political nucleus. The RNU is preparing for registration on the federal level and intends to participate in the parliamentary and presidential elections.

Does Russian fascism have a stable social base? Once again, I am regretfully forced to answer that question in the affirmative. Recently Professor Yuriy Levada, director of VTsIOM [All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion], remarked that, whereas a partial evaluation of today's situation in society is the buildup of chaos, then, naturally, the thing that is becoming the most widespread requirement is the introduction of "order." Late last year 70 percent of Russians agreed to having the long-awaited order being introduced "at any cost" and even by an "iron hand."

So the Russian Nazis have something to put their hopes on: doing things at any cost and with an iron hand is something that they know how to do.

The Fight Against Fascism Threatens To Grow Into a Fight Among Departments

Recently, appearing on the "Vremya" [Time] program, Aleksey Ilyushenko, acting general procurator, speaking about his department's unease concerning the activities of extremist organizations, reproached Roskompechat for failing to take energetic steps to stop the printed propagandizing of the Russian fascists. Incidentally, I have already expressed my opinion rather exhaustively on this subject in this article. But there is just one thing I would like to add.

It would seem that, on the basis of the indestructible habit of officialdom, we enter the most dangerous process when implementing any important state assignment. The fight against the evil that was named in the document is being shamelessly replaced by a struggle — or, to put it more precisely, a wrangle — among the departments that have received that assignment. The purpose is to show how active they are and how passive the others are. In this untalented vanity, there is only one thing that suffers — the job itself. The number of examples of this in our country's history — both recent and past — is countless.

But it seems to me that today, in addition to measures for causing an immediate effect — the banning of frankly extremist movements and printed publications — it is necessary hastily to sit down and renew our legislative abase. It is necessary to formulate in a clear-cut manner for those who are going to execute the laws exactly what extremism is in general, and what fascism is in particular, to name its precise attributes, and to renew our UK and Law on the Press. Putting it more succinctly, it is necessary to arm reliably all those who will never allow the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the Victory over fascism to go down in history also as the year of the strengthening of Russian Nazis.

Military & Space Issues

Duma Member Urges Delay in Ratifying Chemical Weapons Treaty

95WC0054A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 May 95 p 2

[Article by Yelena Subbotina: "Mustard Gas and Zarin Are Not Residents of This World: So the World Community Decided and Drafted the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Russia's President Signed That Document"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The next step is supposed to be ratification of the convention by parliament, and some State Duma deputies are insisting that it should be done as fast as possible. However, those who are knowledgeable about the problem have some serious objections. One of those who recommend against rushing is Tamara Zlotnikova, deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on the Environment.

So what is making Tamara Vladimirovna do everything she can to draw attention to this complicated—to put it mildly—issue?

No healthy person doubts that the world's stockpiles of toxins ought to be destroyed. Recent events in the Tokyo subway made it crystal clear what the ultimate results of preparations for chemical warfare are. The only question is how and under what circumstances does the state propose to get rid of its strategic stocks. These are the circumstances that draw a protest from Deputy Zlotnikova.

A year ago joint hearings of five committees were held in the Duma: the committees on international affairs, defense, security, science, and the environment. While not questioning the need to ratify the convention, the deputies agreed that several conditions must first be met: prepare the legal substantiation, prepare the material facilities, and most importantly, develop a state conceptual framework and program for destroying the toxins. Until these are met, haste is inappropriate.

Zlotnikova does not consider preparation of the legal foundation to be the most difficult thing; the second condition, the technical aspect, is far more complicated. In Tamara Vladimirovna's opinion, Russia is not yet capable of handling the elimination of 40,000 tonnes (those are the stockpiles that our country has declared) of toxins:

"Russia today has only experimental or pilot industrial units but lacks the requisite industrial capacity, while storage facilities are still unreliable. In the event of a rapid ratification of the convention, we would have extremely little time to solve all the problems, including the technical ones, yet our international commitments would demand that we accelerate the pace. I think anyone familiar with Russian reality will have no difficulty imagining what could happen in such a situation."

The elimination of chemical weapons should be safe—no one will object to that—but it turns out that military people have a different understanding of safety. For sanitation inspectors and environmental specialists, it means zero maximum admissible concentrations during the destruction process, but for military people it means totally different numbers. Zlotnikova insists that in parting with chemical weapons we must not, once again, risk people's health and life, as happened during their production, when not just specialists but those who had the misfortune to live nearby suffered. Without special monitoring instruments, it is better not to begin, Tamara Vladimirovna insists, and it is hard not to support that insistence.

A fundamental question: Where do we site the destruction locations? Not long ago it was planned to equip two facilities in order to put toxins from the entire country through them, but rail shipment is such a substantial risk that it was decided not to tempt fate: the chemical weapons will perish wherever they are today. Granted, in this situation it is pointless to expect bouquets from the residents of the seven "lucky" oblasts.

Before serving in the Duma, Tamara Vladimirovna served for several years as a deputy to the Orenburg Oblast Soviet, and she continues to work energetically in her district. Therefore, she knows exactly that the people's reaction will be strongly negative. In such circumstances, it is necessary to regulate the rights and duties of the central authorities and the components of the Federation as soon as possible, while for now the diktat of the center is evident in the decision to destroy the chemical weapons on site. Today only two oblasts have agreed, in principle, to that. Bryansk, for which Chernobyl was enough, is protesting as strongly as possible, while the rest are prepared to bargain with the center, which is supposed to provide environmental, social, and legal guarantees against the risk to which a territory will be subjected during the destruction of chemical weapons.

All these questions demand not only serious study but equally serious financial outlays. According to forecasts, the program will cost $10 million U.S., which converts to the astronomical figure of 50 trillion rubles. Of course, the treasury has no such money, and therefore T. Zlotnikova finds it extremely inappropriate to force events.

"Under such conditions, ratification of the convention is an act of the utmost irresponsibility! Political, economic, environmental, social—you name it!—irresponsibility. Unfortunately, in the government and the State Duma there are politicians who are doing their utmost to push Russia into ratification, explaining their position as follows: if we ratify today, there will be nowhere to retreat, and tomorrow all the issues will inevitably be resolved. But will they be resolved? On the contrary, haste may result in unjustifiable damage to both nature and society. In addition, Russia is being pushed toward a hasty decision through diplomatic channels, too. I have the impression that the United States, above all, which has long since sorted out all the attendant problems of chemical disarmament, has a stake in this. The Americans are prepared to bid farewell to their stockpiles, especially since storage facilities in the United States are less reliable than in Russia, but understandably, they do not want to start without us, since they are worried about parity. If they are impatient, let them offer specific assistance, but we must not be hurried."

So, there is no longer any need to prove that there should be no place for mustard gas, zarin, and the like in today's world; humanity thinks differently 80 years ago, when Kaiser Germany tested poison gas for the first time against a foe near the Belgian village of Ypres. Today yperite [mustard gas] and zarin are not residents, but it is desirable that they be buried without damage to the health and environment of the countries that are parting with chemical weapons.

Commission To Declassify Nuclear Archives

95WC0054B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 5

[Directive No. 728-R of the Russian Federation Government: "Collection of Archival Documents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By way of implementing the Russian Federation president's 17 February 1995 Edict No. 180, "On the Preparation and Publication of an Official Collection of Archival Documents on the History of the Development of Nuclear Weapons in the USSR":

1. A working group of the Government Commission on Comprehensive Solution of the Problems of Nuclear Weapons (referred to hereafter as the working group) shall be formed for the purpose of studying archival documents related to the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR and developing proposals regarding their declassification; the group shall have the following members:

L. D. Ryabev—first deputy Russian Federation minister of atomic energy (director of the working group);

R. G. Pikhoya—director of the Russian State Archival Service (deputy director of the working group);
G. A. Tsyrkov—director of a main administration of the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy (deputy director of the working group);
V. V. Alekseyev—director of the Institute of History and Archaeology of the Urals Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
V. I. Anikeyev—deputy director of an administration of the RF Foreign Intelligence Service;
V. V. Bogdan—manager of affairs of the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy;
A. A. Brish—chief designer at the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy's All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Automation;
V. N. Verkhovets—head of a command sector of a main administration of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
G. A. Goncharov—head of a department at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics of the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy;
Yu. V. Grafov—deputy director of an administration of the Navy;
S. A. Zelentsov—consultant with a main administration of the RF Ministry of Defense;
Ye. A. Ivanov—deputy head of a department of the Department of Defense Industry of the Russian Federation president's Administrative Staff;
A. P. Kalandin—deputy chairman of the RF Gostekhkomissiya [State Commission on Technology] [not complete expansion?];
N. I. Komov—chief specialist of a main administration of the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy;
V. N. Kosorukov—chief engineer of a main administration of the RF Ministry of Defense;
A. A. Krayushkin—director of an administration of the Russian Federation Federal Security Service;
B. V. Litvinov—chief designer at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics of the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy;
V. M. Orel—director of the Institute of the History of Natural Science and Technology imeni S. I. Vavilov of the Russian Academy of Sciences;
V. A. Pidzhakov—deputy director of the Central Institute of Technical Physics of the RF Ministry of Defense;
Yu. B. Khariton—honorary research director of the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics of the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy.

2. The RF Ministry of Atomic Energy, Ministry of Defense, State Committee on the Defense Industry, Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service and State Archival Service, and the Russian Academy of Sciences shall, within three months, prepare and present to the working group a list of archival documents that are proposed for declassification and inclusion in an official collection of archival documents on the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period up to 1954.

3. During the third quarter of 1995, the working group shall determine the subject areas of the archival documents that are proposed for declassification according to established procedures and inclusion in the official collection of archival documents on the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period up to 1954, and shall prepare on that basis a general list of those documents.

4. During the fourth quarter of 1995, the RF Gostekhkomissiya, together with the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy, Ministry of Defense, State Committee on the Defense Industry, Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service and State Archival Service,

and the Russian Academy of Sciences shall organize the declassification according to established procedures of archival documents on the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period up to 1954 in accordance with the list indicated in point 3 of this directive.

5. Organizational and technical support for the activities of the working group and preparation of the necessary materials related to publication of the official collection of archival documents on the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period up to 1954 shall be assigned to the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy.

6. Roskompechat [Russian Committee on the Press and Printing], together with the RF Ministry of Atomic Energy, shall provide for the publication in 1996 of the official collection of archival documents on the history of the development of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the period up to 1954, using funds provided in the federal budget for the periodical press and publishing houses.

[Signed] Chairman of the Russian Federation Government

V. Chernomyrdin
[Dated] 24 May 1995, Moscow

Federal Assembly

*Quarterly Chronicle of Foreign Policy Activities

954Q0206A Moscow DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK in Russian Apr 95
No 4, [Signed to press 19 Apr 95] pp 34-36

[Text of "Discussion of International Issues in the Russian Federation Federal Assembly: Parliamentary Chronicle (January-March 1995)," and items on meetings under the section "Commonwealth of Independent States"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

13 January

State Duma

The Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Between Russia and Hungary and the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Friendly Relations Between Russia and Vietnam were ratified.

The deputy minister of foreign affairs, S. Krylov, gave a report.

18 January

Council of the Federation

The Appeal of the President of the RF on Extending the Mandate of the Russian Peacekeeping Forces in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict Zone was reviewed. The deputy minister of foreign affairs, B. Pastukhov, gave a report.

Continued utilization of a contingent of up to 3,000 people in the conflict zone till 15 May 1995 was approved by the decree adopted.

20 January

State Duma

The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Agreement on the Creation of an Interstate Eurasian Coal and Metal Association were ratified.

26 January

The minister of foreign affairs, A. Kozyrev, spoke at the meeting of the *State Duma Committee on International Affairs.*

The *State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs* conducted hearings on Russian-Belorussian [Belarusian] relations. From the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], the head of the Russian Delegation for Negotiations with the Republic of Belarus, V. Popov, spoke. A Supreme Soviet delegation and representatives of the president's administration and certain parties and public organizations of Belorussia [Belarus] came to the hearings.

27 January

State Duma

The Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Sweden on Trade Relations, the Protocol Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Sweden on the Termination in Relations of the Russian Federation and Sweden of the Effect of Certain Agreements Concluded Between the USSR and Sweden, and in addition the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and Switzerland were ratified.

The Agreement with Armenia on State Credit for 1994 was ratified. A similar agreement was ratified with Tajikistan.

The statement "On the Resolution of the European Parliament 'On the Situation in Chechnya Dated 19 January 1995'" was adopted.

2 February

Council of the Federation

The appeal to the Sejm of Poland on the need for Polish fishermen to stop the unregulated fishing for Korean cod in the central part of the Sea of Okhotsk.

7 February

The chairman of the Republic of South Africa Senate, Kobi Kutsne, spoke at the meeting of the *Council of the Federation.*

9 February

The president of the RF, B. Yeltsin, held a meeting with the chairman of the State Duma, I. Rybkin, where questions of the situation of fellow countrymen abroad as well as the results of I. Rybkin's trip to Poland and Belorussia were discussed.

Council of the Federation

A number of laws on ratification of the following documents were adopted: treaties on friendly relations with Hungary and Vietnam; the Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Sweden on Trade Relations and the Protocol Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of Sweden on the Termination in Relations of the Russian Federation and Sweden of the Effect of Certain Agreements Concluded Between the USSR and Sweden; the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and Switzerland; the Convention on Biological Diversity; and in addition the Agreement on the Creation of an Interstate Eurasian Coal and Metal Association.

The appeal to the parliaments of the Baltic states in connection with the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Victory was adopted.

10 February

State Duma

The Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation of the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Spain and the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Colombia were ratified.

15 February

State Duma

The Statement in Connection with the Statement of the State Assembly of Estonia "On Realizing the Human Right of the Chechen People to Self-Determination" was adopted.

The "Appeal to the Participants in the Meeting of Heads of CIS States in Alma-Ata [Almaty] on 10 February 1995" was approved.

23 February

State Duma

The committees on questions of geopolitics and on defense and other committees held hearings "On the Utilization of Space and the Space Industry in Russia's Geopolitical Interests" in which the RF MID took part.

24 February

State Duma

The following documents were ratified: the Fourth Supplementary Protocol to the Charter of the World Postal Union; the Charter and Convention of the International Electric Communications Union; the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Azeri Republic on the Transfer of Convicted Persons for Incarceration; and the Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on the Granting of State Credit to Belorussia in 1994.

The appeal "On Humane Treatment of the Population of Abkhazia" was adopted.

28 February

Council of the Federation

The Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation of the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Spain and the Treaty on the Fundamentals of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Colombia were ratified.

1 March

The *Council of the Federation* approved the Statute on Russia's Parliamentary Delegation in the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS Participant States.

3 March

The *Council of the Federation and State Duma committees on International Affairs* conducted closed hearings on the problem of the border with China in which the deputy minister of foreign affairs, A. Panov, participated.

15 March

The following *State Duma committees* held parliamentary hearings "On the Foreign Property of the Russian Federation": Committee on CIS Affairs and Relations with Fellow Countrymen; Committee on International Affairs; and Committee on Ownership, Privatization, and Economic Activity. The Department director, M. Veller, spoke from the RF MID.

17 March

State Duma

A number of conventions and agreements between the governments of Russia and Korea, Vietnam, Bulgaria, Sweden, Romania, and Ireland on avoidance of double taxation were ratified.

22 March

State Duma

The Statement and Decree "On Treatment of the Decisions of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on the Crimea" were adopted.

Council of the Federation

A number of laws on ratification were approved. They include the following: the Fourth Supplementary Protocol to the Charter of the World Postal Union; the Charter and Convention of the International Electric Communications Union; the Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on the Granting of State Credit to Belorussia in 1994; and the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Azeri Republic on the Transfer of Convicted Persons for Incarceration.

24 March

State Duma

The Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Labor Migration and Protection of Migrant Workers was ratified.

The law "On the Procedure for the Russian Federation To Allow Military and Civilian Personnel To Participate in Peacekeeping Activity To Maintain International Peace and Security" was adopted.

The Decree on Economic Sanctions Against the Republic of Estonia was adopted.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

Russia-Tajikistan: Meeting Between A. V. Kozyrev and E. Sh. Rakhmonov

On 10 March, A. V. Kozyrev met with the president of the Republic of Tajikistan, E. Sh. Rakhmonov, who was in transit through Moscow.

E. Sh. Rakhmonov told about the political changes being carried out in Tajikistan and the results of the parliamentary elections held recently.

During the talk, primary attention was devoted to questions of a political settlement of the conflict in Tajikistan and normalization of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. The importance of continuing the inter-Tajik dialogue was mentioned. In this context, A. V. Kozyrev favored resuming inter-Tajik negotiations as quickly as possible and reaching concrete new understandings there.

The parties expressed hope for support from the United Nations and the international community of the appeal of the heads of states of five Commonwealth countries to the Chairman of the U.N. Security Council regarding the deployment of a full-fledged U.N. peacekeeping operation in Tajikistan.

E. Sh. Rakhmonov expressed gratitude to Russia's leadership for the multifaceted aid being provided to Tajikistan.

Russia-Armenia: Visit of L. Ter-Petrosyan to Moscow

On 16 March, a meeting was held between the president of the Russian Federation, B. N. Yeltsin, and the president of the Republic of Armenia, L. Ter-Petrosyan, who came to Moscow on a work visit.

The heads of the two friendly states discussed the condition and prospects for development of bilateral relations, ways to strengthen the CIS, questions of settling the Karabakh conflict, and the situation in the Transcaucasus. They expressed confidence that stepping up the process of a Karabakh settlement will give the impetus needed for the multifaceted development of relations between Russia and Armenia.

Presidents B. N. Yeltsin and L. Ter-Petrosyan signed the Treaty on a Russian Military Base in Armenia, which is expected to help stabilize the situation and consolidate peace in the Transcaucasus. According to the Treaty, designation of a Russian base in Armenia will help ensure security along the external border of the CIS member states (that is to say, along the external border of the former USSR). It was emphasized that the Treaty is not directed against any third state and is in complete compliance with the objectives and principles of the United Nations and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe].

The fact that the Treaty on a Russian Base in Armenia was concluded emphasizes the high level of bilateral Russian-Armenian relations, mutual trust, and the responsibility of the leaders of Russia and Armenia for the peaceful and secure future of both states.

The Treaty satisfies pressing needs to reinforce the legal basis of cooperation between Russia and Armenia and fits completely within the position of collective security approved recently by the CIS countries in Alma-Ata.

Regional Affairs

*Regional Authorities Create Own 'Free Customs Zone'

954E1043A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 1 Jun 95 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Bezmenov and Aleksandr Volynets, under rubric "Free Economic Zones in Russia": "The Creation of Free Economic Zones in Russia Has Become the Domain of the Local Authorities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The process of creating free economic zones [FEZ] on the territory of Russia is the domain of historians. It is, however, clear to economists that the slogan "The FEZ is the vanguard of market reforms" is purely political. Something that may serve as testimony to this is both the failure of the previously created FEZ and the procrastination in the State Duma with the enactment of a law that clearly defines the status of the FEZ, as well as the recent decisions by the president concerning the granting of FEZ status to Kabardino-Balkaria and the creation of the "Ingushetiya" economic favor zone. The regional authorities are attempting to correct the situation in this sphere — by means of the independent creation of free customs zones. The most recent attempt of this kind was undertaken in Rostov.**

The regions have already realized that, under the present conditions, the appeals to the people at the top to grant them tax and foreign-economic benefits will scarcely achieve their goal. Thus the local authorities themselves have begun to create free customs zones (STZ) [FCZ] in Russia, being guided by the Customs Code. After the Moscow "Sherizon," the next FCZ is being created in Rostov. The city mayor's office has decided to allocate 120 hectares of land for construction of the "Rostov" FCZ. In conformity with the project that has been approved by the mayor's office, a port, warehouses, production terminals, and office structures will be situated on the allocated plot of land.

[KOMMERSANT-DAILY commentary] in conformity with the draft, the "Rostov" FCZ has been called upon to increase the activity rate of the foreign-economic turnover in Rostov Oblast and to increase the currency receipts of the local treasury. On the territory of the zone it is proposed to erect port structures, terminals, warehouses, processing production entities, and administrative buildings. The zone's forecasted freight turnover is 8-10 million tons a year.

Essentially speaking, an attempt was made in Rostov that is analogous to the Moscow experiment that stipulates the creation of the "Sherizon" FCZ in direct proximity to the "Sheremetyevo" international airport. However, as in the case of the Moscow zone, the factor that became the main problem for the managers of the Rostov project was the lack of financial means for improving the zone. According to Yuriy Pogrebshchikov, president the "STZ 'Rostov'" AO [joint-stock company], it i necessary to invest several hundreds of millions of dollars into creating the zone. The founders of the FCZ — Rostov industrial and commercial enterprises — do not have that kind of money. According to information that is available to KOMMERSANT-DAILY, certain foreign companies, and particularly those from Turkey and Saudi Arabia, have proposed assuming all the construction expenses, with the proviso that they become owners of the zone. Politely rejecting that offer, the founders undertook to seek other sources of financing. One possible source is the World Bank. In the course of a recent visit to Rostov, Aardi Stautesdeik, the director of the bank's Moscow representation, received an offer to participate in financing the project. In response, Stautesdeik stated that he would sent a bank specialist to evaluate the possibilities of the FCZ and, after his finding, a decision would possibly be made concerning the rendering of financial aid.

However, one would scarcely think that the Rostov entrepreneurs who undertook the creation of the FCZ can count on help from the World Bank. As has been demonstrated by the worldwide practice of creating free zones, international financial organizations are not very eager to finance them. This is linked primarily with the fact that such zones become export centers in the country, and this aggravates the competitive climate in the world market. Usually the greatest success is achieved by those FEZ and FCZ that have state support, and primarily financial support. And it is only if these conditions are observed that it possible to count on obtaining currency credit. Another factor of no small importance is the state guarantee of investments being carried out by foreign companies to develop such zones, and to insure them.

In the situation with the Rostov FCZ, however, as with the one at Sheremetyevo, there are no such guarantees. That is, the only real support of the projects is at the local level, and, for the potential foreign investors, this is not yet sufficient guarantee for the return of their money. A conclusion that suggests itself is: if the creation of FEZ and FCZ in Russia does not become one of the first priorities in the government's economic policy, then the further attempts to create them at the regional level are senseless and unpromising.

[Box]

Stages in the Development of Free Economic Zones in Russia

1991. The status of FEZ is granted to nine territories on the scale of oblasts and republic as part of Russia.

1992. The status of FEZ is granted to three more regions.

1993. All FEZ with the exception of Kaliningrad Oblast are deprived of customs benefits and privileges. The first three customs zones are established: "Sheremetyevo," "Moskovskiy Franko-Port," and "Franko-Port Terminal."

1994 The "Nakhodka" FEZ rejects its status and creates local customs zones on its territory.

September 1994. By governmental decree "Certain Measures For Developing the 'Nakhodka' Free Economic Zone," local free customs zones are created on its territory.

Late 1994. All the Russian regions change over to the creation of free customs zones without waiting for governmental decisions. Operations began to improve the territory of the "Sherizon" FEZ; the decision was made concerning the creation of a FCZ in Ulyanovsk; the mayor of St. Petersburg signed the directive "Creation of the 'Gavan' Free Customs Zone."

March 1995. With the issuance of the presidential edict "Recognition of the Loss of Validity and the Repealing of the Decisions of the RF President With Respect to the Granting of Customs Benefits," Kaliningrad Oblast was factually deprived of the status of FEZ.

March 1995. Ministry of Finance decided to grant the "Nakhodka" FEZ loans of 302.76 billion rubles for 1995.

March 1995. The president of Russia signs the edict "The 'Kabardino-Balkariya' Free Economic Zone." The terms for its functioning were not defined in the edict, and the government has not yet even considered the draft of the statute governing the Kabardino-Balkaria FEZ.

May 1995. The Rostov mayor's office allocates 120 hectares of land for the creation of the "Rostov" free customs zone. A port, warehouses, production terminals, and office structures are supposed to be situated on that plot of land.

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*Regions Begin Issuing Bonds To Finance Local Budgets

954E1037A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 2 Jun 95 p 14

[Article by Sergey Chizhov: "Circulation for a Loan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The center's strict credit policy is forcing regional authorities to attract financial resources more aggressively with the aid of their securities.**

Financing the budgets of local administrations with the issuance of debt instruments has been the norm in the fiscal policy of any state with a developed market economy for over 100 years. In some countries, the budget deficit has been maintained with the help of the securities market. Modern Russia is only attempting to revive this method of mobilizing financial resources at present.

The very concept of a "budget for local authorities" made its appearance comparatively recently (in 1991), but it was formulated legislatively only in the spring of 1993.

Taking into account the policy of federal authorities to completely reject inflationary sources in refinancing the state budget deficit in 1995 and the shallow flows of credit resources into the regions, it looks as if they are becoming depleted entirely. This naturally pushes local authorities to make aggressive use of the method of funded loans to finance their needs, inasmuch as tax resources in their current form have been practically exhausted.

Against this background, the first steps are already being taken to develop regional bond markets. While five prospectuses for loan emissions for local organs of authority were registered by the Ministry of Finance in 1992, there were eight registered in 1993 and 16 in 1994.

The loans of administrations of the Sergiyevo-Posadskiy Rayon in Moscow Oblast (50 million rubles [R]) and Beloyarskiy Rayon in Sverdlovsk Oblast (R100 million) are the most modest in size. More ambitious plans have been announced in both capitals. The municipal administration of St. Petersburg intends to mobilize R2.1 trillion with the help of the securities market, and the Moscow government has set the amount of its additional financial requirements at R6 to R7 trillion.

While the decline prevails in rates of inflation, which entails a reduction of bank rates of deposit and the profitability of short-term debt instruments, and the problem of nonpayments is resolved by noninflationary methods, securities with a return period ranging from six months to a year and a half under a guarantee by a local authority may be of interest to investors.

Meanwhile, the specific nature of local banking associations and the practice of serving regional budgets will not make it possible to assign one local bank with good ties within the region the right as an official agent of local authorities. The other authorized banks will be extremely displeased by this, and this will result in undesirable friction in all relationships between them and the administration. As a matter of fact, this is now taking place in Nizhniy Novgorod.

Aside from this, the activity of local banks needs to be unified to serve the interests of regional authorities in mobilizing additional financial resources in the securities market.

This unification should assume the following:

1. introduction of a single procedure for providing transfer-agent and registration services and centralized unified registers of the holders of bonds and other debt instruments issued in the region;

2. provision of trustee services in connection with loans of the local administration. (The nature of trusteeship means that the trustee represents the interests of those who hold debt instruments. Consequently, he should not have a direct financial interest in servicing and repaying the loan being administered. This cannot be obtained from authorized banks, inasmuch as they are all interested parties since they have access to the local budget.

(Moreover, a trustee should have rights with respect to the borrower's accounts, and it is also impossible to grant this right to the banks. As an example, in Nizhniy Novgorod the NBD Bank has access to the budget account in the "Garantiya" Bank and the "Garantiya" Bank has access to the account in the NBD Bank. Naturally, they simply will not permit something like this so that one does not become dependent on another);

3. provision for normal deposit services in connection with the distribution and turnover of securities issued in non-paper form;

4. real protection of the rights of other stockholders in privatized enterprises from arbitrariness by the board of directors and labor collectives; and

5. competent organization of the sales of large blocks of stock held by local authorities (in the form of the appropriate property fund), and a search for contacts with complete independence, within the framework of their charter authority and legal opportunities which exist in Russia's financial market.

It may be questioned whether we need such structures when there are committees to manage property and property funds, a network of authorized banks, and investment institutions which have been officially accredited.

It appears that they are necessary. The committees for property management and the property funds, being state structures, have powers which are clearly defined and they do not have the right to exceed them. In addition, neither the committee nor the fund can act as a trustee for loans, inasmuch as the trusteeship would be hypocritical throughout. (It is hard to visualize a situation when a property management committee, for example, would claim fulfillment of commitments on a loan for the local budget, being a budgeted organization itself).

The authorized banks cannot assume responsibility for this work for the reasons cited above. Investment institutions are too weak and unprofessional to act as effective agents for local authorities. In addition, they would need a coordinating organ with authority, in any case.

Of course, exceptions are possible, depending on the specific situation in a region. The poverty of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug for banks and the complete absence of investment institutions in the okrug make it possible to delegate the powers of fiscal agent for the administration to the Yugorskiy Bank (under the condition that its budget accounts are not located in it but in the large Khanty-Mansiysk Bank for the Development of Northern Peoples). In the event that there is a large branch of a Moscow bank in a given region which does not have direct and informal interest in the region's affairs, it may be assigned the functions of a fiscal agency; such a bank has already left the regional level for the federal level, and consequently its branch in the region will not be a hostage to local problems.

It appears that a fiscal agency which is in charge of adding to the local treasury and management of the regional authorities' liabilities should be oriented initially to the types of activity which are critical to development of the stock market in the region and which do not require major initial investments:

—distribution of the securities of local organs of authority on an agency basis;

—provision of registration and transfer-agent services in connection with the securities of local authorities which are being (and have been) distributed;

—organization of transactions with large blocks of stock in privatized enterprises (on a commission basis, once again); and

—development of materials on state and corporate financing with respect to a region's requirements.

It should be taken into account that such a business structure will encounter a number of problems right away. First of all, investment institutions will oppose its establishment, but this is not really a source of concern. Factors such as state support for its activity in the initial stage, access to the register of issuers, and the powers of a general agent for the local administration in floating the loans will quickly make it an entity to be reckoned with. If professionals with authority and experience in the securities market can be enlisted to work in this company, the struggle for its market "recognition" promises to be one that is not very long.

The second problem is the opposition of banks, especially the authorized ones. This opposition will be natural, though it may be overcome both by direct administration on the part of local authorities and by enlisting banks to take part in the capital of such an agency. Of course, this participation should rule out even the possibility of obtaining minimal control over it and be limited to 1 to 2 percent of the votes (for each of its participants).

*Tatarstan Council's Likhachev on National, Regional Problems

954E1047A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 25 May 95 p 5

[Interview with Vasiliy Likhachev, chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan, by Dmitriy Mikhaylin; place and date not given: "Vasiliy Likhachev: Nationality and Territorial Problems Must Be Approached With Extreme Care"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Vasiliy Nikolayevich Likhachev is 43 years old, a doctor of international law, and a professor. He was elected chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan on 30 March 1995. He is a Russian, is married, and has two children.**

[Mikhaylin] What do you think about the renewed debates over improving the state structure?

[Likhachev] From Kazan, it is very troubling to watch the processes that are currently taking place in Russia. What is especially worrisome is the fact that discussions about Russia's state structure are taking place against the backdrop of a huge set of unsolved socioeconomic problems. One gets the impression that certain political circles in Moscow have a very large stake in shifting the emphasis from the analysis and resolution of the economic situation to a debate about creating guberniyas, zemstvos, etc. In addition to everything else, this puts the Russian president in an awkward position. In his annual message to the Federal Assembly he spoke precisely about the need to preserve stability in multinational Russia, about respect for the rights of the peoples inhabiting it, and about the need to continue the democratic reforms, an important element of which is a civilized solution of the problem of national state structure.

At the same time, I do not want to dispute the fact that the regional problem is pressing and must be solved. The main question is how to do so. In my view, the idea of creating guberniyas is being put out by people who have forgotten or are deliberately not calling attention to the fact that the nationality factor in Russia has existed in the past, exists now, and will continue to exist. Proceeding from that fact, it is understandable that the process of creating guberniyas that are interpreted exclusively in territorial terms will only worsen the situation. The Chechen war is not yet over, but Moscow bureaucrats are already forgetting its main lesson: nationality and territorial problems must be approached with extreme care and caution, and that requires that they be addressed not just in the capital's corridors of power but with due regard for the opinion both of Russian society as a whole and of each region in particular.

However, I can already foresee that it will be extremely difficult to find a common position on this issue. Therefore, maybe it makes sense not to try to find that common position but to unite the regions along the path of economic federalism. After all, without solving regional economic problems it is impossible to speak of the existence of federalism in the political or social and psychological sense.

[Mikhaylin] In my view, what one should see in resuming these discussions is not only the "intrigues" of Moscow bureaucrats but a perfectly natural reaction of the regions to an increase in the status and acquisition of greater independence by a number of republics, which include Tatarstan, first and foremost. If I were president of the neighboring Republic of Mari-el or head of the administration of Kirov Oblast, I would find it incomprehensible and, moreover, offensive that Tatarstan had far more rights and far fewer duties (taxes, for example).

[Likhachev] I fully admit that. The desire to have more rights is natural and normal, if only because it reflects a respect for the people who live in the oblasts and, of course, in no way differ from the inhabitants, for example, of Tatarstan.

Yes, it is necessary to raise the oblasts to the level of the republics in a legal sense, but in doing so one must keep in mind that the people who live in the former autonomous republics always felt themselves to be not simply citizens of Russia but residents of the respective states making it up. Even if they were only declared to be states, they were felt to be states nonetheless, and the residents of Tatarstan, for example, have great respect for what has happened in recent years. The republics have taken a great leap forward in terms of recognizing their roles and their places and in understanding that they can finally take the economic and national potential they possess under their own control and use it for their own good.

Economic relations in past years have resulted in the fact that the regions are unequal economically. The example of Yakutia is indicative; they are literally walking on gold and diamonds, but in social terms they live much worse than many. You won't make the regions equal with a mere stroke of the pen. Today the donor components of Russia must be supported (I am speaking about the krays and oblasts too), and the less economically developed regions must be brought up to par through the federal center.

[Mikhaylin] As I understand it, in discussions about equalizing the status of components of the Federation, elevating the status of the oblasts to the status of the republics is not what is always meant; to the contrary...

[Likhachev] That is what I most of all would not like to see, not because Tatarstan would lose rights and powers gained in many months of negotiations with Moscow, but because it would set Russia back even further.

After all, the legal base and initial legal possibilities are the same for everyone today. The examples of Nizhniy Novgorod, Sverdlovsk, and a number of other oblasts show that where people think about the economy, the process of moving the reforms forward proceeds very actively. Now it is necessary to shift the emphasis and speak not about enhancing status but about exercising those powers that already exist.

A lot is being said about the notion that Tatarstan has some sort of special rights and privileges. Yes, that pertains, for example, to meeting the needs and requirements of the Tatar diaspora in Russia. Here you will agree that there is nothing to envy, since that is an additional duty rather than an additional right.

We have fairly great powers in the international realm, and through that we contribute, to some degree, to the advancement of Russia's interests. For example, many Middle Eastern countries, because of various circumstances, have their own special view of the policies followed by Moscow and the Russian foreign policy department. At the same time, Russian diplomacy has objective requirements in the eastern area that can be satisfied by uniting the efforts of the center and Tatarstan, and Tatarstan has accomplished some things in that sense. The same could be said about Karelia with reference to Finland.

Therefore it is very important, in speaking about Russia's state territorial problems, not to set them apart and view them in some sort of refined way but to speak of them in the context of economic, international, social, and other problems.

[Mikhaylin] Yet Tatarstan's main privilege—and not even privileges in terms of exporting oil—is not dealing with the interests of the Tatar diaspora but the possibility of entering the international arena and coming to agreement with Moscow.

[Likhachev] Yes, I think that the model that we have proposed and adopted is, for most regions, the model of future relations with the federal center. I am referring not to the essence of our treaty with Russia but to the mechanism of coordinating interests.

What is frightening is that this situation, which was created by Tatarstan together with the federal center, is perceived by many people as being something inorganic that does not fit into Russian reality. Although one could look at the Russian-Tatar model of relations from the other side, by using the categories of the general, the particular, and the individual. From the philosophical viewpoint, as we know, those categories are interrelated, and a process can proceed not only from the general to the individual but from the individual to the general.

Let me repeat once again that it would be senseless to copy the treaty between Russia and Tatarstan, if only because when it was prepared (1991-1993) we were addressing totally different problems. Starting with the creation of the mechanism itself of the treaty process, we did not limit ourselves to the technical delimitation of powers. Our treaty solves political, economic, and many other problems, and its preamble states that the Republic of Tatarstan as a state is UNITED with the Russian Federation. All this permits me to speak about the special nature of this document and of our relations with the federal center. Therefore we disagree, above all, when it is said that problems in relations between Moscow and Groznyy or Kiev and Crimea could be solved by the signing of such a treaty. No, they could not be. The mechanism that we devised and tested, however, is perfectly suitable.

The same thing could be said with respect to a number of treaties that have already been signed between

Moscow and the regions. For example, the treaties with Kabardino-Balkaria and with North Ossetia contain virtually nothing new when compared with the provisions of the Federal Treaty, although they are of political importance for those peoples. In these cases there is merely an interpretation that transfers the text of the Federal Treaty or Russian Constitution to documents regulating relations between the center and those regions. Yet we, if you recall, started talking about a separate treaty at the time only because we had not signed the Federal Treaty, since we disagreed with some of its provisions.

[Mikhaylin] What, in your opinion, might be the outcome of this debate about how we can revitalize Russia?

[Likhachev] It is very difficult to make any forecasts in our country. How can one make any forecasts if, for example, the very thesis about establishing guberniyas has been launched to a great extent by State Duma deputies who are worried about the next elections? I would like to say something not about what will be in the future but about what, in my view, ought to be.

First of all, it is necessary to take as the truth the fact that Russia is a great country, not in and of itself but as the aggregate of the regions making it up. At the same time, we have not yet developed the proper concept of regional and national policy, although that is precisely where we should have started.

Different and sometimes mutually contradictory instructions from ministries and departments cannot be considered a policy.

Russia needs a program for reforming its national territorial system, but that program should be worked out not only by Moscow bureaucrats but through the combined efforts of the center and the regions, especially since there is a mechanism—the Federation Council. Although, unfortunately, many people there are engaged only in establishing the fact of the existence of conflicts between the interests of the center and those of their regions, instead of seeking ways to draw them closer together.

This is especially important in that after several steps by official Moscow, people in the regions have begun to doubt the ability of that regime to be a general federal regime. Many people see the radius of action of the present Russian leadership as fairly limited.

Moreover, just as in the years of the Soviet regime, the Russian state's nationalities policy, generally speaking, comes down to playing up to and making much over the national minorities. Songs and dances are fine, of course, but you will agree that they are not the main thing.

At the same time, following a period when everything national was kept quiet and received no development, now it has burst out. That is by no means nationalism, and only once people understand that in this state there is respect for the individual and the national, will they, unquestionably, be concerned about the general.

*Decree on Supporting, Organizing Deliveries to Far North

954E1059A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 3

[Decree: "Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation, 24 May 1995, No. 508, Moscow, 'System of State Support and Organization of Deliveries of Output (Goods) to Rayons of the Far North and Localities Equated to Them in 1995'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For purposes of increasing the effectiveness of the use of funds in the federal budget and guaranteeing normal conditions for the vital activity of the population of the northern regions of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

1. To establish that state support of deliveries of output (goods) to the rayons of the Far North and localities equated to them (primarily with limited navigational seasons) is carried out for the guaranteed providing of the social needs of the population of those territories at the expense of means in specially designated federal and regional funds.

At such time:

deliveries of agricultural output, raw materials, and food products are guaranteed by agencies of the executive authority of the appropriate subjects of the Russian Federation jointly with the Federal Food Products Corporation under the RF Ministry of Agriculture and Food Products in the procedure established by decree of the RF Government, dated 13 March 1995, No. 241, "Measures for Implementing Federal Law 'Purchases and Deliveries of Agricultural Output, Raw Materials, and Food Products For State Needs'" (SOBRANIYE ZAKONODATELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1995, No. 12, Article 1055), at the expense of means to be channeled into the formation of federal and regional food-products funds, and regional funds for state support of shipping of output (goods) into the rayons of the Far North and localities equated to them;

the shipping in of petroleum, petroleum products, and fuel is carried out in conformity with Articles 17 and 42 of Federal Law "Federal Budget For 1995" (SOBRANIYE ZAKONODATELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1995, No. 14, Article 1213) at the expense of means in the federal fund for state support of the shipping of output (goods) into the rayons of the Far North and localities equated to them (hereinunder, the Federal Support Fund), the federal fund for financial support of the seasonal procurement of fuel for electric-power stations, the pumping of gas into underground storage facilities, the carrying out of measures to repair power equipment, and the providing of the population with fuel;

the shipping in of other types of output and goods that are necessary for the life support of the population of the northern regions, including output intended for technical-production purposes, is carried out at the expense of means in the regional funds for state support of the shipping of output (goods) to the rayons of the Far North and the localities equated to them.

2. RF Ministry of Finance is to transfer, for the period of one year, for administration of agencies of the executive authority of subjects of the Russian Federation, the means arriving to pay off federal budgetary loans issued in 1994 for the shipping of output (goods) into the rayons of the Far North and localities equated to them, as well as the sums arriving in form of payment for the use of those loans.

Agencies of the executive authority of the Russian Federation are to be granted the right to define independently the list of goods to be shipped in (food products, medicines, as well as output intended for material-technical purposes and essential nonedible goods) in order to supply the population and enterprises in the social sphere; the volumes of their reserves for the periods between navigational seasons; and suppliers and middlemen and to conclude with them the appropriate contracts; to approve the procedure for the formation and use of the means in the regional funds for state support of the shipping of output (goods) into the rayons of the Far North and the localities equated to them.

3. RF Ministry of Finance is to issue in the first half of 1995, if necessary, to subjects of the Russian Federation budgetary loans for the cash rupture that arises in May-September 1995 as a result of the lack of coincidence in the deadlines for returning the means of the Federal Support Fund that were issued in 1994 and the deadlines for purchase and shipping of output (goods) into the rayons of the Far North and the localities equated to them with limited navigational seasons.

4. The means in the Federal Support Fund are offered in the established procedure to agencies of the executive authority of subjects of the Federation, and to enterprises and organizations, on a returnable basis in the form of financial means and treasury bonds.

Agencies of the executive authority of subjects of the Russian Federation are to guarantee the specifically designated use by the enterprises and organizations of the means that are allocated to them from the Federal Support Fund, their prompt return, and the organizing of the purchase and shipping of output (goods) into the rayons of the Far North and the localities equated to them.

5. RF Ministry of Finance is to guarantee the financing of measures for the state support of deliveries of output (goods) to the rayons of the Far North and localities equated to them within the limits of the means stipulated in the federal budget for 1995.

6. RF Ministry for Nationality Affairs and Regional Policy, jointly with RF Ministry of Economics and RF Ministry of Finance, is to develop and submit in the fourth quarter of 1995 to the RF Government scientifically substantiated recommendations concerning the criteria for a differentiated approach to defining the amounts of state financial support of deliveries of output (goods) to rayons of the Far North and localities equated to them, with a consideration of the natural-climatic and socioeconomic peculiarities.

7. Agencies of the executive authority of subjects of the Russian Federation are to involve nonstate commercial organizations in resolving problems of deliveries of output (goods) to rayons of the Far North and localities equated to them for the more complete satisfying of the needs of the population on the basis of paying their own way.

8. RF Ministry for Nationality Affairs and Regional Policy, jointly with the interested ministries and departments, is to submit in the second quarter of 1995 to the RF Government recommendations concerning the making of the necessary amendments and additions to the existing normative legal acts pertaining to questions of organizing and financing deliveries of output (goods) to rayons of the Far North and the localities equated to them.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.

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*Komi Oil Spill Scale, Aftermath, Cleanup Effort Examined

95WN0173A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (DELOVOY VTORNIK Supplement) in Russian 23 May 95 p 2

[Article by Valentin Karkavtsev: "Usinsk Tragedy: Act Two"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Fishermen on the Pechora are not happy today: a rainbow film floats and floats down the river. This is the legacy of last year's Usinsk catastrophe. Winter was a time for compromise. How much oil leaked from the pipe then? First, Komineft's [Komi Oil] people gave a modest figure—14,000 tons. Specialists from the Ministry for Emergency Situations flew in. They determined that there was no way it could have been less than 70,000.

Spring has its own count. The forest streams have broken through the ice, and the rivers have carried the spilled oil for them into the Pechora. Exposed along with the rivers is the emptiness of the assurances that the Syktyvkar and Moscow chiefs used to charm the public all winter. Let me remind you: the governor of Alaska immediately offered his aid. In response, on 26 December last year, V. Torlopov, the republic administration's deputy chief, announced across the ocean that no help was needed, "the cleanup had entered its final stage."

From a statement by the Russian division of Greenpeace: "Assurances that the effects of the accident would be eliminated by 1 April turned out to be empty words. In actuality, they have not even begun the cleanup of many catastrophically contaminated areas, such as the Bezymyannyi, Khata-Yakha, and Bolshoi Kenyu streams...

"The cleanup effort there is entirely primitive: workers chop through the ice, scoop out the oil with ladles and load it onto trucks. At the Palnik-Shor stream, which is overflowing with oil, two dams—"Oil-catchers"—of the three that were built have been swept away by melting waters. One can say with sufficient confidence that the third won't last long, either.

"...Close to 1,000 tons of oil went into the Kolva River, and now it is moving toward the Pechora."

What threats does the oil that is rushing toward the Pechora conceal? In the opinion of Valentina Chukhchina, an employee of PINRO (Polar Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography), valuable salmons may simply not reach their spawning grounds, which are located in the upper reaches of the Pechora and its tributaries. There is an even greater threat, however, to the largest salmon run in Russia. The problem is that in cold water, high-paraffin oil drops to the bottom and fills up the depressions in the sediment where the salmon winter. One such winter, say the ichthyologists, would be entirely enough to send the salmon "belly-up" in the spring.

The institute is conducting studies basically without money. In order to conduct large-scale research, the scientists need 700 million rubles [R]. Where can they get it? Lately, there has been a gleam of hope that some money would go "to science" from the special-purpose credit granted by the World Bank for dealing with the Usinsk tragedy, but will it be too late by the time that money makes it to the institute?

Here is the story of that money. The World Bank, putting its stake on developing the oil business in Russia, offered its services back at the beginning of the year. For two months, the government did not accept the offer. They scraped together $12 million in the Ministry of Energy, but that was only a drop in the bucket; by the beginning of May the money was spent. In order to comprehend what kind of funds were needed to deal with the effects of the Usinsk catastrophe, one must only recall the story of the tanker "Exxon Valdez." That accident was four times smaller than the one at Usinsk, but it took $2.3 billion to eliminate its effects.

After losing two months, the prime minister requested credit from the World Bank, after all. On 26 April, the bank allotted $99 million at an extremely "steep" interest rate; Russia's debt will increase each year by $7 million. As the loan's guarantor was the Cabinet of Ministers, it follows that the entire weight of its repayment will fall on the taxpayers' shoulders. It would seem that it is not the oil industrialists, themselves, who are responsible for the ecological catastrophe, but all of us.

As far as those who bear the direct guilt, they intend to sue Komineft for R311 billion—the cost of the expenditures necessary to liquidate the effects of the spill of those same 14,000 tons of oil, but we are talking about a spill of a minimum of 79,000 tons. It would seem that the real damage should be counted as R1.5 trillion, but today nobody has any interest in suing the guilty party for that kind of money. Then we would be talking about bankruptcy for Komineft, one of the seven leading oil-extraction companies in Russia.

The strength of the oil lobby in the northern republic is another story. In Komi's State Soviet alone, oilmen comprise up to half of the deputy body. The overwhelming majority of these people are new arrivals who have appeared here with the goal of making some money then going back down south. What do they care what state the northern taiga is in after their oil piracy?

Now everyone is concerned about how to eliminate the effects of the August catastrophe as quickly and cheaply as possible, but nobody is talking about the fact that nearly 100 kilometers of rotted pipeline are still in use. This part of the oil pipeline runs through swampy areas, and if an accident were to occur here, it could only be cleaned up in the winter. Nobody is insured against new oil spills; just last year 2,470 accidents were recorded on Komineft's pipelines.

Has the Usinsk catastrophe taught us anything? Not likely. Most of the pipelines in Russia have already been in use for decades, and the pipes have rotted through; in the country over the course of one year, according to various estimates, from 20 to 50 million tons of oil are leaked. Now a special State Duma commission has begun serious study of this issue, but it is not hard to predict what the results of its activities will be. They will prepare a report and publish it, and people will be scandalized for a while. Then everything will go back to the way it was before. There isn't any money to replace the oil pipelines.

*Officials Comment on Region, Center Responsibilities

954F2439A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 15

[Article: "Inheritance For Close Relatives: The Power Pie —Some People Gobble It, and Others Nibble at It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] How much power does the center need. And how much do the subjects of the Federation need? A tug of war is still in progress about this. Moscow alternately states that the regions may take as much freedom as they can swallow, and then issues edicts that "abrogate" the too independent decisions made by the local agencies.

Moreover, the republics, krays, and oblasts themselves are confused. On the one hand, they would like to get the maximum amount of sovereignty. On the other, they would like to dump the maximum amount of concerns onto the shoulders of the federal agencies.

Who, then, will determine the balance of power, and how? That will be done by the package of federal laws being prepared to delimit the powers between the center and the subjects of the Dederation, and to define the principles of organizing local power in Russia.

That package, of course, will include the very latest studies by specialists. But the acquired experience will also be used: certain things that have been inherited will still be useful for the future power structures, but other things should be rejected.

Opinions on this topic are provided by theoreticians and practical experts in state constructions.

Anatoliy Sobchak, mayor of St. Petersburg:

I would like to give warning about a certain danger. That danger lies in the fact that, if a law on local self-government is adopted without the clear-cut delimitation of the federal functions and the functions of the subjects of the Federation, an erosion of power may occur. That is convenient for those who would like to return Russia to the bosom of the unitary state. Let the subjects of the Federation fight with the agencies of local self-government. Thus the single vertical line of federal authority will be strengthened.

In order to avoid this danger, it is necessary for us, as a minimum, to enact in the package of laws governing local self-government, a law on the delimitation of the powers of the federal and regional agencies of authority. If that is divided in time and in content, then we shall inevitably collide with artificially created problems.

It seems to me that it is necessary to write directly into the law on local self-government the right of the Federation subjects themselves to define the powers, structure, and stages of development of the agencies of local self-government. And, most important, in no instance should the agencies of local self-government be endowed with state functions, as is mentioned in Article 55 of the presidential draft. That already occurred once in the history of our country — under Khrushchev, when state functions were entrusted to various public organizations. If we proceed along that same path, we shall restore under a new name the very same system of Soviet authority.

Valeriy Kirpichnikov, president of the Union of Russian Cities:

The Union of Russian Cities at various stages reviewed in detail the drafts of the law on the general principles of organizing local self-government in the Russian Federation. The absolute majority of the specialists in our organization and the current heads of agencies of self-government support the draft of the law that was prepared by the united working group in the government and that was submitted to the State Duma by the President of Russia. Our position is that we should accelerate the enactment of the law by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

Developed local self-government will be a powerful stabilizing factor in society, and will remove from the state agencies of authority a considerable number of the concerns in organizing the life of the population.

The heads of cities, settlements, rayons, and other agencies of local self-government are ready and willing to be partners, rather than the opponents of state authority. I can state just one thing unambiguously: at the present time, we are making practically no use of the opportunities of the cities or their powerful unifying potential.

Yuriy Seliverstov, chairman of the Belgorod Oblast Duma:

Among the problems that require urgent resolution, the questions of local self-government occupy a special place. However, their concrete realization is being unjustifiably prolonged.

What problems did the oblast Duma and administration collide with?

An analysis of the oblast laws on local self-government in those regions where they were enacted indicates that those laws, as a rule, are of a general, imprecise nature and are frequently extremely contradictory. A federal law is completely nonexistent. And that situation is used very effectively by those who today oppose the reform of local self-government.

Therefore, it would seem to be desirable to take immediate steps to review and enact the law on guaranteeing the constitutional rights of the population to local self-government.

Secondly, many people are afraid that the total reform of local self-government will lead to a collapse of the authority, and, as a result, to the further worsening of the crisis. And, to a large extent, those fears are justified.

Today, when the local budgets of many territories have a share in state subsidies and grants of 50-70 percent, speaking about their complete independence means putting an end to this.

I am not talking about the major cities that have a good tax-forming base and that only win from this kind of scheme. Therefore, it seems to be desirable to define a scheme of local self-government for the transitional period, which scheme would include within itself the self-government of the communities in populated places, rural okrugs, and cities, and simultaneously elements of state regulation along the line of the administration of the rural rayons. At such time the degree of state effect would be influenced by the total amount of subsidies arriving at the local budget from the oblast budget.

Grigoriy Atamanchuk, department head, Russian Academy of State Service:

It is absolutely mandatory to recreate an integrated, coordinated system of instructing administrative personnel on the entire territory of Russia, a system that would carry out retraining, beginning with the rural administration, in a mandatory and consistent procedure. All the subjects of the Federation must have such centers.

Naturally, the question arises: who will train the administrative personnel, and how? The professors and instructors in the field of public opinion, unfortunately, are becoming older and fewer. For a number of reasons, there are almost no young replacements. There are practically no modern scientific works, textbooks, or methodological aids that can be used for instructional purposes. And those publications are constantly limited by economic unprofitability. What is vitally important here is state support, since a nation that does not develop its intellect is doomed to impoverishment.

We are talking about saturating local self-government with specialists in the field of law, administration, politics, sociology, and economics, who have been trained in conformity with world standards. And also who have been trained both for the executive and representative agencies of local self-government, not to mention the state agencies. On the whole this encompasses the replacement personnel with a consideration of the deputy corps, of the order of 1.5 million persons.

Valentin Tubylov, chairman of the Supreme Council of Udmurt Republic:

Enacting a normative act is only half the job. It is also necessary to force it to operate. Unfortunately, problems arise here. We have enacted a law and have held an election, but the self-government still has not started working at full capacity. Why? It is because the interrelations between the agencies of self-government and the state authority, even at the republic level, do not encourage the development of production, and they suppress people's initiative because there is no firm economic base.

Because of the lack of a stable normative base in the financial and budgetary relations, exactly the same relations have developed between the Russian Federation and the regions. I consider it necessary to express my opinion with regard to these questions.

We are beginning to be increasingly aware of the fact that Russia's future is inseparably linked with the development of federalism. After all, it is obvious that it is practically impossible to govern such a tremendous and economically, socially, and ethnically diverse country simply from the center. Therefore decentralization with a consideration of the principles of federalism is an objective and inevitable process.

The legal base that is necessary for this was laid in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It is simply necessary to execute and develop the Constitution. But, practically speaking, much remains unchanged. And this is understandable, inasmuch as the main thing — the budgetary system — remains unchanged. And if one is to be frank about it, that system so far does not have anything in common either with true federalism or with true self-government.

Likely Communist Victory Consequence Aired

954F2508A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English 19-25 May 95 No 19, pp 1, 3

[Article by Dmitry Pushkar: "Moscow Region Votes for a Communist"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nobody in Kolomna expected that elections would be held. Last year the elections to the municipal assembly failed twice in that district: in March and November. This was due to poor attendance, which confirmed that people no longer expected anything from the authorities. However, this time the names of the candidates have attracted the attention of electors.

Names

The election committee poster presents the names in Russian alphabetical order: extreme nationalist Alexei Vedenkin; businessmen Mikhail Guberman, Vasily Zavyalov, Kukharenko and Nikolai Lopukhov; the only female-candidate and model Yelena Mavrodi (the wife of notorious MMM leader, Sergei Mavrodi); opposition Lieutenant-Colonel Stanislav Terekhov; and world-famous Cosmonaut No. 2, Gherman Titov. As a result of the elections, Titov was elected deputy, leaving his immediate opponent far behind.

Morals and Manners

"The level of squabbling? Compared to past elections, it has increased," Anatoly Irgashev, chairman of the district election committee, told *MN*. He then took a moment to think, and added, "Considerably." A thick bundle of complaints is attached to the set of election documents, together with the proceedings record. The population expressed discontent with the fact that one of the candidates stuck his posters all over the walls in the town of Stupino, and bombarded summer country residents with leaflets, dropped from a helicopter. He overdid it. Candidates complained that Vedenkin (he is escorted by a small guard of five to six people) asked for protection against reprisals, scheduled for election day. Candidates also launched complaints against one another for creating disturbances on election day.

Other election methods also aroused a stream of protests. For the time being, organizers of Mavrodi's election campaign decided not to press charges against Vedenkin for writing in one of his election leaflets: "Photo-models to brothels!" Moreover, everyone witnessed how Vedenkin primitively distributed 10,000-ruble bills to future electors. However, he did not buy everyone; apparently, he does not have as much money as he bragged. He received only 6,587 votes out of 230,000.

Guberman, the 54-year-old general manager of the Glukhovsky Tekstil joint-stock company, was runner-up. Employees from his company interceded on his behalf. Before the elections, Guberman's company sold cheap dresses, dressing-gowns, socks and bed-linen in villages. The textile tycoon received the votes of 37,967 electors.

Mavrodi, 25, a beauty married to a wealthy man, also decided to become a Duma deputy. She set up a charitable fund worth one billion rubles and suggested that all electors conclude agreements with her on deputy service. For the first time in world practice, a candidate offered electors a legally registered deal: you elect me, I'll do you good in return. The charity consisted of a lottery, which will be held by the candidate everywhere, and permanently. She won 26,494 votes for home-made irons (and other lottery prizes), which placed her third.

Businessman Lopukhov also held a lottery for electors. The prizes included a Volga and 20 Japanese television sets. The Prosecutor's Office declared the venture to be reprehensible. He was placed fifth.

Zheludovsky, vice-chairman of the election committee, called the campaign of Terekhov "correct" because he did not try to buy electors. However, after reading in a local newspaper that Terekhov was offering free legal advice in the district, he smirked: "This one did not resist temptation either." He held fourth place.

The Outcome

The election campaigns were led by professionals as well as amateurs.

It looks as though Vedenkin led his own campaign. We were not able to learn the details. When he realized that he was talking to *MN*, Vedenkin said: "I hate this paper. When I hear the words *"Moscow News"* I am ready to grab my pistol." I asked: "Can I quote you?" "Yes, please," replied the candidate. Apparently his campaign was organized thoroughly poorly, but he has not given up the habit of threatening with a pistol.

He won in only one constituency: a hospital, where 12 people voted for him, and 11 for Titov.

"The elections in Kolomna were like a cold shower for us," admitted Akhmed Khalitov, general secretary of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] and Zhirinovsky's assistant.

Titov's campaign was managed by Kolomna resident Alla Zaikina. Communists do not have a lot of money. Titov did not appear in Kolomna often, and the weight of the campaign rested on Zaikina's shoulders. Her method is: "We, uninterested people, honest communist fools, went door to door."

Fifty-nine-year-old Colonel-General Titov, a hero of the Soviet Union and a pilot-cosmonaut of the USSR, never parted with his party membership card. He has not been seen at any political activities. He is sufficiently famous, even without a mandate. He does not need the Duma salary. Titov was not afraid to lose, he had no personal interest in victory. He did not even promise electors anything stunning. Zaikina told *MN* that Titov's decision to take part in the election was a party assignment, as the only worthy candidate from the Communist Party. Even in the final hours before the announcement of the election outcome, he was not the least bit worried. The only call she got at the election committee was from Grigory Rebrov, first secretary of the Moscow regional committee of the RF Communist Party.

Mavrodi's image-consultant, Yefim Ostrovsky, predicts a "fantastic attendance" for the December elections to the Duma" up to 65-75 percent. According to him, the present elections cannot be called a duel between money investments; it is more of a competition between paradigms: it was capital and ideas that competed. The national-patriotic idea (Terekhov, Vedenkin, Pavlov) lost, and the socialist idea proved to be stronger than money... for the time being.

*Local Administration Lawbreaking Detailed

954F2440A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 15

[Article by Vladimir Davydov, deputy RF General Procurator: "Level of Arbitrariness: Almost 35,000 Violations of the Law Were Committed During the Year by the Executive Agencies of Local Self-Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As of today the situation in the system of local self-government is typified, on the one hand, by a noticeable increase in the number of violations of laws, and, on the other hand, by a lack of concrete mechanisms for implementing the constitutional right to local self-government, a situation that is substantially impeding the carrying out of the planned reforms.

The norm-making activity that is developing locally is largely distinguished by the administrative *diktat* on the part of the heads of the executive agencies of local self-government, who have concentrated for themselves the basic powers in administering the territories.

The number of revealed violations of laws that were committed by the executive agencies of local self-government in 1994, as compared with 1993, increased by a factor of 1.3, and constituted 34,600, of which 17,500 were illegal acts of law. Most of them were not abolished until upon the demand of agencies of the procuracy. In Bryansk Oblast, out of 400 protests that were made, each sixth one was the reaction of procurators to illegal acts of laws by the heads of the local administration.

The appearance of such a negative tendency is linked primarily with the unmonitored nature of the actions taken by the heads of local self-government and their actual impunity.

V. Bolyak, the head of the administration of Kstovskiy Rayon, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, during the period from 1 September 1993 through 1 November 1994, in violation of the legislation governing the formation and use of nonbudgetary funds, issued to enterprises that had been founded with the right of private ownership, loans from the basic current budget for a total of approximately 5 billion rubles, including interest-free loans for a total amount of more than 2 billion rubles. The same Bolyak, in violation of the Statute on Elections to Local Agencies of Authority on the Territory of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, illegally financed his own election campaign for election to the oblast legislative assembly, at the expense of funds from the local budget. Acting as the founder of the "Sonata" Trading House, Bolyak, by his own directive, granted to that commercial structure as a deposit to the statutory fund a municipal facility for use as an office and trading areas. The illegal decrees and directives of the head of the rayon administration were protested by the procurator. In addition, the procurator's office is reviewing the question of Bolyak's responsibility for the infractions that were committed and concerning the compensation of the losses caused by him to the local self-government.

Scandalous instances of the squandering of municipal housing were revealed in other places. With the connivance and personal self-interestedness of a considerable number of heads of the city (rayon) administration, housing space was frequently used for purposes other than those for which it was intended. By arbitrary acts of those officials in Samara, Vladimir,and other oblasts, apartments that were intended for habitation by persons on a waiting list were illegally turned into official dormitories and were leased to commercial structures. Despite the law, housing areas that were suitable for habitation were converted into nonhousing areas.

In the course of audits by the procuracy in 1993-1994, instances of the arbitrary limitation by administration heads of the rights of property owners and entrepreneurs were established practically everywhere. The examples of such violations are extremely diverse — from the making of official decisions concerning the computation of the volumes of consumer cooperatives and the makeup of municipal property (Bryansk, Kaluga, Penza oblasts) to the creation of artificial hindrances in the sale of housing (Volgograd Oblast), plots of land (Ivanovo Oblast), automobile parts (Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast), and other property (Republic of Karelia, Kaluga, Kamchatka, and Leningad oblasts).

To a large extent in an unmonitored manner the heads of local administrations issue legal acts concerning the increase, or, conversely, the decrease of the amounts of taxes and fees charged to individuals and legal entities, as well as those concerning the freeing of individual enterprises from the payment of taxes (or the granting of tax benefits to them), or from the payment of state duty. Numerous violations by heads of local administrations of tax legislation have been established in the Republic of Tyva, Chuvash Republic, and Belgorod, Penza, Tver, and other oblasts).

There have been instances when, in violation of Paragraph 2 of Article 131 of the RF Constitution, individual heads of local administrations, without taking the population's opinion into consideration, have enacted legal acts that changed the borders of territories.

For example, the head of the Bryansk city administration, with the consent of the oblast administration, enacted the decree "Reorganization of the General Scheme of City Management," dated 18 October 1994, No. 2386, by which, at the oblast center, the administrative-territorial division into rayons was abolished. Taking into consideration the fact that the change in the borders of the territories was carried out without the population's participation, in accordance with the city procurator the illegal decree was canceled.

A question that continues to be a moot one is the question of the legal basis of local self-government in cities of federal importance — in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Until recently, agencies of local self-government were not elected either in Moscow or in St. Petersburg. Moreover, in violation of Article 12 of the RF Constitution, concerning the independence of local self-government, the Moscow City Duma enacted a decree "Procedure and General Principles of Organizing Local Self-Government in the City of Moscow," dated 18 May 1994, No. 28, Paragraph 2 of which stipulates that the implementation of the powers of self-government is carried out by way of the representative and executive agencies of the city's authority — the Moscow City Duma and the mayor of Moscow. Taking into consideration the fact that, factually speaking, that decree usurped the powers of the agencies of self-government, the city's procurator brought this situation to the attention of the deputies to the Moscow City Duma. However, the message sent by the procurator was ignored by the Duma.

And it also revealed other instances of infringement by subjects of the Russian Federation of the population's rights to local self-government. There have been many instances when they forced on the population their own structure of local self-government (Republic of Bakhkortostan, Khabarovsk Kray, Amur, Kostroma, Kurgan, and other oblasts), and interfered in the activities of the agencies of local self-government by means of establishing overview over the local budget and municipal property, up to and including the direct confiscation of part of the funds paid into the budget by a subject of the Russian Federation, and objects of municipal property for conversion to their own property (Republic of Dagestan, Maritime Kray, Astrakhan, Kemerovo, Tyumen, and other oblasts).

The warning messages arriving at the RF General Procuracy indicate that in practically all subjects of the Russian Federation the population's right to local self-government has not yet been implemented in full volume. In most instances this is the result of the lack of a federal law on the general principles of implementing that right. Meanwhile, at the present time it is impossible, simply by measures of procurator reaction, to achieve the execution on the territory of Russia of the requirements of Articles 12, 130-133 of the RF Constitution. Especially since, in addition to the RF Constitution, the edicts of the President of Russia that are devoted to the organization and activity of local self-government continue to be in effect since October 1993. An analysis of the practice of forming agencies of local self-government indicates that, in the course of this work, state agencies of authority were oriented primarily to executing those edicts of the President of Russia.

*Necessary Measures To Prevent Religious Extremism Viewed

954F2316A St. Petersburg SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 17 May 95 p 5

[Article by S. I. Ivanenko, candidate of philosophical sciences (excerpts from a report read at the "Freedom of Conscience and Human Rights in Russia" parliamentary hearings), under "Man and Society" rubric: "Freedom of Conscience Realistic, but Must Be Supported by Well Thought-Out State Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Constitution of the Russian Federation recognizes and guarantees human rights and freedoms in accordance with the principles and norms of international law. Freedom of conscience, that is, the freedom to subscribe to any religion or not to subscribe to any at all, including the right to freedom of choice, to possess or disseminate religious or other convictions, and to act in accordance with them (Article 28), is recognized to be one of the most important human rights.

At present, Russian society's attitude toward religion is mixed, while the portion that believes is of many denominations.

The most numerous and influential religious organizations are the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchy), the Muslims, the Old Believers, the Protestants, and the Buddhists. In all, there are over 40 denominations and different religions.

As a sociological study, representative (characteristic) of all of Russia (at the close of 1994, the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion surveyed 3,000 thousand people), has shown:

56 percent consider themselves Christians;

4 percent—Moslems;
1 percent—followers of other religions;
39 percent—non-believers.

It is clear that the majority of Russians who consider themselves believers are rarely seen in places of worship, and more often than not do not adhere to even the basic precepts of their religion in their everyday lives. Only 2 percent go to a place of worship once a week or more.

In Russia, there is no single approach to choosing a model for the relationship between religious organizations and the state. Part of the Russian public is in favor of establishing equal relations between religious organizations and the state, proposing equality for religious organizations before the law, that there be no denominational priorities in state policy. Another part of society, alluding to the fact that the Orthodox Church has had a powerful impact on the building of Russian statehood and culture, connects the prospect of the country's spiritual rebirth with state support of the Russian Orthodox Church and other traditional Russian denominations.

The reality is that the freedom of conscience and freedom of religious profession guaranteed by the Constitution, including the right to freedom of choice, to possess and disseminate religious and other convictions, and to act in accordance with them (Article 28), is threatened by the anarchy and lack of control that have arisen in this sphere, multiplied by the religious ignorance of the greater portion of the population. Any person or any religious or pseudo-religious organization can appear today in Russia and begin propagandizing its doctrine, creating organizational structures, starting educational programs, etc. if it has the money.

Mysterious Ways

This is an entirely abnormal situation. All over the world, there exists a certain set of rights and obligations for people engaged in missionary work, and, to all appearances, Russia is a kind of incomprehensible exception among other states who function according to the conviction that religious organizations create the spiritual foundation for the state and that the country that fails to care for the solidity of its spiritual foundation places itself at great risk.

Now, nobody in Russia knows how many or what types of missions there are in the country or what they are doing. State organs do not have at their disposal information on the foreign religious organizations and missions that exist in Russia and cannot control their activities. There are 32 foreign missions registered in the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, and some of them have already changed their addresses without informing the ministry, and its employees are unable, even in an emergency, to get in touch with the missionaries. At the same time, according to information from the Christian Information Center (U.S.A.), there are over 400 Christian missions operating in Russia; in 1994, nearly 1500 missionaries from the United States alone entered the country. As a rule, the Ministry of Justice, as well as government organs in Moscow and the provinces, knows almost nothing about them. Besides failing to grant government organs any authorization to control the activities of missions and religious organizations, current legislation also gives them no power to receive information about their activities.

It is no secret that the leaders of the traditional denominations speak in favor of regulating the rights of foreign missionaries. Besides this, many missions engage in proselytizing and creating religious movements and communities that are non-traditional for the country. As a result of missionary activity over recent years, religious organizations previously unknown here have appeared in Russia and consolidated their positions. In the opinion of P. B. Konovalchik, chairman of the Union of Evangelical Christian-Baptists of Russia, at times it is odd people who are taking up missionary work in our country, "whom nobody invited to Russia, and whom no authoritative church has sent here."

In a series of cases, serious contradictions and conflicts have arisen between missionaries and already existing religious organizations. For example, Russian Buddhists were critical of the widespread missionary activity of

AUM Sinrike, a Japanese religious corporation; in 1994, Jewish organizations picketed the "Messianic Jewish Festival" in Moscow, which was put on by American missionaries whose stated goal was to turn Jews to Christianity.

Law and Faith

The governments of various states have to deal with pseudo-religious and extremist groups. In many cases, these conflicts are accompanied by mass victims. For example, in the United States in 1993, in connection with suspicions that the Branch Davidian religious community was holding unregistered weapons, the police took the building where the believers lived by storm. As a result, nearly 100 members of the religious community were killed, including women and children, as well as three policemen.

In Europe until 1994, when the mass self-immolation of the members of the secret Temple of the Sun occult order took place in Switzerland, there weren't as many tragedies. However even in 1986-1987, the question of the danger posed by certain new religious movements for the interests of society and human rights was discussed in the European Parliament as well as the expediency of adopting special laws that would regulate the activities of the new religious movements. In 1990, after a comprehensive study of the problem, the committee of ministers of the European Council ruled the drafting of special legislation regulating the activities of new religious movements unacceptable, as it would violate the principle of equality of all religions before the law. The committee of ministers noted that existing legislation makes it possible to control the activities of new religious movements. Specifically, in Western Europe and in the United States, the law forbids the recruitment of minors into religious organizations and communities without parental approval. Criminal liability awaits those guilty of violating these norms, as well as large fines. This restrains the activity of extremist religious and pseudo-religious groups.

In Russia, there are no analogous, effective, judicial norms. In fact, according to statements by the Committee for the Protection of Youth, several religious organizations (the Bogorodichnyi [Madonna] Center, AUM Sinrike, the Great White Brotherhood) practice the recruitment of minor children into their communities against their parents' will. True, certain steps have been taken to guard society and individuals from extremist religious and pseudo-religious groups. In 1993, the parliament adopted the appropriate amendments to Russia's Criminal Code. Beginning in September 1993, a new edition of Article 143 appeared in it. The first part of it stipulates, for the leaders of religious or public organizations whose activities cause harm to the health of citizens, encroach upon their rights, or hinder their performance of civil duties, punishment in the form of deprivation of freedom for up to three years, or a fine equal to 16 minimum wage salaries. Until now, this article of the Criminal Code has not been applied; nobody has been convicted on it. Besides this, according to the opinion expressed by the 12 May 1994 Memorandum from the Moscow Patriarchy, the amendments to the Criminal Code adopted by the Russian parliament are, themselves, inadequate; "it is necessary that law enforcement organs and the judicial branch aid the application of the law that has been adopted in any way possible. It is possible that the norm that has been introduced into the Criminal Code should be supplemented by certain norms in other areas of the law." However, in the assessment of jurists, article 143 was vaguely formulated, and law enforcement organs do not know how to apply it in practice. In Moscow, at the Taganskiy Intermunicipal Court, a suit brought by the Committee for the Protection of Youth against the AUM Sinrike corporation has already been under examination for several months. No decision has yet been made.

New Religions Most Often Attract People Who Considered Themselves Non-Believers the Day Before

In Russia, the lack of a reliable legal base for limiting the activities of pseudo-religious and extremist organizations has given some of the parents of children who have been recruited into organizations of this type some hope for aid from so-called "deprogrammers." We are speaking of several organizations that appeared in the 1970s in the United States and other countries to fight the new religious movements. Their members believe that the new religious movements use hypnosis and other methods of "programming" the personality, controlling its consciousness and behavior. In order to fight "programming," they practice special psychological methods to incite the person to leave the religious community; they have acquired the name "deprogramming."

Is there some basis to believe that the members of new religious movements are deprived of freedom of will because the leaders subject their psyches to "programming" and strict control? This is a question for discussion; it is now being debated by scientists and journalists. There is one thing we know for sure—no court in any country has concluded that any religious organization has subjected its adherents to "programming," "brain-washing" or manipulating their consciousness. We know something else as well: in the opinion of sociologists, only about 10 percent of the people who join new religious movements remain members; the remaining 90 percent leave them for one reason or another. This fact does not fit the assumptions that there is some kind of strict control over members' consciousness in the new religious movements.

Noticeable changes do, indeed, occur in the consciousness and behavior of people who join new religious movements. The absolute majority of people who have become followers of new religious movements in Russia were non-believers before. The turn toward belief in God may have seemed to observers (for example, non-believing relatives and acquaintances) almost like madness, the result of "programming" or "brain-washing." Belief in God in any of its forms, however, is the result of a serious internal choice made by the person himself; it is impossible to "force" someone to believe who is internally unprepared for it or who does not wish to believe. As a rule, the decision to join a new religious movement is the result of a prolonged search for meaning in life, an attempt to find a way out of a serious life crisis. A person who becomes a member of a religious movement that is non-traditional for Russia (if it does not profess satanism and does not violate criminal legislation), has the right to do this, according to the principle of freedom of conscience and convictions, whether the majority of his co-citizens like is choice or not.

I don't think anybody has the right to take upon himself the role of judge and to decide which new religious teaching carries within itself a spark of truth or whether its appearance is according to the will of God, which teaching is just human invention, and which doctrine has been initiated by the devil to lead people away from the truth. He who tries to judge these things is taking upon himself an enormous responsibility and must have colossal spiritual wisdom, the gift of "amusing the spirits." Regarding teachings that are purely of this world, the end products of human activity within one religious organization or another, the facts show that people are appearing almost constantly all over the world who attempt to create new religious teachings or to reform those that already exist.

Most likely, this is a kind of natural law of spiritual life that we must take into consideration instead of regarding every new religious movement as pseudo-religious extremism. Also, we must not place our stakes on the scientifically, legally, and morally dubious "deprogramming" methods practiced by so-called "anti-cult" organizations.

What the Future Holds For Us

Indisputably, unlike the church, the state can and should apply methods of force in certain cases stipulated by law—if criminal legislation is being violated or human rights flouted—but force cannot be applied indiscriminately. We need objective information about new religious movements in order to firmly establish that we may have an unusual but entirely legal religious activity or that there is extremist or pseudo-religious activity that may lead to the kindling of inter-religious hatred or that the activity violates legal citizens' rights. Unfortunately, Russia still lacks any such organization with that kind of information at its disposal.

In Western Europe, along with freedom of religion for all religions, in many countries the state supports the most authoritative churches: the Anglican in Great Britain, the Catholic in Italy and Spain, the Orthodox in Greece, and the Lutheran in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland.

Each European state, within the framework of general principles of freedom of religion, works out its own norms for relations with religious organizations, for state support of a certain church or several denominations. It is striking that the West European model of state-church relations excludes discrimination against religious minorities and provides for real freedom of conscience for every citizen.

In Russia, the model of state-church relations has undergone cardinal changes several times over the course of the 20th century.

Since 1988, religious organizations have been coming out of an isolation that was created artificially by numerous prohibitions, while believers and the clergy have ceased to be "second-class" citizens. A legislative consolidation of international standards in the sphere of human rights and the assurance of freedom of conscience, as well as equality of all religious organizations before the law, is taking place.

This transition from the former, strictly regimented activities of religious organizations to a new system of state-church relations has been accompanied by a noticeable worsening in inter-religious relations, a new urgency to old contradictions, and the appearance of new conflicts.

A substantial contribution toward improving inter-religious relations, toward the formation of a constructive state-church relationship could be made by the expert consulting council in the State Duma Committee on the Affairs of Public Associations and Religious Organizations. Now it provides for participation by representatives of the six leading traditional religious organizations. Taking into consideration that the former membership in the expert consulting council (1992) included representatives of nine denominations, including Old Believers, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Pentecostals, it would seem useful to broaden the representation of religious organizations in the current membership in the expert consulting council. It might even be useful to include a representative of the Russian division of the International Association for the Defense of Religious Freedom, which has earned a high level of authority both in Russia and throughout the world.

Kazakhstan

Statehood Evolution, Crime, Power Analyzed

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[Article by Leonid Nikitinsky: "Kazakhstan Wavers Between Strength and Law"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In Alma-Ata one can witness the thin sheet of ice separating us from the dark slough of "socialism," with all of its charms like "socialist legality."

Kazakhstan, where mainly Russian is spoken, is too close to Russia for one to take a detached view of the situation. Everything here is recognizable, including the problems, but at the same time they acquire the features of a prophetic parody.

Kazakhstan's "legal field" is being structured under the influence of two extreme poles. One is represented by the country's Minister of Justice Nagashybai Shaikenov. The other pole is the State Counsellor, Kairbek Suleimenov, who is also a high-ranking official of the presidential apparat.

Shaikenov was born in the Orenburg Region and graduated from the Sverdlovsk Institute of Law. He worked under the prominent lawyer Sergei Alexeyev, becoming one of his favorite pupils, and received a Doctor of Science. After the USSR disintegrated Shaikenov felt he should return home. Upon the invitation of Nursultan Nazarbayev, Shaikenov moved to Kazakhstan and headed the Ministry of Justice.

Explaining his position in the struggle for legal reform, as well as in relation to the country's balance of forces, Shaikenov says:

"Whatever we, on the remains of the former USSR, take for a crisis in parliamentary or judicial institutions tends in actual fact to hide a different problem: the crisis of executive authority. We live in conditions of sham democracy when society is moulding a request for despotic forms of government. The growth of crime has been a by-product of the weakening of the ruling element. And here we find that against the backdrop of the collapse of other government departments it is the power structures alone —the KGB, the Interior Ministry and the Prosecutor's Office — that have retained relative stability. The ruling regime has nothing else to rely on except these structures which have survived thanks to the rigidity of their inner connections, permeated with authoritarianism and mutual guarantee. But they, amounting as they do to the last bastion of authoritarianism, have practically not been reformed."

Nevertheless Shaikenov believes that emphasis must be given to legal reform, not simply reform of the power structures. When he arrived in Kazakhstan the teaching staff at the institutions of higher learning had already been halved — people had gone into business and politics or had left for Russia. Moreover, the number of educational establishments issuing legal diplomas had increased here twentyfold. Needless to say, tuition was not free.

With great difficulty Shaikenov managed to end this mess, having annulled the licenses and creating the Institute of Law in Alma-Ata. But this is only the first part of the task. Now there is a need to create a new system for the placement of graduates, and for this it is important to destroy the existing system.

"In the past all threads converged in the department of administrative bodies at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, from where Kairbek Suleimenov could pull any investigator or judge like a puppet," says Shaikenov. "Today the same Kairbek Suleimenov is the chief in the apparat handling legal matters. And he has continued placing people in key posts, not only in the Prosecutor's Office and the militia, but also in the courts."

Nobody in Kazakhstan has yet even approached reforming the judicial system, but the problems and proposals being discussed here are the same as in Russia. In Shaikenov's view, the judge must be independent primarily from the chairman of the court, and lower-grade (people's) courts — from the superior ones. Under no circumstances must the selection, placing and dismissal of judges be entrusted to the chairmen of the courts and higher judicial organs. The financing of the judicial system, carried out as a separate line in the state budget, must be overturned from head to foot in favor of rank-and-file judges. In the field of criminal justice — while retaining the functions of instituting criminal proceedings, supervision and support for the prosecution in court at the hand of the Prosecutor's Office — there is a need to separate it from the bodies of investigation, for which purpose an investigation committee must be set up.

Even a summary of this program makes it possible to grasp what kind of resistance it has aroused among the close-knit nomenklatura upper crust of "law-enforcement bodies," as well as the bodies of executive authority. Suleimenov, who, in contrast to Shaikenov, is indeed an experienced practical worker, has advanced as a counterbalance to the latter's legal reform a program to fight crime.

And crime is really being reduced, but at the cost of human rights. The militia in Kazakhstan has been quantitatively swollen, its ranks having been joined by persons who, under a different system of legal education, would have most likely found themselves on the dock. The population of Alma-Ata has been terrorized by roundups which sweep both right and wrong with equal success. Shaikenov says that it is impossible to speak about terror in Kazakhstan because here the facts of political persecutions are wanting in contrast to neighboring Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. Indeed, for the time being the situation in the republic may be qualified rather as commonplace "police brutality." However, all the mechanisms being used are also quite suitable for political reprisals if someone considers them to be indispensable. Such are the costs making it possible for Suleimenov to demonstrate success in the struggle against crime and to persuade Nazarbayev that it is his "operation law and order," in contrast to Shaikenov's "utopias," that is making the difference. Shaikenov, for his part, believes that he is being supported by grassroots judges and by the president. However, the former do not decide anything in a system where the nomenklatura has been left untouched. Furthermore, if Suleimenov thinks he is supported by the president, he is deluding himself. In all probability, like a real eastern ruler, Nazarbayev deliberately keeps under him these two uncompromising antagonists whom he can use depending on the development of the political situation.

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